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Proceeding through a series of case studies centred on the representation of African 
dictatorships, this work re-examines the relationship between the political and the 
aesthetic in current approaches to postcolonial themes. The texts analysed are in 
French and in English, and range across literature, film and social science. Following 
a number of recent interventions in the field of postcolonial criticism which have 
placed renewed emphasis on the aesthetic and the literary, this thesis questions the 
nature of the political resistance that critics sometimes ascribe to certain aesthetic 
practices. 
However, contrary to recent analyses which have construed the future of postcolonial 
criticism as an alternative between a ‘political turn’ and an ‘aesthetic turn’ (for 
example Bongie 2008 & 2010), my thesis contests the notion that criticism can only 
be legitimized by either an evaluative conception of aesthetics or a commitment to 
progressive politics. Instead, this work argues for a form of criticism that would 
place the complexity of aesthetic experiences at the heart of its investigations, and 
shows how representations of African dictatorships offer a privileged opportunity to 
understand the mutual embeddedness of the political and the aesthetic. In this way, I 
hope both to intervene in current methodological debates animating postcolonial 
studies and other forms of politicized criticism, and to offer new insights into a major 
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Following the emergence of a number of politicized fields such as postcolonial, 
queer, or feminist studies, politics and aesthetics have increasingly been seen as 
antagonistic concerns in the practice of literary and cultural criticism. Focusing on a 
series of case studies centred on the representation of African dictatorships, this 
thesis will question this opposition by showing how political approaches to texts 
often rely on an unacknowledged investment in the aesthetic. I will take as a starting 
point a series of theoretical debates that have emerged in the field of postcolonial 
criticism in order to explore the contradictory, and often incompatible, pressures that 
define current approaches to political themes. I will insist, following a number of 
recent interventions, on the heterogeneity between the aesthetic or literary 
subversions celebrated by critics and the political resistance that they are often said 
to constitute. However, my argument contests the notion that critical interpretations 
can only be legitimized by either an evaluative conception of aesthetics or a 
commitment to progressive politics, because both ideas fail to do justice to the reality 
of aesthetic experience. Instead, I will argue that a deeper awareness of the relation 
between these different concerns – which on some levels fail to coincide, and on 
others, intersect in complex ways – should be central to the practice of criticism. 
The theme of post-independence dictatorships in Africa offers an ideal focus to 
examine these issues. The topic is illustrative of themes and questions which have 
been central to the field of postcolonial criticism, and mobilizes very directly the 
entanglement between politics and aesthetics that is central to my argument. 
Dictatorship is not only an explicitly political theme, but the phenomenon itself also 
implies a very concrete politicization of arts and literature, through the use of 
censorship and propaganda. Moreover, the continuities between the forms of colonial 
domination and of dictatorial oppression in many African countries, as well as the 
close ties between African despots and ex-colonial powers (particularly in the case of 
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the infamous ‘Françafrique’), constitute a potent example of the complex relations 
between the colonial and post-colonial eras, which have come to infuse the ‘post’ in 
‘postcolonial’ with multiple and conflicting meanings.1 Such a subject thus seems to 
confer an immediate political relevance to the works that deal with it.  
Accordingly, in a previous work about filmic and literary representations of African 
dictatorships, Mariama Baldé argued that these representations, because of their 
subject matter, are necessarily ‘anti-despotic’: 
Les auteurs qui ont représenté le dictateur africain défient la loi du parti unique en sortant du 
schéma de la voix unique et de l’unique expression. Leurs œuvres s’opposent d’emblée au 
régime qu’ils figurent. Parce qu’elles posent une interrogation bannie, font entendre des voix 
étouffées, lèvent le voile sur ce qui est caché, profanent ce qui est sacralisé et revalorisent ce 
qui a été avili, ces œuvres sont d’entrée de jeu anti-despotiques.
2
 
This could be understood in several ways. On a first level, many of the works 
produced about African dictatorships contain an explicit or veiled criticism of these 
regimes, and it may seem legitimate to describe them as ‘anti-despotic’ on this 
account. However, it seems that Baldé also implies that the works possess an 
oppositional value in a stronger sense: she depicts literary and filmic representations 
of dictatorship as a form of counter-censorship, and as a means to retrieve the 
questions and voices dictatorial regimes have repressed. The phrasing suggests that 
novels and films about dictatorship constitute an actual challenge to the real 
dictatorial regimes on which their (predominantly fictional) subjects have been 
modelled. The desire to transcend the distinction between reality and fiction in order 
to make claims for the political significance of texts is, I think, central to the 
attraction of the topic and, as I will examine in Chapter 1, some writers have skilfully 
capitalized on this urge. However, the rest of this thesis will question the 
assumptions that underlie this sort of approach: many of these works would be 
                                                          
1
See for instance the recent synthetic account of postcolonialism in Jane Hiddleston, Understanding 
Postcolonialism (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2009), pp. 1-5. In the following pages I use the hyphenated 
version ‘post-colonial’ as a chronological marker, in order to refer to the era that followed formal 
colonization. I use the term ‘postcolonial’ to refer to the complex, multi-directional relations that link 
the colonial and the post-colonial periods, and to the body of theoretical and critical works which 
examine these relations.  
2
 Mariama Samba Baldé Cissé, ‘Le Dictateur d’Afrique noire dans la littérature et le cinéma 
francophones de 1963 à 2000. Une analyse des représentations’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Saint-
Denis: Université Paris VIII- Saint Denis, 2007), p. 685. 
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deeply oppositional and subversive within the universe they describe, but in spite of 
Baldé’s insistence on immediacy (‘d’emblée’, ‘d’entrée de jeu’), there is no reason to 
assume that their (fictional) universe will coincide with the actual context of either 
their production or their reception.  
Furthermore, the ways in which we, as critics, come to interpret this supposedly 
‘anti-despotic’ dimension are situated and inflected by our own situation in wider 
political contexts that do not necessarily coincide with the dictatorial situation to 
which the texts refer. In his pioneering study on the status of art in Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Republic, entitled Art Under a Dictatorship, Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt 
suggested that dictators are actually more insightful than democratic leaders when it 
comes to assessing the significance of art:  
One of the reasons so many people find it difficult to take these things seriously is an 
ingrained indifference to art, a traditional reluctance to accept art as a direct social force of 
extraordinary magnitude. The dictators in authoritarian states have understood this fact far 
more promptly and more thoroughly than any of the leaders of democratic societies.
3
 
In Lehmann-Haupt’s account, dictatorship is a regime in which the critic is no longer 
isolated in his or her concern with art, and where critics’ own belief in its 
‘subversive’ and ‘radical’ nature is shared by the highest authorities. Thus, according 
to Lehmann-Haupt, the modern dictator ‘does not think of arts as a luxury or a 
pastime, a pleasant embellishment of life’ but ‘has a very healthy respect’ for it.4 My 
own approach to this topic will suggest that the political dimension of art or literature 
is not actually ‘understood’ by dictators, but in fact shaped, and even produced, by 
these regimes, whereas the ‘reluctance’ of democracies to treat art as a political 
matter is partly linked to the kind of freedom that art and artists are granted (which is 
also political, albeit in a different way). Art or literature can certainly be ‘subversive’ 
in a democratic context, but probably not for the same reasons or in quite the same 
way as in a dictatorship. For instance, those conceptions of literature that insist on its 
polysemy, ambiguity, or inexhaustibility of meaning as forms of resistance to 
dominant meanings and discourses are inscribed within a more general context, 
                                                          
3
 Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, Art Under a Dictatorship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 
xviii. 
4
 Ibid., p. xviii. 
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where the literary text is recognized as somehow exceptional and, because its 
meaning can never be contained by one given interpretation, partly exempted from 
the responsibilities and liabilities of other discourses.5 However, these interpretations 
are not necessarily those that would lead these texts to be censored by actual 
dictatorial regimes. In many cases, these works would not be read as ‘literature’ or 
‘art’ in the way I have just described, but directly made accountable for their political 
‘message’.6 Therefore, instead of a celebration of the supposed radicality or 
subversiveness of the works under discussion, this thesis will carry out a critical 
analysis of our desire to seek such qualities. In the following pages, I will take my 
own attempt to treat the subject of African dictatorships and, more precisely, my own 
impulse to examine a political theme through a series of primarily fictional and 
artistic representations, as a test case for the tensions or even contradictions that 
define postcolonial and other forms of politicized criticism. This will lead to an 
argument about the importance of aesthetic experience to the work of criticism, even 
when it is concerned with a topic as obviously political as dictatorship. 
                                                          
5
 My understanding of this link between a certain form of democratic freedom of expression, the 
institution of literature and its ambiguous ‘irresponsibility’ is partly inspired by Derrida’s reflexions in 
‘“This Strange Institution Called Literature”. An Interview with Jacques Derrida [1989]’, in Acts of 
Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-75 (p. 38). 
6
 For instance, in a discussion of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s play The Trial of Dedan Kimathi Oliver 
Lovesey supports his approach by referring to Ngũgĩ’s arrest and imprisonment by the Kenyan 
authorities in December 1977. Lovesey argues that in breaking the ‘fourth wall’ and in including the 
audience, the play performed a metaphorical subversion of the national space: ‘Every night of its [The 
Trial of Dedan Kimathi’s] brief run, the audience broke the conceptual fourth wall separating 
audience and actors, and they sang and danced inside and outside the theater, breaking out of the 
enclosed free space of the theater and, in the state's view, challenging its control of national space. 
The punishment for violating the state's control of space was Ngugi’s imprisonment and exile’. Oliver 
Lovesey, ‘Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s Postnation: The Cultural Geographies of Colonial, Neocolonial, and 
Postnational Space’, MFS Modern Fiction Studies, 48 (2002), 139-168 (pp. 149-150). In this passage, 
Lovesey is invoking Ngũgĩ’s persecution by the state to confer a direct political import to his 
interpretation of Ngũgĩ’s ‘defamiliarization’. In reality, the persecution of Ngũgĩ was not the direct 
consequence of this particular play, which was written in English and performed at the Kenya 
National Theatre, in front of a mostly middle-class audience, but happened after the prohibition of his 
1977 play I Will Marry When I Want, which was in Gikuyu, was produced in the countryside and 
involved rural populations in the performances. The Trial of Dedan Kimathi was indeed controversial, 
but not in the way Lovesey’s interpretation suggests: according to Simon Gikandi, ‘when [The Trial of 
Dedan Kimathi] was produced at the National Theatre in Nairobi in 1976, opposition toward it did not 
come from the Kenyatta government, but from established settler interests who tried to stifle it using 
their powerful connections in the office of the Attorney General’. Simon Gikandi, Ngugi wa Thiong’o 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 183. In attributing his own analysis of the play to 
the state, Lovesey probably overemphasized the political relevance of his own concern for Ngũgĩ’s 
subversion of the aesthetics of drama, and ignored elements which were probably more essential for 
the government, such as the identity of the audience. 
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*   * 
* 
Dictators have figured abundantly in representations of Africa after independence 
and have inspired many works of literature.7 In the Francophone field, one could 
mention numerous examples, such as Alioum Fantouré’s Le Cercle des tropiques 
(1972), Sony Labou Tansi’s famous novels La Vie et demie (1979) and L’Etat 
honteux (1981), Henri Lopes’s Le Pleurer-rire (1982), Doumbi Fakoly’s La Retraite 
anticipée du Guide Suprême (1984), Aminata Sow Fall’s L’Ex-Père de la Nation 
(1987), or Ahmadou Kourouma’s En attendant le vote des bêtes sauvages (1998), as 
well as several plays, including Maxime N’Débéka’s Le Président (1970) and 
Tchicaya U Tam’si’s Le Destin glorieux du Maréchal Nnikon Nniku, prince qu’on 
sort (1979). Comparably, in the Anglophone field the theme has been addressed by a 
number of prominent writers, among whom are Nurrudin Farah (the trilogy 
Variations on the Theme of an African Dictatorship, which is composed of the 
novels Sweet and Sour Milk (1979), Sardines (1981), and Close Sesame (1985)), 
Chinua Achebe (Anthills of the Savannah (1986)), Wole Soyinka (A Play of Giants 
(1984) and King Baabu (2001)) and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (Wizard of the Crow 
(2006)).  
African dictators and dictatorships have also been the subject of a number of films, 
particularly documentaries (such as Barbet Schroeder’s Général Idi Amin Dada: 
Autoportrait (1974), Werner Herzog’s Echoes from a Somber Empire (1990), 
Thierry Michel’s Mobutu, Roi du Zaïre (1999) or, more recently, Lucy Bailey and 
Andrew Thompson’s Mugabe and the White African (2009)), but also fiction films 
by African filmmakers (notably Balufu Bakupa-Kanyinda’s Le Damier, Papa 
national, Oyé! (1996)) as well as American or European directors (among the most 
successful, Sydney Pollack’s The Interpreter (2005), and Kevin MacDonald’s The 
Last King of Scotland (2006)). In addition, African dictators have been widely 
depicted and parodied in popular culture. One may think for instance of the 
appearance of the fictional dictator Dibala in the sixth season of the medical TV 
                                                          
7
 Lydie Moudileno describes it as a ‘topos’ of post-independence African literature. Lydie Moudileno, 




show House (2009), or of the Simpsons episode ‘Simpson Safari’ (2001), in which 
the family travels to an African country officially called ‘Pepsi Presents New 
Zanzibar’, ruled by the dictator Muntu, who just ‘seized power in a bloodless coup – 
all smothering’.8 The prevalence of the theme makes it hard to delimit the corpus of 
dictatorship novels or films as it appears in the background of many works, as well 
as in many representations of the continent, which do not necessarily take 
dictatorship as their main topic. This difficulty is made even greater by the fact that 
the phenomenon itself is hard to define: dictatorship is an extremely vague political 
category and also a polemical one, which has been applied to very heterogeneous 
political regimes. In this introduction and in the rest of the thesis, I am therefore 
focusing on a few significant examples, in which the theme is absolutely central and 
where the regimes depicted are explicitly described as dictatorial.  
In addition to a significant number of articles and studies dedicated to specific works 
or authors, representations of African dictatorships have been the object of three 
monographs.9 These monographs have offered comprehensive accounts of the image 
of the dictator as it emerges from their respective corpuses (mostly centred on 
Francophone writings) and have successfully identified recurring thematic and 
formal features. But they have paid little attention to what will be at the centre of my 
own discussion, namely the relation between the aesthetic dimension of the texts and 
their political subject matter. For instance, in the most recent of these works, 
Mamadou Kalidou Ba’s Le Roman africain francophone post-colonial (2009), the 
two aspects are considered but neatly separated: 
Ainsi, à travers un corpus de onze romans écrits par dix auteurs issus de sept nationalités 
différentes en Afrique francophone, l’on envisage d’étudier d’abord les caractéristiques 
psychiques du dictateur, les fondements de l’exercice de son pouvoir, ensuite les réalités 
cachées de l’iceberg que constituent les régimes oligarchiques africains, avant de terminer 
par les options narratives et la satire qui se dégage de l’attitude des narrateurs face aux tyrans. 
Ce travail qui se veut une sorte de radioscopie des dictatures dépeintes par les romanciers 
                                                          
8
 Mark Kirkland, ‘Simpson Safari’, The Simpsons (Fox, 2001). 
9
 Koffi Anyinefa, Littérature et politique en Afrique noire: socialisme et dictature comme thèmes du 
roman congolais d’expression française (Bayreuth: Eckhard Breitinger/Bayreuth University, 1990); 
Baldé Cissé; Mamadou Kalidou Ba, Le Roman africain francophone post-colonial: radioscopie de la 
dictature à travers une narration hybride (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009). 
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africains francophones de la “seconde génération” a aussi l’ambition de mettre en exergue 
leur génie littéraire qui se manifeste dans l’esthétique qui caractérise leurs œuvres.
10
 
As announced in this passage, the texts are first subjected to a broadly documentary 
approach which uses the concepts of psychology and political science, and only then 
examined as aesthetic objects. Besides, although Ba insists that the literary character 
of the texts calls for specific attention to their formal and narrative aspects, it seems 
that this literariness has no impact on Ba’s project to use these novels as 
documentary sources. Thus Ba’s first chapter, which offers a psychological diagnosis 
of the predominantly fictional dictators of his corpus, is motivated by the necessity to 
gain a better understanding of the mechanisms of real dictatorial regimes:  
Il paraît donc nécessaire, pour mieux décrypter les systèmes dictatoriaux basés sur la volonté 
unilatérale d’un homme, de voir dans la personnalité de celui-ci ce qui l’incite à adopter un 
type particulier de comportement. La position “avant-gardiste” de ce chapitre est donc avant 
tout motivée par la nécessité de faciliter la compréhension des mécanismes de la dictature.
11
  
Throughout his study, Ba constantly reaffirms the continuity between the fictional 
portrayals offered by African novelists and the real-life figures on which they are 
modelled (‘les romanciers négro-africains des “soleils des indépendances” exagèrent 
très peu lorsqu’ils dépeignent des dictateurs mégalomanes aspirant à la surhumanité’) 
and, surprisingly, the possibility of gaining reliable knowledge of actual postcolonial 
dictatorships from a reading of these (fictional) texts is never seriously challenged.12 
My aim, however, is not to oppose the naiveté of this approach with proclamations 
about the alleged self-referentiality of all literature. On the contrary, I believe that 
Ba’s impulsion to link novels about dictatorship to the political realities they evoke 
should be taken seriously, and that the desire to gain an understanding of these 
regimes constitutes a legitimate reason to get interested in these texts. But this issue 
cannot be examined in isolation from the literariness that Ba relegates to the end of 
his study. In the following chapters, I will therefore try to bring together the two 
dimensions that Ba keeps separated, and to examine the interconnections between the 
                                                          
10
 Ba, p. 13. 
11
 Ba, p. 17. 
12
 Ibid., p. 20. 
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aesthetic and the impulse toward political realities in the representation of African 
dictatorships.  
*   * 
* 
In placing an emphasis on these issues, my work follows a number of recent works 
which have called for a re-examination of the relationship between politics and 
aesthetics in postcolonial criticism. On the face of it, postcolonial criticism, like a 
number of other politicized fields, seems to displace the focus of critical attention 
away from the aesthetic and towards the political. The institutionalization of the field 
and the inclusion of postcolonial literatures in the academic curriculum have been 
achieved not only through a reconsideration of ‘Eurocentric’ aesthetic hierarchies, 
but also through a radical critique of the aesthetic itself, and more precisely of the 
notion of aesthetic autonomy. Thus, in his widely influential studies Orientalism 
(1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993), Edward Said challenged existing 
conceptions of literary autonomy by exposing the complicity of canonical works of 
literature with imperialist domination. This defiance of postcolonial criticism 
towards a certain notion of the aesthetic means not only that canonical texts can no 
longer be exempted from political and ideological scrutiny in the name of aesthetic 
value, but that the aesthetic in general has become increasingly suspected of offering 
a convenient alibi for the marginalization of non-canonical, ‘non-Western’ cultural 
productions and for the propagation of imperialist ideas. As Elleke Boehmer notes, a 
phrase such as ‘postcolonial aesthetic’ has come to represent ‘a contradiction in 
terms; even an oxymoron’.13 This has had important effects on the general rhetoric of 
the field: as Ato Quayson and Theo Goldberg argue, postcolonial criticism is not 
organized around a distinctive methodology but articulated around a number of 
extra-textual referents, such as (neo-)colonial domination, or migration and exile, 
which provide its ‘enabling pre-text’ and orient the way texts are approached.14 Thus 
                                                          
13
 Elleke Boehmer, ‘A Postcolonial Aesthetic: Repeating Upon the Present’, in Rerouting the 
Postcolonial: New Directions for the New Millennium, ed. by Janet Wilson, Cristina Sandru and Sarah 
Lawson Welsh (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 170-181 (p. 170). 
14
 Relocating Postcolonialism, ed. by David Theo Goldberg and Ato Quayson (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2002), p. xii. 
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Stephen Slemon in his essay ‘The Scramble for Post-Colonialism’ could assert 
vigorously: ‘I believe that post-colonial studies needs always to remember that its 
referent in the real world is a form of political, economic, and discursive oppression 
whose name, first and last, is colonialism’.15 As Quayson and Goldberg suggest, a 
consequence of this political emphasis is that the analyses of postcolonial critics are 
often ‘proffered as attempts at rectifying disorders in the extra-textual world of social 
relations’.16 In other words, the legitimacy of the field appears to be founded on the 
political project it supports, rather than on the aesthetic value of the objects it studies. 
But in spite of this apparent rejection of the aesthetic in favour of politics, the fact 
remains that a significant proportion of postcolonial critics still tend to privilege 
either canonical European texts or ‘cosmopolitan’ and highly ‘literary’ postcolonial 
works in their analyses. This has sometimes been perceived as a contradiction and a 
weakness. Indeed, if one is primarily interested in culture because of its ideological 
and political influence, there is no obvious rationale for focusing on literary texts, 
especially ‘canonical’ works, as their audience is somewhat limited compared to that 
of, say, ‘airport’ novels and popular TV shows.17 Even those disciplines which, like 
cultural studies, focus on non-canonical cultural productions still have to contend 
with the fact that if one is primarily interested in correcting political injustice and 
promoting progressive political agendas, it is not clear that any kind of expert 
cultural interpretation is a priority, compared with actual political activism.18 The 
marginalization of criticism as a political discourse is determined by larger historical, 
                                                          
15
 Stephen Slemon, ‘The Scramble for Post-Colonialism’, in De-Scribing Empire: Post-Colonialism 
and Textuality, ed. by Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 15-32 (p. 31). 
16
 Goldberg and Quayson, p. xii. 
17
 This issue was raised by Chris Bongie in his essay ‘Exiles on Main Stream’ (2003), which examines 
the ‘failed dialogue’ between the field of postcolonial literary studies and that of cultural studies.Chris 
Bongie, ‘Exiles on Main Stream: Valuing the Popularity of Postcolonial Literature’, Postmodern 
Culture, 14 (2003) <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v014/14.1bongie.html> 
[accessed 22 February 2010].  
18
 Although this legacy constitutes an important source of anxiety, much work in cultural studies relies 
on analytical tools and theories that are directly derived from literary criticism, as is particularly well 
exemplified by the influence of semiotic theory in the field. As Rita Felski writes: ‘To confuse an 
interest in popular culture with a sociological stress on content is to mistake the essence of the cultural 
studies project. […] By training their eye on works once dismissed as aesthetically unworthy, cultural 
critics challenged the opposition between formally sophisticated high art and content-driven mass 
culture. It now seems obvious that many popular forms, from rap music to sitcoms, from science 
fiction novels to slasher movies, rely on a sophisticated manipulation of stylistic conventions’. Rita 
Felski, ‘The Role of Aesthetics in Cultural Studies’, in The Aesthetics of Cultural Studies, ed. by 
Michael Bérubé (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 28-43 (p. 33).  
14 
 
cultural and political factors that are largely independent of critics’ own choice of 
topics or emphasis.19 These have to do for instance with the institutional setting in 
which much literary or cultural criticism is pursued, which implies that the 
circulation of these works often remains confined to a limited, academic audience, 
which shares certain specialized vocabularies. This situation is itself linked to wider 
social conceptions and assumptions concerning the role of literature and art in 
relation to politics. 
All this suggests that in spite of its politicized rhetoric, postcolonial criticism, in so 
far as it still mostly deals with literary/aesthetic objects and methods of 
interpretation, cannot easily be justified by its impact as a political activity. Nicholas 
Harrison thus points out in a recent article that Said’s persistent attachment to high 
culture and canonical literature ‘raises unanswered questions – and doubts – about 
the relative significance of canonical texts, in their ideological impact, compared 
with numerous other texts and non-textual factors’.20 Indeed, even when it explicitly 
privileges political over aesthetic/literary concerns, the work that is carried out by 
postcolonial critics remains inextricably invested in the aesthetic value of literature (a 
fact that Said appears to have been less reluctant to admit than many other 
practitioners in the field). Criticism is a practice which presupposes that the cultural 
products on which it focuses have a specific value (distinct from its social utility, for 
instance), and that in consequence, works of art or literature must be the object of 
specific modes of attention (which often focus on ‘form’), distinct from other reading 
and interpretive practices. Its procedures are not only enabled or motivated by the 
‘aesthetic’ value of the objects it studies, but also constitute a means to ‘actualize’ 
and reveal this value, which is already assumed to exist, and tacitly or explicitly 
justifies critics’ interpretations. The same goes for a practice like postcolonial 
criticism, whose contestation of the distinctiveness of the aesthetic is in fact 
implicitly organized around it. This inevitable dependency of politicized forms of 
criticism on the very notion of the aesthetic that they seek to challenge is well 
captured by John Guillory: ‘If Shakespeare’s plays, for example, can be received or 
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 This argument was provocatively developed by Stanley Eugene Fish, Professional Correctness: 
Literary Studies and Political Change (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), p. 51. 
20
 Nicholas Harrison, ‘“A Roomy Place Full of Possibility”: Said’s Orientalism and the Literary’, in 




“used” as moral exempla for adolescent schoolchildren, as monuments of nationalist 
pride, as the cultural capital of the educated classes, they are only capable of these 
“nonaesthetic” uses because they are classified as (canonical) works of art’.21 
Likewise, whether postcolonial critics choose to engage with this aspect or not, the 
potential value of their analyses in detecting political complicities or subversions in 
the works they study is tied to the value implicitly attributed to art or literature, i.e. to 
the aesthetic.  
These arguments were recently extended by Eli Sorensen’s study Postcolonial 
Studies and the Literary, which explores not only the implicit investment of 
postcolonial criticism in the aesthetic value of literature, but exposes some of the 
manoeuvres through which this investment has been given a political significance. 
According to Sorensen, the field is organized around what he calls a ‘modernist 
ethos’, through which postcolonial critics perform a ‘“tacit”, allegorizing leap’ 
between a modernist and somewhat confined conception of literary and political 
resistance, relying on ‘the uncritical assumption that a set of politically subversive 
concepts corresponds to formal disruption, meta-fictive strategies and labyrinths of 
narrative structures’.22 Traces of these assumptions can be detected in many analyses 
of novels about African dictatorship. For instance, a recent article on Ngũgĩ wa 
Thiong’o’s Wizard of the Crow argues: 
the form of Ngũgĩ wa Thiongo’s Wizard of the Crow challenges the Ruler’s hegemony. In my 
analysis, the novel’s narrators and Ngũgĩ’s inventive use of rumor, prolepsis, and metalepsis 
work to create pluralistic modes of community that counteract the autocratic repressive 
politics of the novel’s dictator. This analysis adds a distinctively political dimension to the 
work of narrative theorists like Gérard Genette, Mark Currie, and Brian Richardson, reading 
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Here, the formal devices examined by the critic are supposedly given a ‘distinctively 
political dimension’ because they are said to serve as signs of ‘resistance’ and 
opposition to the dictator. However, the dictator under discussion is a fictional one 
and only a character in a novel. Consequently, this ‘political dimension’ exists only 
within the fiction, and is distinct from the nonfictional world in which the novel has 
been written and read, and where actual dictatorships are located – often far from the 
places where postcolonial academic criticism is circulated and produced. Claims to a 
‘distinctively political’ dimension may thus seem slightly disconnected from what 
the article actually achieves, i.e. a careful and technical analysis of Ngũgĩ’s narrative 
structure. In this example, one may see a response to a number of pressures towards 
the politicization of literary criticism: a reading which simply highlighted the formal 
complexities of the text, and celebrated ‘Ngũgĩ’s inventive use of rumor, prolepsis, 
and metalepsis’ as a set of ‘literary’ qualities with no specific political significance 
might appear irrelevant, and would lend itself to accusations of having 
‘depoliticized’ the text.  
Such attempts to draw equivalences between the textual and the political have 
constituted one of the most disputed but also one of the most engaging aspects of 
postcolonial criticism. It has been particularly crucial to that strand of the discipline 
sometimes referred to as ‘textualist’. Central to this approach is the notion that 
political phenomena such as colonialism not only manifest themselves through 
material conditions, but also operate through ‘discursive apparatuses’. For instance, 
in a 1994 article entitled ‘The Textuality of Empire’, Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson 
wrote: 
Imperial relations may have been established initially by guns, guile and disease, but they 
were maintained in their interpellative phase largely by textuality, both institutionally as 
scholars like Gauri Viswanathan (1989) have shown, and informally. Colonialism (like its 
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counterpart, racism), then, is an operation of discourse, and as an operation of discourse it 
interpellates colonial subjects by incorporating them in a system of representation.
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Comparably, Bill Ashcroft’s Post-Colonial Transformation (2001) defines the post-
colonial as ‘not a chronological period but a range of material conditions and a 
rhizomic pattern of discursive struggles, ways of contending with various specific 
forms of colonial oppression’, thus placing the material and discursive aspects of the 
post-colonial predicament on the same level, and implicitly conflating the two levels 
under the phrase ‘various forms of colonial oppression’.25 A central manoeuvre of 
this type of criticism has been to use this textual understanding of social and political 
realities to revise binary oppositions such as colonizer/colonized, or 
oppression/resistance, in order to create a new range of concepts emphasizing instead 
the ambiguous forms of interdependency and ambivalence that link the previously 
opposed terms. Homi Bhabha’s work on the notions of ‘mimicry’, ‘liminality’, and 
‘hybridity’, is perhaps the most famous example of this investment in the 
‘interstitial’. In Bhabha’s arguments, as in much of the research in postcolonial 
theory it has inspired, this destabilization of boundaries is linked to a subversive 
agenda, as it is said to expose the ‘ambivalence’ of colonial authority itself, and to 
reveal new forms of agency for the colonized subject or objectified ‘Other’:  
My contention, elaborated in my writing on postcolonial discourse in terms of mimicry, 
hybridity, sly civility, is that this liminal moment of identification – eluding resemblance – 
produces a subversive strategy of subaltern agency that negotiates its own authority through a 
process of iterative “unpicking” and incommensurable, insurgent relinking.
26
 
In recent years the viability of this ambition to combine distinctly political 
preoccupations with a focus on sophisticated theorization and arcane textual analysis 
has been increasingly contested. A growing number of critics have questioned the 
adequacy of textual resistance as a response to the brutal realities of colonial and 
neo-colonial domination. The general spirit is captured by Peter Hallward’s remark 
in Absolutely Postcolonial: ‘postcolonial theory emerged as the dominant paradigm 
for understanding collective “struggle” over the same years that witnessed the 
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massive and sustained asset-stripping of the third world. The properly political value 
of this theory needs to be assessed in terms of the way it responds to this situation’.27 
Such debates are of course not new, and the ‘textualism’ I described has been 
opposed to another strand of criticism, usually construed as ‘materialist’, since the 
emergence of postcolonial studies. Critics such as Aijaz Ahmad, Arif Dirlik, Terry 
Eagleton, or Benita Parry, have consistently denounced ‘textualist’ critics’ neglect of 
the concrete, economic and material reality of colonial oppression, their tendency to 
privilege cosmopolitan figures at the expense of local populations, or the 
disempowering effects of the destabilization of political binaries. Over the past 
decade, these critiques have been advanced by a number of interventions, among 
them Hallward’s Absolutely Postcolonial (2001), Robert Young’s Postcolonialism: A 
Historical Introduction (2001), Graham Huggan’s The Postcolonial Exotic (2001), 
(more ambiguously) Chris Bongie’s Friends and Enemies (2008) and Neil Lazarus’s 
The Postcolonial Unconscious (2011).28 But the ‘textualist’ compromise has also 
been destabilized by a number of recent works that have called this time for greater 
attention to the literary and aesthetic dimensions of postcolonial criticism. My own 
analysis would like to situate itself in this recent movement, which includes Gayatri 
Spivak’s Death of a Discipline (2003), Deepika Bahri’s Native Intelligence (2003), 
Nicholas Harrison’s Postcolonial Criticism (2003), Nicholas Brown’s Utopian 
Generations (2005), and Eli Sorensen’s Postcolonial Studies and the Literary (2010).  
In the light of the conjugated assaults of materialist and literary-minded critics on the 
precarious balance of textuality, it seems that the field of postcolonial criticism has 
now reached a crossroads. This situation was sharply summarized by Chris Bongie in 
a recent review article. According to him, there has been a ‘collapse’ of the ‘middle, 
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and muddled, ground’ of postcolonial textualism, and this implies that postcolonial 
critics must now face an alternative between an ‘aesthetic’ and a ‘political’ turn: 
Ought we take an “aesthetic turn,” and openly embrace literary values – of the sort that were 
self-consciously marginalized in Orientalism […]; or ought we take “the political turn,” and 
have the nerve to acknowledge the basic irrelevance of those values to the properly political 
project of undoing […] the neo-colonial, neo-liberal world order that, quite probably, feeds 
mightily upon the sort of literary subversions on offer in Segalen’s Les Immémoriaux no less 
than on those in Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children?
29
 
As I suggested earlier, a ‘properly political’ turn would probably imply abandoning 
the academic study of art and literature in favour of more immediately political 
objects and activities.30 However, acknowledging the inevitable reliance of 
postcolonial criticism on the aesthetic does not necessarily entail that the only 
possibility left consists in making explicit what used to be implicit, and reaffirming, 
in Bongie’s words, critics’ preference for a ‘particular, hegemonic and 
aestheticizing’ definition of literature in terms of heteroglossy, linguistic complexity 
or textual hybridity. Such an evolution sounds highly implausible: it is hard to 
imagine how postcolonial critics could suddenly ‘forget’ the political issues that 
inform most work in the field, and revert to the confident assertion of their own 
tastes and preferences, without considering the social, cultural and racial histories 
with which these appear to be embroiled.31 Besides, if an ‘aesthetic turn’ means that, 
in the present case, the examination of works about African dictatorship should leave 
aside the interest we may have in the extra-textual realities they apparently refer to, 
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or the curiosity we may feel concerning the way these texts may or may not be linked 
to these realities, and instead focus exclusively on assessing the ‘aesthetic value’ of 
these representations in formal and broadly modernist terms, I believe that 
paradoxically, much of what makes these texts interesting as aesthetic objects would 
be lost. Therefore, the following chapters will not only re-examine the aesthetic 
foundations of postcolonial criticism, but also the relation between the aesthetic and 
those other concerns from which it is supposed to be distinct. 
My discussion starts from the recognition that the aesthetic is not a transcendent, 
ahistorical phenomenon, but that the relation between the aesthetic and the extra-
aesthetic constitutes what Jan Mukařovský described in Aesthetic Function, Norm and 
Value as Social Facts as a ‘dialectical antinomy’.32 In this text, Mukařovský set out to 
historicize the aesthetic by focusing on its changing and porous boundaries, showing 
how these are historically and culturally situated: ‘As soon as we change our 
perspective in time, space, or even from one social grouping to another (e.g. from 
one stratum to another, one generation to another, etc.) we find a change in the 
distribution of the aesthetic function and of its boundaries’.33 In his account, the very 
existence of a specific aesthetic function, far from being a universal function of all 
humankind, is historically variable: ‘There are [...] environments in which there is no 
systematic differentiation of functions, e.g., society in the Middle Ages’.34 These 
reflexions were further discussed by Raymond Williams in the chapter ‘Aesthetic 
and Other Situations’, in Marxism and Literature, which argues that the emergence 
of the modern concept of the aesthetic is directly shaped by the development of 
bourgeois capitalism:  
historically [...] the definition of “aesthetic” response is an affirmation, directly comparable 
with the definition and affirmation of “creative imagination”, of certain human meanings and 
values which a dominant social system reduced and even tried to exclude. Its history is in 
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large part a protest against the forcing of all experience into instrumentality (“utility”), and of 
all things into commodities.
35
 
In other words, the claim of the aesthetic to be set apart from the social is itself 
inscribed within social circumstances, to which it responds. The value and meaning 
of the aesthetic depends on its relation (even if it is one of antinomy) with other 
dominant values and experiences. It is therefore only apparently a paradox that, as 
Williams adds, ‘the form of this protest, within definite social and historical 
conditions, led almost inevitably to new kinds of privileged instrumentality and 
specialized commodity’.36 Indeed, as Michael Bérubé notes in relation to these 
remarks, ‘Williams’s sense of the aesthetic as a new niche in the division of labour 
has been borne out spectacularly by the history of modern art, which has managed to 
abjure the logic of commodity so completely as to have become extremely 
valuable’.37 
My adoption of this historicized, and even materialist, conception of the aesthetic is 
partly strategic: in emphasizing its relativity and dependency on other social 
meanings and contexts, I wish to make clear that a reengagement with the aesthetic 




-century idealist vision. One of 
the objectives of this thesis is to move beyond the opposition between (more or less) 
Kantian notions of disinterestedness and pure attention to form38 and the various 
schools of thought (materialist, sociological, postcolonial, feminist, etc.) that have 
exposed the hidden interests behind these notions. Instead of adopting a normative 
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point of view, I will examine whether an approach to the aesthetic that would 
privilege an empirical and experiential perspective over theoretical and polemical 
arguments could help us elaborate a critical approach offering a better understanding 
of the interaction of the aesthetic with cultural, political and social issues. Contrary to 
much philosophical work in aesthetics, whose ambition has been to define in the 
most precise and rigorous manner notions such as art or the aesthetic experience, my 
own use of the term ‘aesthetic’ will thus capitalize on the imprecision of its current 
use, as a means of capturing common ways of thinking about art and literature.39 
Indeed, as will become clearer in the course of the thesis, it is my contention that the 
imprecision and contradictions carried by the term reveal something crucial about the 
nature of aesthetic experiences.  
*   * 
* 
By examining literature alongside other genres and media, I will be able to 
emphasize how the relationship between aesthetic and ethical/political concerns is 
not static but operates differently in and across genres, as it intersects with other 
elements such as the relative popularity of the works under consideration, the way 
their aesthetic value has been perceived, or the different forms of referentiality they 
have been seen to establish. Although this generic diversity is among other things an 
attempt to convey something of the variety of representations of African 
dictatorships, my selection is not meant to offer a representative sample of the texts 
produced about the topic in recent decades. Rather, the variety of objects of critical 
attention hopes to illustrate the multi-faceted aspect of our aesthetic encounters, 
while showing that a reengagement with the aesthetic inscription of postcolonial 
criticism does not necessarily imply the defence of a specific, modernist conception 
of literary value.  
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The issues I have been discussing in this introduction will be further developed in 
Chapter 1, which explores the contradictions that arise from postcolonial critics’ 
simultaneous investment in aesthetics and in politics, through an interpretation of 
Henri Lopes’s Le Pleurer-rire, one of the most famous Francophone novels on 
African dictatorship. The aesthetic inventiveness of the novel and its narrative 
complexity have frequently been perceived as somehow ‘subversive’ – an 
interpretation on which I offer two different perspectives. The first part of the chapter 
focuses on intra-textual elements to highlight how Le Pleurer-rire offers a 
paradoxical response to the difficulties of the post-independence era, where the 
instrumentalization of anticolonial discourse by tyrannical regimes seems to have 
discredited the very notion of intellectual emancipation. My reading thus shows how 
Le Pleurer-rire could be said to use irony to deconstruct the oppressive mosaic of 
ideologies that often characterizes post-independence dictatorships, and to invest 
literature as a site of playful contestation, in opposition to classic models of political 
commitment. The second part of the chapter then calls this reading into question as it 
(re-)connects the text in a different way with its political context, examining whether 
this appreciation of the text, as well as its apparent rejection of previous conceptions 
of ‘engagement’, should or should not be modified by extra-textual information 
concerning Lopes’s own involvement in Congolese politics. 
Chapter 2 focuses on Chinua Achebe’s novel Anthills of the Savannah. When the 
novel was published in 1987, only three years after Achebe’s essay The Trouble with 
Nigeria (1984) and more than twenty years after Achebe’s previous novel A Man of 
the People (1966), many readers expected it to offer a solution to the predicament 
exposed in the essay, and to provide clear insights into the role of African 
intellectuals in the era of post-independence dictatorships. Many of these readers 
were disappointed. This chapter retraces the modalities of this reception, and situates 
it in relation to the opposition between literary autonomy and political commitment 
which has often polarized critical discussions of African literature, including 
Achebe’s own theoretical interventions.40 My discussion focuses more precisely on 
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the difficulties inherent in any reading of African texts as ‘literature’. Following on 
from the paradoxes uncovered in Chapter 1, and interrogating the contrast between 
Lopes’s reluctance to link his novel to real political situations and Achebe’s famous 
stance on the didactic role of literature, this chapter shows how the apparent 
contradictions between the impulse towards a political reading of the text and an 
attention to its aesthetic and ‘literary’ qualities can in fact serve as a driving force for 
its interpretation. These aspects are brought to the fore by assessing Achebe’s novel 
against the model of the ‘roman à thèse’, as analysed by Susan Suleiman in 
Authoritarian Fictions.41 
If the first two chapters are mostly concerned with the tension between forms of 
criticism that focus on the aesthetics of texts and approaches that privilege political 
interpretations, Chapter 3 destabilizes this opposition by showing how these 
apparently conflicting modes of interpretation are not only theoretically dependent 
on each other, but also intricately entangled at the level of the reader or viewer’s 
experiences. This chapter examines three films about Ugandan dictator Idi Amin 
Dada: Général Idi Amin Dada: Autoportrait (1974), by Franco-Swiss documentarist 
Barbet Schroeder, the British drama The Last King of Scotland (2006) by Kevin 
MacDonald, and the ‘exploitation’ film The Rise and Fall of Idi Amin by Kenyan 
director Sharad Patel (1981). Starting with a discussion of Amin’s popularity, the 
chapter engages with the ethical issues raised by the potential exploitation of African 
dictators as a sensational topic for filmmakers. Indeed, considering the extent of 
Amin’s crimes and the ways in which a denunciation of African dictatorships may 
feed racist stereotypes, it might seem legitimate to privilege an interpretative 
approach that would favour ethical concerns over aesthetics. In addition, whereas in 
the case of Achebe’s and Lopes’s literary representations, concerns or claims relating 
to their potential impact would have to be mitigated by their relatively limited 
circulation, a successful entertainment film such as The Last King of Scotland may 
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be said to bring a new urgency to the question of its influence on the general public. 
However, this chapter provides further evidence that the opposition between political 
or ethical judgment on the one hand, and aesthetics on the other hand needs to be 
reexamined, as the two are inextricably linked in the way the films under 
consideration are actually experienced and interpreted. Furthermore, by introducing 
films that belong to widely different genres, this chapter is also able to introduce new 
lines of analysis concerning the way perceptions of aesthetic value determine the 
articulation of aesthetics and politics.  
Finally, Chapter 4 returns to the predicament of discursive saturation that I examine 
at the beginning of Chapter 1, where I suggest that Lopes’s novel could be read as a 
response to the difficulty of negotiating a path between depictions of Africa that are 
mired in colonial clichés and the perverted anticolonial rhetoric that many dictatorial 
regimes have exploited. This chapter considers how the arguments developed 
throughout this thesis might provide us with a new understanding of these issues. 
This time, the question is examined through a reading of Achille Mbembe’s 
landmark essay ‘Provisional Notes on the Postcolony’ (1992). My reading takes as 
its starting point Mbembe’s ambition to create a new form of knowledge about 
Africa, which would use its own aesthetic power in order to move beyond what he 
has termed the ‘cul-de-sac’ of many discourses about Africa. My analysis goes on to 
examine the epistemological uncertainty created by Mbembe’s writing, and 
particularly by his abundant use of the work of Congolese novelist Sony Labou 
Tansi, which keeps cropping up in Mbembe’s essay. I suggest that this proximity to 
fiction should not be understood as an invitation to forsake distinctions between 
literature and the social sciences, or between the aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic, 
however unstable they may be. Rather, it is through the simultaneous destabilization 
and confirmation of these distinctions that Mbembe’s essay may be said to produce a 
new form of knowledge, one that is not necessarily located in the text itself, but 
emerges from the confusing experience of reading it.  
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1   
The Emperor’s Old Clothes:  






At the beginning of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx famously 
wrote that ‘all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it 
were, twice’: ‘the first time as tragedy, the second as farce’.42 This remark was 
directed at Napoléon III, or ‘Napoléon le petit’, whom Marx regarded as a 
‘caricature’ of his uncle, Napoléon Ier. Looking at images of Bokassa’s coronation as 
‘Emperor of Central Africa’ in December 1977, in which the famous scenography of 
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er’s self-crowning was scrupulously reproduced and symbols of the 
Napoleonic Empire lavishly displayed, one cannot help but wonder: what about the 
third time? 
As Derrida emphasized in Spectres de Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire represents 
this apparent repetition of history through the metaphor of the ghost: Marx’s text is 
full of spirits and awakened dead.43 Accordingly, Bokassa’s crowning could be read 
as another return of Napoleon’s ghost and, as such, a potent symbol for the 
ambiguous significations of the ‘post-’ in ‘postcolonial’.44 In reality, the example of 
Bokassa does not enact one but two ‘returns’. Behind the return of Napoleon’s ghost 
looms another, perhaps even more disturbing: the supposed ‘return to barbarity’. 
Bokassa’s desperate efforts to conjure up the spirit of Napoleon did not inspire the 
awe he was hoping for, but sarcasm in the European media and embarrassment on 
the African continent – even his close friends Mobutu and Bongo declined to 
attend.45 In his historical study of Bokassa’s reign, Brian Titley writes: ‘The 
coronation was seen to epitomize the worst Western stereotypes of the continent, and 
it was said to play into the hands of the white supremacists in Rhodesia and South 
Africa, who insisted that blacks were childlike, irresponsible, and incapable of ruling 
themselves’.46 This is indeed one of the most frequent commentaries elicited by 
African post-independence dictatorships: ‘Has the darkness that Europeans once 
ascribed to Africa finally become a reality?’47 Bokassa is a good example of this, if 
one remembers how his deposition by the French army in 1979 was partly justified 
by his alleged cannibalism, with pictures in Paris Match of bodies he was 
supposedly keeping in his giant refrigerators.48  
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Instead of ghosts and spirits, this return of a past that was actually never there (a 
childlike, anthropophagic Africa) would be better captured through another uncanny 
figure: the déjà vu. The Oxford English Dictionary defines its primary meaning as 
‘an illusory feeling of having previously experienced a present situation; a form of 
paramnesia’ and dates this use of the term to 1903. This would correspond well to 
the perceived ‘return’ of Africa’s fantasized past. But in the second half of the 20th 
century, a second meaning of déjà vu appeared: ‘the correct impression that 
something has been previously experienced; tedious familiarity’. As Nicholas Royle 
has underlined, there is an apparent contradiction between these two definitions, 
since déjà vu can be both an ‘illusory feeling’ and a ‘correct impression’.49 However, 
this contradiction befits the complex impressions produced by postcolonial 
dictatorships. In the comments I quoted before, ‘the return to barbarity’ is not 
experienced as a naive déjà vu, but is pervaded by the awareness that the only 
notions available to describe African dictatorships are ‘tediously familiar’ clichés. 
See, for instance, how in a recent interview about his book on Uganda, writer 
Andrew Rice uncomfortably declared: ‘If one historical figure could be said to 
embody the continent as it is stereotypically imagined — dark, dangerous, atavistic 
and charged with sexual magnetism — it would be Idi Amin Dada’.50 What Rice is 
experiencing in front of Amin is a degraded déjà vu, in which both meanings are 
merged: the uncanny illusion of repetition and the correct impression that it is in fact 
a mere accumulation of clichés. In his analysis, Royle makes this passing remark: 
‘we are living in the epoch of the double-sense of “déjà vu”’.51 This could describe 
the age of African dictatorships.  
The ghost is not the only significant metaphor in Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire. As 
Derrida emphasized, it is closely intertwined with another: language.52 In the second 
paragraph, Marx writes:  
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The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And 
just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something 
that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously 
conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries, 
and costumes in order to present the new scene in world history in this time-honoured 
disguise and this borrowed language.
53
 
In the context of this discussion, the phrase ‘borrowed language’ not only represents 
adequately the notion that Bokassa is borrowing the political language of the French 
Napoleonic Empire, but it also resonates with the situation of linguistic and cultural 
imposition that characterized colonial domination. What The Eighteenth Brumaire 
sketches out is the possibility, and indeed the necessity, for each historical epoch to 
attain a relation of authenticity with itself. The conjuring of spirits and the use of a 
borrowed language should only be temporary. This is for instance what happened 
with Cromwell’s revolution: ‘Cromwell and the English people had borrowed 
speech, passions, and illusions from the Old Testament for their bourgeois 
revolution. When the real aim had been achieved, when the bourgeois transformation 
of English society had been accomplished, Locke supplanted Habakkuk’.54 
Ultimately, the order of being and appearance is restored and ghosts are driven away. 
This reordering finds its equivalent in the language metaphor:  
In like manner, a beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his 
mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and can freely express 
himself in it only when he finds his way in it without recalling the old and forgets his native 
tongue in the use of the new.
55
  
Yet something does not quite fit anymore. In the case of ideological and political 
language, each historical era needs to make its language coincide with its essence, 
needs to renounce the language of the past to learn how to use its own. But Marx’s 
simile with the learning of a foreign language illustrates the opposite movement: 
what the beginner is slowly renouncing and forgetting is precisely his own language 
and he is doing so in order to master the foreign, ‘borrowed’ language. If we 
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transpose this observation into the postcolonial context, where does this leave the 
possibility of finding an original language to escape the African déjà vu?  
*   * 
* 
The quest for an authentic, African mode of representation was central to the agenda 
of nationalist movements in Africa, and the investment of language as a site of 
political accommodation or resistance is itself strongly linked to nationalist 
conceptions of the relation between culture and identity. Anticolonial discourse thus 
assigned an important role to literature, which was perceived as pivotal in the 
rehabilitation of African cultures and in the elaboration of an original and 
distinctively African voice, leading to important debates on the legitimacy of African 
literature in European languages.56 For instance, the Second Congress of Black 
Writers and Artists in 1959 insisted simultaneously on the revolutionary role of 
literature and on the mission of writers to create a common language for black 
Africans.57 African literature was called upon to ‘go beyond fixed literary structures, 
such as they result from Western literary history’, and it was expected that the black 
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writer ‘should from a natural tendency invent new structures, corresponding to the 
history of his people’.58 The political disillusion that characterized the post-
independence era led to a reconsideration of the role and power of the writer, and to a 
questioning of previous forms of committed literature. Thus, in the field of 
Francophone African literature, the theme of dictatorship has sometimes been 
associated with the idea of a post-independence aesthetic ‘renewal’. In his 1986 book 
Nouvelles écritures africaines: romanciers de la seconde génération, Séwanou Dabla 
described Sony Labou Tansi’s La Vie et demie (1979) and the novel on which my 
discussion will now focus, Henri Lopes’s Le Pleurer-rire (1982), as prime examples 
of the emergence of a new and subversive stage of African literature.59 A similar 
analysis was proposed in Création et rupture en littérature africaine (1996) by 
Georges Ngal, who also insisted on the groundbreaking dimension of La Vie et demie 
and Le Pleurer-rire, especially in their treatment of dictatorship:  
L’apparition de Sony Labou Tansi avec La Vie et demie (1979) et d’autres écrivains comme 
H. Lopès [sic] avec le Pleurer-rire (1982) permet de parler de ‘ruptures’, dans le champ 
linguistique et littéraire. Le contexte historique incite à la revendication de plus de liberté 
face au dictateur, démystifié, rendu plus bouffon et ubuesque, dans un Etat, échec du placage 
de l’Etat d’origine européenne.
60
 
However, the opposition between anticolonial and post-independence literatures 
should not be exaggerated, just as Dabla and Ngal’s accounts tend to present a 
somewhat caricatural vision of the previous generation of writers as narrowly realist 
and hostile to formal concerns, the fact that the use of anti-realist modes of 
representation in the post-independence era coincided with the emergence of African 
dictatorships as a central theme of African literature shows the persistent engagement 
of many African writers with political realities.  
Le Pleurer-rire offers a privileged site of inquiry to understand the particular 
difficulty of rearticulating politics, aesthetics and literature in the 1980s. The novel 
indeed combines the exploration of a political theme with a complex, multi-layered 
narrative and a constant use of metafiction. Le Pleurer-rire is set in a fictional 
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country called ‘Le Pays’, which is situated ‘quelque part sur ce continent’ (60) 
(Africa, presumably) and is ruled by a dictator, Bwakamabé Na Sakkadé. 
Bwakamabé is a brutal tyrant, who has been compared to a number of real African 
heads of states, notably Bokassa (who shared his nostalgic passion for the French 
army), Mobutu (who made similar arguments about democracy being a Western 
invention), Sékou Touré (who had comparable literary ambitions) or Idi Amin 
(whose expulsion of Uganda’s Indian community resembles Bwakamabé’s eviction 
of Lusitanian traders).61 The composite character of ‘Le Pays’ is reinforced by the 
mosaic of languages that have been included in the novel, especially in the 
characters’ names, which are derived from Lingala, French, Kikongo, Latin and 
Arabic.62 The main narrative strand of the novel consists of a retrospective first-
person account by a character named ‘Maître’, who used to be Bwakamabé Na 
Sakkadé’s maître d’hôtel and is now writing a memoir about this experience while 
living in exile. This main narrative is constantly interrupted by sub-plots and 
digressions resulting from Maître’s apparent lack of focus, as well as by the critical 
comments of some of the other characters on the truthfulness and political value of 
Maître’s manuscript.63 
Maître corresponds to one of the familiar devices of satire, that of the naive narrator. 
He describes himself as ‘un nègre modeste qui fait son éducation’ by listening to 
other people’s opinions (36). Thus Maître is usually keen to let others intervene in 
his narrative, and his own voice feeds on all the worn-out discourses that surround 
him: dictatorial propaganda, colonial clichés, anticolonial platitudes, patriarchal 
prejudices, rumours (‘radio-trottoir’), quotations from canonical writers, and so on. 
But in reality, Maître’s account constantly undermines these opinions: not only are 
they frequently made to contradict each other, but his own narrative actually 
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reproduces them in a slightly altered form.64 For instance, Maître borrows his 
depiction of Bwakamabé from the official press:  
A l’école primaire, il aurait appris plus vite que les autres et se serait distingué à l’attention 
de ses moniteurs par des qualités exceptionnelles. […] Il n’aurait jamais fait une faute 
d’orthographe à ses dictées. Il aurait toujours été le plus rapide en calcul mental et le meilleur 
en problèmes. Car sinon, il n’aurait jamais été admis à l’Ecole des enfants de troupe du 
Général Mangin et ne serait pas aujourd’hui président de la République.  
Tel est ce que nous apprenait, ou à peu près, ce jour-là, l’éditorialiste de La Croix du Sud, 
Aziz Sonika, celui-là même qui nourrit le culte de Polépolé et pourfendit, la plume trempée 
dans la bile d’hyène, l’injure plein la salive, les opposants de l’ancien président. (29-30) 
Although the text does not offer any alternative to the official version, ‘ou à peu 
près’ is precisely where irony creeps in. The use of conditionals and of free indirect 
speech, the reminder of Aziz Sonika’s opportunism (Polépolé was deposed by 
Bwakamabé), and the exaggerated nature of the praise leave little doubt as to the 
falsity of what has just been said (Bwakamabé’s linguistic incompetence throughout 
the novel makes it hard to believe that he never made spelling mistakes, supposing he 
even went to school).  
Comparably, Maître often reproduces colonial clichés about Africans. For instance, 
in a digression in which he reminisces over his attraction to his French school 
teacher, he comments on his own excitation by saying: ‘Les Oncles semblent penser 
rarement à ces choses-là, eux. Mais moi j’avais, malgré le catéchisme et l’éducation 
des bons pères, les idées déjà mal orientées. Les nègres-là…’ (50). The disputable 
notion that white people do not often think about sex, the quaint euphemism ‘idées 
mal orientées’ and the comic effect of the phrase ‘les nègres-là...’, which reproduces 
colonial prejudices about black people while making a typically West African use of 
‘-là’ for emphasis, all convey the passage’s irony.65  
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This extensive copying and intermixing of other discourse is dramatized within the 
novel when Maître is accused of plagiarism. The accusation has been brought by 
another writer, referred to as ‘un certain Benoist-Meschin’, whose text Maître claims 
he has never read (183). Maître once again toys with the fact that he is partly 
reproducing the discourse of the French about Africa: ‘Benoist-Meschin’ is a 
quintessential French name, and its sonority is strongly reminiscent of the French 
word ‘Machin’, which is used to designate something or somebody whose name one 
cannot be bothered to learn or remember. In addition, some readers may recognize 
this passage as a possible reference to the minor collaborationist writer Jacques 
Benoist-Méchin, a self-declared admirer of Hitler who published a series of 
biographies celebrating, among others, Bonaparte and his campaign in Egypt, Hubert 
Lyautey and T.E. Lawrence.66 In signalling the proximity between his critical 
account of dictatorship and Benoist-Meschin’s, Maître emphasizes once more his 
apparent lack of a consistent political viewpoint, while questioning his own 
credentials as a progressive writer. Maître’s defence against Benoist-Meschin’s 
accusation consists in saying: ‘Monsieur Benoist-Meschin a fait le même rêve que 
nous, par un après-midi d’intense réalité, et […] c’est bien à cela que se 
reconnaissent les hommes d’une même époque’ (183). In this passage, both 
meanings of déjà vu merge again: the uncanny feeling, with its peculiar ‘intensity’ of 
reality, and the pervasive stereotypes of a given epoch. Maître then goes on to 
dismiss Benoist-Meschin’s claims by saying:  
Qu’il sorte un instant d’une conception par trop étriquée et surannée de l’univers, pour tenter 
de comprendre celui du Monde Noir, l’univers des nouveaux horizons, mais aussi des 
mystères. Qu’il interroge donc mille Africains choisis indifféremment dans la cinquantaine 
d’Etats qui forment la mosaïque du continent et il découvrira alors qu’il en existe au moins 
un nombre égal, pour lui affirmer qu’en fait, non, vraiment non, c’est un épisode de leur vie 
que je viens de relater là. (182)  
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Maître’s invitation to understand the mysteries of the ‘black world’ may sound like a 
bad faith attempt to justify his plagiarism of a French author in the name of African 
authenticity. It could also be read as a parody of Jacques Benoist-Méchin’s own 
exoticizing vision, notably through the references to ‘le Monde Noir’ (with the use of 
capital letters reinforcing the essentializing dimension of the phrase), its ‘mysteries’ 
and the ‘new horizons’ these constituted for European explorers. However, the 
notion that a thousand Africans from all over the continent might recognize the 
incriminated episode as one moment of their own life can also be taken more 
seriously, as a reflexion on the influence of colonial ideas on the way Africa’s 
realities are experienced and on the complex forms of subjectivities that are created 
by the postcolonial context. In this collective déjà vu, it is as if the pervasiveness of 
stereotypes had made it impossible to experience the ‘here and now’ in its 
singularity, and the African continent in its variety.  
Thus, clichés play an important role in the construction of a referent for the fictional 
‘Pays’, and allow the reader to conjure up a mental image of it as a generic African 
country. For instance, at the beginning of a description of ‘le Pays’, Maître writes: 
Je ne dirai pas ses couleurs que le soleil met en valeur comme sur une diapositive. Je ne dirai 
rien de ses sons, de ses odeurs, du rythme des hanches des femmes qui s’en vont, des charges 
en équilibre sur la tête. Les écrivains de l’exotisme, ceux de la négritude, les rédactions des 
écoliers, ont déjà suffisamment décrit nos villages et les marchés de nos villes. Il n’y a plus 
rien à ajouter. A moins d’être ce génie que le siècle attend et qui n’a plus que quelques 
années pour se présenter (64).  
In this passage, organized around the use of paralipsis, Maître dismisses the usual 
exotic clichés about Africa at the same time that he reproduces them. Indeed, if ‘le 
pays’ is to be located somewhere, it is precisely in the play between the particular 
and the general, facts and clichés, fiction and reality that Maître’s paralipsis triggers 
in the mind of the reader. In other words, the referentiality of Maître’s narrative 
depends on the very clichés that it simultaneously exposes. 
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*   * 
* 
Critics have been prompt to resituate the irony and collages of Le Pleurer-rire within 
a project of political resistance. Yet, as I have already implied, the constant 
incorporation of other voices, notably through the use of irony, is also a sign of the 
novel’s inability to adopt a position of clear-cut opposition to the discourses it 
mocks. For instance, the review of the novel in the journal Ethiopiques insists: 
‘Qu’on ne s’y trompe pas : le ton enjoué qui baigne le roman n’empêche pas qu’il 
s’agisse de littérature engagée, dénonciatrice’.67 Some critics have also argued that 
the novel offers a structural alternative to dictatorship. One of the most recurrent 
ideas in those interpretations concerns the supposedly ‘democratic’ nature of 
fragmentation and polyphony, as opposed to the monopoly of discourse sought by 
the dictator. For instance, for Koffi Anyinefa, ‘by multiplying the narrative voices, 
Lopes forces different points of view to enter the novel: one can read a democratic 
principle of polyphony’.68 However, the opposition between Maître’s polyphonic 
narrative and the dictator’s discourse should not be exaggerated. In its opportunism, 
Bwakamabé’s speech too displays a high degree of ideological and cultural diversity. 
It mixes French army talk (‘Bande d’indigènes, bande d’enfoirés’ (93), African 
phrases (notably the recurring salute ‘Wollé, wollé? Woï Woï !’, or the frequent 
insult ‘con de leur maman !’), French slang (‘la caillasse’ (81), ‘sensas’ (145)), a lot 
of misguided attempts at formal French (‘Or que’ (230), ‘tout est il que’ (236)), and 
even a few perilous ventures into English (‘Un géant (il prononçait giant)’ (337))’. 
Besides, Bwakamabé’s political inspirations, although they are united by a certain 
cult of absolute power, are strikingly eclectic, and he gives equal praise to ‘Papa De 
Gaulle’ (318), Hitler (‘Hitler, c’était la grande Allemagne’ (337); Stalin (‘Lui aussi 
c’était un as. Chapeau !’ (337)), and Napoléon (‘Ah ! L’homme-là !’ (336)). This 
cultural and political slipperiness, far from being necessarily ‘democratic’ is in fact at 
the heart of the regime’s artificial and corrupt nature.  
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Another reason to remain cautious in attributing to the text an ‘oppositional’ value 
has to do with its own treatment of the relation between literature and politics. This 
theme appears already in the few pages entitled ‘sérieux avertissement’ that open the 
novel – the first in a long series of ironic, self-reflexive comments on the text and its 
interpretation. This avertissement is a fake document, signed by the fictitious 
‘Associations des censeurs francophones’, which parodies the way some African 
postcolonial states have used censorship. It presents itself as an emphatic 
condemnation of Le Pleurer-rire, whose author is described as ‘une canaille qui 
mérite le cachot, quelques bons coups de chicotte et l’oubli’ (9). However, a very 
important point in the censors’ ‘avertissement’ is that they actually refuse to ban the 
text, for fear that this gesture should increase readers’ interest, and make the book 
seem more significant or dangerous than it really is:  
Les livres proscrits se vendent sous le manteau mieux que les bons. Et nous détenons des 
dossiers de méchants auteurs qui, pour se faire une réputation acquise à peu de frais et mieux 
liquider leur marchandise, recherchent cyniquement la publicité que confèrent les décrets de 
la censure. (9) 
By representing itself as a novel that censors resent but do not find worthy of being 
either forbidden or destroyed, and by highlighting, even in this ironic form, the 
potential opportunism behind this representation of itself as a censorable text, the 
novel invites us to question its own position as an act of political opposition. This 
‘avertissement’ may not only be read as a parody of censorship, but also as a 
mockery of the very expectations it creates, namely that the text is necessarily going 
to be subversive because it is an African novel dealing with dictatorship.  
A similar play with the potentiality of censorship can be found when Maître 
concludes his depiction of the fictional ‘Pays’ with this disclaimer:  
Mais j’en ai trop dit et me suis permis trop d’imprudences dans ma description. Certains 
risqueraient de croire que c’est dans la capitale de leur pays que vit Bwakamabé Na Sakkadé, 
ce qui est, bien sûr, totalement faux et absurde. (67-68) 
According to Ange-Séverin Malanda, ‘L’indétermination des lieux (et 
l’indétermination du référent) évoqués dans Le Pleurer-rire permet de surmonter et 
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d’annihiler l’illusion (la superstition, la chimère) référentielle’.69 But one could as 
easily argue the opposite: this indeterminacy is made to foster the very referential 
impulse it appears to discourage. As usual, there are several levels of irony here: the 
narrator’s insistent denial (‘bien sûr, totalement faux et absurde’) is an oblique 
encouragement to ‘read between the lines’ and to link the fiction with a real African 
place. The necessity of evading censorship is implied by Maître’s allusions to ‘saying 
too much’ and ‘imprudence’. But at another level, it is indeed possible that the 
narrator is simply poking fun at those readers who are always trying to link fiction 
with a familiar reality, and Maître’s coyness may simply be a trick to make his story 
more intriguing.  
However, several clues suggest that there may be a more serious point to this 
systematic destabilization of the impulses towards political realities. The theme of 
the relationship between censorship, literature and political commitment reappears in 
the evocation of Matapalé, a famous writer who has been jailed for opposing 
Bwakamabé’s regime (73-4). This elicits not only the indignation of the Western 
media, but also the international consecration of Matapélé as a literary genius. Maître 
regards these reactions as a great exaggeration and, in spite of his sympathy for the 
writer’s activism, dismisses Matapalé as a mediocre author: ‘Le grand prix de 
l’Union française qu’il a obtenu ne prouve rien, sinon qu’à cette époque les autres 
nègres n’écrivaient pas mieux et que les Oncles s’émerveillaient, comme d’un 
exploit, devant vingt pages écrites par un nègre’ (73). In these disdainful and 
provocative comments, Maître exposes the potential condescension behind appraisals 
of African literature that tend to privilege the political commitment or the national 
origin of authors instead of the properly literary and aesthetic value of their works.  
Maître’s argument for the separation of political and aesthetic evaluations is 
significant if we remember that an important aspect of the censors’ ‘sérieux 
avertissement’ is that their criticisms are not only aimed at the text’s disrespect for 
power but also at its failure to comply with a certain conception of committed 
literature. For instance, the author of Le Pleurer-rire and his fellow writers are 
blamed for using ‘un ton qui n’a rien à voir avec la négritude’ (10). What emerges 
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from the novel is actually a form of collusion between the aesthetics of anticolonial, 
politically committed literature (which the censors equate with négritude) and 
dictatorship. This is confirmed later when Bwakamabé himself writes a ballet, which 
is not only a monument of kitsch but also appropriates most of the topoi of 
anticolonial didacticism for the self-promotion of the regime. It represents the brutal 
conquest of Angola by the Portuguese and the heroic liberation of the country by 
Bwakamabé’s own troops. This is hailed by the other heads of state as ‘l’art réaliste 
éducatif et militant dont l’Afrique avait besoin’ and is explicitly contrasted with ‘les 
écrivains africains dont les poèmes étaient désespérément rédigés en charabia et dont 
les pièces de théâtre et les romans se complaisaient dans un ton pleurnichard et 
subversif’ (109). In this situation where the very language and ideas that carried the 
hopes of independence have been reinvested by a new form of oppression, the idea of 
a literary and aesthetic autonomy seems to take on a renewed relevance and may 
even represent a potential means of emancipation. 
Therefore, in spite of its unmistakably political topic, a key element of Le Pleurer-
rire seems to consist in simultaneously suggesting and destabilizing political 
interpretations. To underline this, I would like to focus on a theme which, at first 
sight, is not directly political: Maître’s busy sex-life, which echoes Bwakamabé’s 
own sexual hyperactivity. There are indeed a large number of erotic digressions 
throughout the novel but, as Patrick Corcoran has observed, they have received little 
critical attention.70 Yet many elements of these adventures point to a link between 
sex and politics. This is notably the case of Maître’s affair with Bwakamabé’s wife, 
which, as Corcoran argues, subverts not only the master/servant relation, but also 
traditional gender roles, since the dictator's wife practically orders Maître into bed.71 
It is also around these erotic passages that some of the most important turning points 
of the narrative are articulated. For instance, it is because his conversations with his 
mistress have been wiretapped that Maître falls into disgrace and has to go into exile. 
Finally, these erotic passages are the object of a particularly intense interpretive 
activity within the novel itself. The following paragraphs will focus on two 
particularly significant examples. 
                                                          
70
 Corcoran, p. 50. 
71
 Ibid., p. 51. 
40 
 
The first to discuss Maître’s philandering is a character named ‘le jeune compatriote 
directeur de cabinet’, one of Bwakamabé’s former advisers. ‘Le jeune compatriote’ is 
a serious and somewhat naive young man, who in principle opposed Bwakamabé but 
thought he might curb Bwakamabé’s most destructive policies by collaborating with 
his regime. As he writes, Maître regularly sends him his manuscript in order to get 
his opinion. The comments are then inserted directly into the text of the novel, in a 
smaller typeface. ‘Le jeune compatriote’ condemns Maître’s erotic digressions for 
being inappropriate and for creating a distraction from the political project of the 
novel:  
Vous me faites peur avec toutes ces scènes d’amour trop osées. […] Sans être, dans ma vie 
privée, un ascète, je me demande si l’on a le droit de mêler ainsi politique et porno, sans que 
celui-ci ne gâche celle-là ? [...] Il s’agissait, je le répète, à mon sens, de contribuer à la lutte 
contre le tyran Bwakamabé. Or, voici qu’aujourd’hui, la tournure que prend votre manuscrit 
me fait craindre que, cédant à des souvenirs intimes, vous mêliez les genres et perdiez de vue 
l’objectif fondamental de tout écrit engagé. Et un livre d’africain, vivant dans ces temps et 
qui se respecte, ne peut être qu’engagé… (143-144)  
‘Le jeune compatriote’ has a very clear idea of what the aim of the book should be: 
contribute to the struggle against Bwakamabé. For him, this can only be achieved 
through a certain ‘genre’, namely ‘committed literature’, with which ‘pornographic’ 
elements are incompatible. ‘Le jeune compatriote’ is the proponent of a traditional 
kind of didactic literature and he is disappointed by Maître’s unwillingness to 
produce a clear ideological message. He notably resents Maître’s ironic treatment of 
the young intellectuals who oppose the regime, urging him to introduce a positive 
character who might embody the values of resistance: ‘Si vous voulez rendre service 
au Pays, introduisez donc vite dans cette histoire un héros positif’ (59-60). Through 
this comment, the proximity between ‘le jeune compatriote’ and the fictional censors 
of the ‘sérieux avertissement’ is made clear: they too condemned African writers for 
not creating any ‘héros exaltant les valeurs morales et positives’ of Africa and its 
traditions (10). The narrator predictably disavows this interpretation. This appears 
first through the irony to which ‘le jeune compatriote’ is constantly subjected, but 
also explicitly when Maître finally refuses to reproduce his complaints: ‘Je fais grâce 
au lecteur des longues pages de rhétorique où mon jeune compatriote ancien 
directeur de cabinet, au nom de la pudeur révolutionnaire, s’en prend à la littérature 
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érotico-pornographique’ (302). This is followed by the insertion of a two-page 
excerpt from Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste, in which the author claims his right to 
describe sex as crudely as he wishes, and exposes the hypocrisy of those who accuse 
him (302-304).
 
But it should be noted that the passage quoted does not really address 
the concerns expressed by ‘le jeune compatriote’ and that the issue of the relations 
between ‘porn’ and politics is left unaddressed. 
Maître’s sexual activities are also the object of another interpretation, this time by 
Monsieur Gourdain, the head of the secret services, who intercepts some of his 
conversations with his married mistress, Soukali. Soukali, the wife of a high civil 
servant, has decided that the life of a housewife is not enough for her and has found a 
job as a switchboard operator at the Bulgarian embassy. From there, she constantly 
calls Maître and demands that he declare his passion for her: ‘Elle voulait entendre 
ma voix lui répéter que j’avais pensé à elle, que j’avais rêvé d’elle, que je l’aimais’ 
(191). But while Maître is doing his best to obey the rules of romance talk, Monsieur 
Gourdain’s secret services are tapping the conversations, looking for a different kind 
of message: those frequent phone calls from a communist embassy are immediately 
interpreted as coded political discussions and Maître is accused of spying in 
preparation for a coup. For Monsieur Gourdain, the conversations are part of a 
conspiracy and are all the more dangerous as his services have not been able to break 
the code yet: ‘Le danger, de surcroît résidait, avec ces conversations codées, dans le 
fait que nul n’était en mesure de déterminer à quel moment serait donné l’ordre fatal’ 
(286-287). This may be regarded as the second possible way to interpret those love 
scenes: finding in them an oblique political meaning. But the counter-example of M. 
Gourdain’s paranoia apparently invalidates this type of interpretation as well.  
As Patrick Corcoran argues, the constant interruptions of the political narrative by 
Maître's sexual activities ‘authorize a complex web of ironic interpretations and 
ensure that the political and sexual topoi, which provide the substance of the novel, 
are inextricably linked’.72 But, as the readings of ‘le jeune compatriote’ and Monsieur 
Gourdain exemplify, they also foreclose such interpretations. The reader is placed 
vis-à-vis the novel in a position similar to that of the narrator vis-à-vis the realities he 
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tries to write about: just as the narrator of Le Pleurer-rire is faced with a reality 
where potential descriptions have been pre-empted, the reader’s interpretations have 
also been anticipated and ridiculed. Whether we consider those sexual scenes as an 
apolitical entertainment or whether we attribute to them a political meaning, we find 
ourselves somehow aligned with those caricatural misreaders. In this sense, Le 
Pleurer-rire insists on telling us not how it wants to be read but how it should not be 
read. Perhaps this is precisely how Maître’s erotic musings should be understood: 
besides their comic effect, they are not meant to be interpreted so much as 
misinterpreted. The ideal reading of Le Pleurer-rire reproduces its many ironies and 
exists only in the impossibility of the ridiculous misreading represented in the novel. 
Ultimately, the question of the novel's relation to politics is deliberately left wide 
open.  
As announced by its title, the literary project of Le Pleurer-rire is marked by 
ambivalence. It bears testimony to both the unavoidability of the postcolonial déjà vu 
and the impulse to go beyond it. Perhaps, in the end, a similar openness to irony and 
interpretation could be found in Bokassa’s coronation, with which I started this 
discussion. At first sight, Bokassa’s imitation of Napoleon may seem to epitomize 
the entrapment of many post-colonial states in what could be called, following 
Marx’s phrase, the ‘borrowed language’ of the ex-colonizer’s political rhetoric. But 
all things considered, there may be another way to look at it: in using this ‘borrowed 
language’, Bokassa also created an unwillingly ironic effect. Irony arises from an 
apparent contradiction between the explicit meaning of an utterance and its context. 
For Napoleon I, the gesture of crowning himself instead of letting the Pope do it 
signified his independence vis-à-vis Rome’s religious authority and a break from the 
traditions of the French monarchy. By importing this gesture into the postcolonial 
context, Bokassa destabilized its meaning and in fact suggested the opposite of its 
explicit content: his imitation of Napoleon’s self-crowning did not signify 
independence but, on the contrary, his enduring political and cultural subjection to 
the ex-colonizer. Yet in doing so, didn’t Bokassa unwittingly expose the 
inauthenticity and pompousness of Napoleon’s own coronation, in which the French 
emperor presented himself as a new Caesar? In any case, all of this suggests a 
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provisional answer to my initial question: perhaps, when great world-historical 
characters appear three times, to tragedy and farce one can add irony. 
*   * 
* 
Having reached this first conclusion, I would now like to reintroduce some para- and 
extra-textual information that I have withheld until this point. On the back cover of 
the second edition of Le Pleurer-rire, one reads: ‘Henri Lopes est congolais. Né en 
1937 à Kinshasa, il a d’abord enseigné, puis occupé de hautes fonctions politiques 
dans son pays et en France’. In fact, Henri Lopes played a central role in the 
establishment of the Marxist-Leninist regime of Marien Ngouabi, who came to 
power in 1968 and turned Congo-Brazzaville into the first African ‘Popular 
Republic’.73 Lopes was among the founding members of the single party (Parti 
Congolais du Travail, P.C.T.), wrote the new national anthem ‘Les Trois Glorieuses’, 
and held major political offices, including Minister of Education and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, before becoming Prime Minister in 1973. He resigned from this role 
in 1975, presumably because of political dissensions among members of the 
government, and became chief editor of the official P.C.T. newspaper, Etumba, in 
1976. When Ngouabi was murdered in suspicious circumstances and supplanted by 
Colonel Yhomby-Opango in 1977, Lopes again entered the government as Minister 
of Finance. Similarly, when Denis Sassou-Nguesso toppled Yhomby-Opango in 
1979, Lopes remained in charge of the same Ministry. He resigned and left for Paris 
in the following year, where he started a diplomatic career at UNESCO (the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and at the Organisation 
Internationale de la Francophonie. Le Pleurer-rire was published soon after, in 1982. 
After that, his participation in Congolese politics continued, although less directly: he 
took part in the National Sovereign Conference of 1991, served as a mediator 
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between Sassou-Nguesso’s government and the opposition in 1999, and has been the 
ambassador of the Republic of Congo in France since 1998.74 
Should these elements have an impact on our interpretation of the text, and should 
they transform the reading I developed in the first part of this chapter? Although I 
have tried to resist attributing to irony the type of subversive political value that is 
often conferred on cognate notions such as mimicry and parody, it could be argued 
that my insistence on the political elusiveness of the novel, and on the notion that this 
elusiveness may be an appropriate response to dictatorship, has unduly preserved it 
from a number of difficult questions concerning its conditions of production. If we 
re-read the novel with this biographical context in mind, its play with referentiality, 
its often sarcastic treatment of political commitment and its defence of aesthetic 
autonomy may appear in a new light. It is noteworthy that Lopes, who describes his 
fictions as ‘un jeu gratuit’, has consistently refused to establish any direct link 
between his literary and political careers or between his novels and reality.75 This 
refusal to be judged in ideological or political terms (which echoes Maître’s 
reluctance to excuse the lack of aesthetic value of Matapalé’s work in the name of his 
activism) was expressed unambiguously in a collection of essays published in 2003:  
Plutôt que de recenser, soupeser et classifier mes idées, mon inconscient et mon 
subconscient, dites-moi, s’il vous plaît, si j’ai bien campé mes personnages; dites-moi si vous 
apercevez leurs sourires et leurs tics, si vous sentez battre leur pouls; dites-moi si j’ai su vous 
dépayser, si j’ai trouvé les mots justes pour faire s’évanouir le monde environnant et pour 
vous tenir éveillé; dites-moi si vous vous êtes laissé prendre à mon affabulation, si, vous 




But this denial may actually be more complex than it appears. Just as Maître is 
making ironic claims to fictionality in order to encourage the very referential 
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movement that his declarations openly disavow, Lopes could be said to exploit the 
gap between the (theoretical) interdiction of equating the author of a fiction with its 
narrator and character, and the irreducible openness of literature to such a conflation 
in the reader’s experience. Lopes could thus be suspected of producing a fiction that 
will invite precisely the kind of biographical interpretation that it is apparently meant 
to prevent, in order to offer an altered representation of his own role.  
*   * 
* 
The impulse towards such a conflation of fiction and autobiography can be illustrated 
by the way a number of critics have interpreted the censors’ ‘Sérieux avertissement’ I 
discussed earlier. In spite of its obvious fictionality, this passage has often led to 
comments on the impact or meaning of the novel itself, in its own historical and 
political context. For instance, although Patrick Corcoran rightly underlines that 
‘Lopes’s preoccupation with censors and censorship is [...] not necessarily a matter 
of personal concern’,77 he nonetheless argues: 
 the real irony of the ‘SERIEUX AVERTISSEMENT’ is that while it offers itself to be read 
as a parody of the blue-pencil regime of censors, it is at least partially intended to ward off 
any such intervention and render the censors impotent, not in the fictional world of Maître 




Comparably, Koffi Anyinefa contends that ‘Dans ce texte à caractère officiel, Lopes 
soulève, d’une part les problèmes de la censure en Afrique et de l’autre, déroute les 
censeurs éventuels de son livre’.79 Although these arguments about the effects of the 
‘avertissement’ are not implausible, so far, I have found no evidence that the novel 
was actually censored or threatened by censorship in Congo-Brazzaville.80 
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Considering the absence of a review of the novel in the P.C.T.’s official newspaper 
Etumba in 1982 or 1983 (whereas the newspaper often celebrated Lopes’s previous 
texts), we may speculate that the novel was probably not greatly appreciated by the 
regime; and it is very possible that it was not widely distributed in Congo-
Brazzaville. Another clue can be found in a 1988 issue of Notre Librairie, dedicated 
to Congolese literature. The introduction by the writer Jean-Baptiste Tati-Loutard, 
who was then in charge of the ministry of Culture, offers an ideologically charged 
presentation of Congo’s literary history, tracing back the development of the 
country’s literature to the ‘Trois Glorieuses’ that founded the Marxist-Leninist 
regime:  
Nous pouvons situer le début de l’accélération de notre histoire littéraire à partir de 1963. 
C’est l’année de ce que nous appelons les Trois glorieuses journées des 13, 14 et 15 août, qui 
ouvrent une période de remise en question de notre passé colonial, du régime néo-colonial, 
de nos coutumes rétrogrades. Les langues se sont alors déliées. Il en est résulté un climat 
d’enthousiasme révolutionnaire, d’exaltation des idéaux de liberté, de justice et de progrès.
81
  
In Tati-Loutard’s summary of the evolutions of Congolese literature, Henri Lopes 
appears twice and his collection of short stories Tribaliques (1971) is credited as a 
landmark in the emergence of ‘critical realism’ in Congo, whereas Le Pleurer-rire is 
never mentioned.  
However, there are no traces of an explicit condemnation of the novel either.82 In 
1987, the counter-censorship organization Article 19 published a study on freedom 
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of speech in the country, with a list of the books known to be banned, but Le Pleurer-
rire does not appear among the 94 references (these include for instance Sony Labou 
Tansi’s novel on dictatorship, L’Etat honteux).83 The conflation of Lopes’s 
‘avertissement’ with the actual context of Le Pleurer-rire’s reception is therefore 
illustrative of a certain eagerness to read the novel as an act of political resistance, 
even though there is no clear evidence that Lopes was in danger of being censored or 
that the ‘avertissement’ did enable his novel to evade censorship. 
Another significant instance of the tension between literary interpretations and 
political realities can be found in Dominic Thomas’s reading of Le Pleurer-rire in 
Nation-Building, Propaganda, and Literature in Francophone Africa. Thomas, 
contrary to the other critics I have just discussed, puts the relation between the text 
and Lopes’s biography at the centre of his analysis, which offers an in-depth 
examination of literary life in Congo, while resituating the text in its institutional and 
political contexts. Thomas divides Congolese authors between ‘official’ and ‘non-
official’ writers, according to their positions vis-à-vis the nationalist agenda of the 
state. Official writers are those who produce the type of literature sponsored by 
power (notably through the Union Nationale des Ecrivains, Artistes, et Artisans 
Congolais (UNEAC)) and obey a strict aesthetic code: ‘Socialist Realism, 
accessibility, communicability, simplicity, glorification of heroes’.84 ‘Non-official’ 
authors, on the other hand, ‘subscribe to an aesthetics of avant-gardism’ and are 
described as ‘producing texts independently of the hegemonic power of party 
control, denouncing the homogeneity of official writing, and undermining and 
exposing the postcolonial political elite to the scrutiny of outsiders’.85  
If one is to follow this distinction, it seems that the aesthetics of Le Pleurer-rire, with 
its satire of dictatorship, its intertextual references, and complex structure belong to 
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the second kind of literature. However, in Thomas’s classification, non-official 
writers are also politically subversive, and he describes them as ‘avant-garde 
resistance authors’, adding between parentheses that they have been ‘sometimes 
censored, and almost exclusively published abroad’.86 His reading is therefore 
centred on the tension that arises between Le Pleurer-rire’s visible subversion of 
official literary norms and Lopes’s own ‘status inside the very power structure his 
work subverts and challenges’.87 Indeed, for Thomas, ‘this presents somewhat of a 
contradiction, given the inevitable collaborationist complicity that such a position 
entails with the ruling elite’.88 Thomas’s reading constitutes a relentless attempt to try 
and solve this contradiction, which he achieves by recasting the novel as a 
‘confessional and testimonial narrative’, through which Lopes supposedly re-
examines his own collaboration with the regime.89  
As I mentioned before, Lopes has always denied that what is described in Le 
Pleurer-rire is a reflection of his own political experience, going as far as to claim: ‘I 
myself have not collaborated with anyone who resembles the Daddy character in my 
novel’.90 To this, Thomas retorts that ‘historical facts do not corroborate this 
statement and many Congolese citizens who lived under the authoritarian rule of 
Ngouabi, Yhombi-Opango, and Sassou Nguesso would disagree with Lopes’s 
comparative standard for abuse’.91 Furthermore, Thomas points out that ‘While 
Lopes has resorted to the veil of allegory to structure his narrative, a number of 
references do nevertheless make the text specific to the Congo’.92 Indeed, not only is 
the dictatorial atmosphere of the novel reminiscent of the realities of Congo-
Brazzaville during Lopes’s participation in the government, but some specific 
episodes might be invoked to justify Thomas’s reading of Le Pleurer-rire as an 
autobiographical account. 
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Thus, Bwakamabé’s proclivity to blame the communists (or indeed any other ‘-ists’) 
for every manifestation of political opposition mirrors the heavy-handed 
instrumentalization of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric by the regime of 
Brazzaville. For instance, an important development in the plot concerns a failed 
coup d’état orchestrated by Colonel Haraka, who manages to escape and is hunted by 
the government. The narrative details the violent press campaign organized against 
Haraka, who is of course accused of being Moscow’s agent. The novel also describes 
the desperate attempts to capture him (these include the hiring of sorcerers and 
astrologers), and we are told that the security services have decided that only 
Haraka’s accomplices would be judged, while ‘Haraka réunissait suffisamment de 
preuves contre lui pour que son exécution eût lieu avant son procès’ (188). Haraka 
will indeed end up executed during a tragicomic episode in which it is discovered 
that he was hiding by dressing up as a woman – a fact that is revealed after a soldier 
tries to rape him (208).93 These fictional events may remind us of the failed military 
coup which was attempted in the Congo by a group led by Ange Diawara in 1972. 
Just as Maître is briefly captured by the rebels, Lopes too was allegedly kidnapped 
by Diawara and his accomplices.94 Like Haraka, Diawara initially managed to escape 
and hide, became the object of a violent campaign, and was eventually caught and 
killed in April 1973.95 Although Diawara could only be judged in absentia, he and 
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his companions had been condemned by a military court in 1972, which, 
incidentally, was presided over by Henri Lopes.96  
Another example of potential echoes between the fiction and Congolese realities can 
be found in an episode where two young white activists, a woman and a teacher, are 
accused of subversive activities against Bwakamabé. Maître describes the two 
characters by paraphrasing a virulent editorial published in the official press: ‘La fille 
en jean était évidemment une trottoire [prostitute] qui cherchait à assouvir sa soif 
sexuelle dans une action d’un romantisme au goût douteux’, while the man, ‘Le 
Français chevelu, vulgaire, “gauchiste rescapé de mai 68”’, is accused of ‘vouloir 
tenter dans notre “beau Pays”, une expérience qui avait piteusement échoué dans le 
sien propre’ (131). As usual, both are said to be ‘Moscow’s agents’ and are suspected 
of seeking to organize orgies with their students, ‘dans la tradition honteuse des 
bacchanales modernes pratiquées par les sociétés décadentes’ (131). This episode 
resonates with an article published in Etumba in March 1973, on the theme of 
‘Comment les gauchistes français ont mouillé dans le complot contre la révolution 
congolaise’. Three young French teachers were accused of having been involved in 
Diawara’s coup. The article was illustrated with pictures of the alleged conspirators, 
and the young man (who sports a wild mane of hair), is described as a teacher of 
‘subversive mathematics’, while the caption under the picture of one of the women 
reads: ‘Prof de Français [sic], trempée jusqu’au cou’. The rest of the article argues:  
ces petits français [sic] qui n’ont de tradition révolutionnaire du peuple français que le 
désordre qu’ils incarnent et le Hachich qu’il [sic] fument, veulent rééditer “l’exploit” de De 
Brazza. Mais hélas ! Les Temps [sic] changent et la société se développe. […] Une raison de 
plus que le Congo ne peut recevoir une leçon de Révolution des jeunes français qui n’ont 
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découvert la théorie marxiste qu’avec le “Mai 1968” alors que le peuple congolais en avait 
déclenché le processus cinq ans auparavant.
97
 
Yet it is not clear what kind of critical moves these echoes (which are obviously 
subject to interpretation) authorize. There is a vast distance, which is quickly crossed 
in Thomas’s account, between the possibility that (some) readers will detect such 
similarities and the definition of the text as a ‘confession’ or an autobiography. 
Starting from what he considers the ‘avant-garde’ aspects of the book, Thomas sets 
out to invent Lopes’s political persona, attributing to him feelings (guilt) and desires 
(curbing political action from the inside). For instance, we read that the polyvocality 
of the text allows Lopes ‘to address the question of the exercise of political power in 
a Francophone postcolony while also justifying his participation’, whereas the last 
words of the novel are said to ‘address the question of trauma in a very significant 
way, situating his writing as a liberating act’.98 The concluding lines of Thomas’s 
analysis even contend that ‘writing for Lopes has become a therapeutic and purging 
experience, enabling him to confront his feelings of guilt and helplessness’.99 This 
leads Thomas to reverse the terms of his initial paradox and to argue that Lopes’s 
exercise of political power actually makes the novel even more politically 
subversive: ‘If Lopes’s text is to be categorized as a work of resistance, aligned with 
other non-official authors, then one could argue that his objective to undermine the 
authorities becomes all the more effective, given his understanding of the workings 
of power’.100 The circularity of this argument emerges clearly when Thomas 
speculates on Lopes’s intentions and objectives in order to argue that he could not 
have left his own experience out of the narrative: ‘He would have nothing to achieve 
(or prove for that matter) were he to deliberately exclude his experiences; on the 
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contrary, they add weight to the narrator’s observations and accord Lopes a 
perspective other authors do not have’.101 As these statements on Lopes’s supposed 
‘objective’ exemplifies, Thomas is not so much using Lopes’s biography to interpret 
the book as he is reconstructing Lopes’s intentions and personality to make them fit 
with his perception of the text’s subversiveness: Le Pleurer-rire parodies 
dictatorship, hence Lopes must have been a secret opponent of the Congolese 
regime.  
But at several points in his argument, Thomas’s attempt to read the text as an 
autobiographical account seems to place an untenable pressure on his interpretation 
of the novel. For instance, Thomas suggests that a degree of veracity can be granted 
to the narrator’s observations, and that it ‘serves to further legitimate them as we 
begin to sense their proximity to Lopes’s own sentiments’.102 Looking for proof of 
this veracity within the text, Thomas comments on the final intervention of Maître’s 
mistress, Soukali, in a passage entitled ‘quand Soukali enjambe la fenêtre du roman 
ou (au choix) de la réalité’ (369-371). His argument is that ‘Soukali’s extra-textual 
interjection at the end of the novel adds legitimacy to the narrator’s argument to the 
extent that her recognition of the fictional space in question lends veracity to the 
narrative’.103 This assertion is backed up by an extensive quotation of the passage, 
which reads as follows: 
Despite a few transpositions, your friends will have no difficulty in recognizing every one of 
the actors under their masks... If the names and places sound strange to our ears, even though 
you leave here and there in the text the words of an imaginary dialect of your invention, the 
most myopic of moles would recognize ‘the country’... There is scarcely as much difference 
between your story and our lives as between a Van Gogh, a Cézanne or a Modigliani and a 
photograph of the original model. But the magic and teaching power of art, isn’t it less to 
resemble reality than to lend reality the colours of the painter’s heart?
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One might suspect that the implication that there is little difference between a 
painting by Van Gogh, Cézanne or Modigliani and a photograph should not be taken 
entirely at face value. Indeed, the irony of this passage becomes obvious if one 
reintroduces the passages Thomas has edited from the quotation through the use of 
ellipses. In these passages, Soukali argues that ‘Tonton est évidemment le préfet 
célèbre d’une province où vécut trois ans durant un jeune cardiologue, alors 
fraîchement émoulu des universités européennes, et à qui je confie aujourd’hui le 
soin de ma santé’ (369).105 She goes on to explain that she is having an affair with 
this young cardiologist and hopes that her students won’t recognize her, thereby 
suggesting that she is actually a teacher (370). All these elements create a parody of 
dénouement: they do not point toward any sort of recognizable reality, but add yet 
another layer of opacity by bringing in a completely new, blatantly irrelevant (and 
probably fictional) plot line. Far from being an encouragement to identify the novel 
with a given historical context, or to see it as a truthful testimony, this passage mocks 
those readings that would turn the Le Pleurer-rire into a roman à clef, and gestures 
toward an infinity of real or imagined contexts with which the novel might resonate. 
This is emphasized by Maître’s response to Soukali in the last lines of the novel, 
which insist: ‘je n’ai rien emprunté à la réalité ni non plus inventé’ (371). 
*   * 
* 
Thus, a large part of the ‘contradiction’ that Dominic Thomas seeks to resolve only 
emerges because his distinction between official and non-official writers rests on the 
notion that aesthetic subversiveness and political resistance necessarily go together. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Même si les noms de personnes et de lieux sonnent étrangers à nos oreilles, même si tu livres 
ça et là, dans le texte, des mots d’un dialecte imaginaire, forgé par toi seul, la plus myope des 
taupes reconnaîtra “Le Pays”. 
Il y a entre ton histoire et notre actualité, à peine plus de différence qu’entre un Van Gogh, un 
Cézanne ou un Modigliani et la photographie du modèle originel. Mais la magie et la 
puissance pédagogique de l’art n’est-elle justement pas moins de ressembler à la réalité que 
de donner à la réalité les couleurs du cœur du peintre ? (369-370) 
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Indeed, Thomas seems extremely reluctant to consider the possibility that the new 
‘aesthetic articulations’ of avant-garde authors might not necessarily ‘undermine and 
expose the postcolonial political elite to the scrutiny of outsiders’, and that such 
‘articulations’ might also protect some of them against such scrutiny.106 In this 
respect, it should be pointed out that his construction of the category of the ‘non-
official’ writer merely reverses the systematic equivalence between literary aesthetics 
and politics that is posited by the socialist realism of Congolese ‘official writers’, and 
fails to question the foundation of such equivalences. 
However, the way out of these equivocations is not so easy to find. Politicized 
approaches to literary texts, such as postcolonial criticism, seem to preclude the 
separation between the author and his or her work that is often advocated in other 
fields of literary criticism, more openly invested in aesthetic value (and in which, at 
least in the Francophone context, Proust’s Contre Sainte-Beuve often serves as a 
heroic inaugural moment). For instance, not only have postcolonial critics questioned 
the way in which notions of literary autonomy or universal value have shielded 
canonical authors from political and biographical scrutiny,107 but as Nicholas 
Harrison argues, postcolonial criticism tends to rely on a specific ‘author-function’, 
in which the identification of an author as ‘postcolonial’ is based on biographical, 
and more precisely ethno-racial, considerations: 
The notion of the “francophone author” or of the “postcolonial novelist” thus designates a 
certain “author-function”, to use the term offered by Foucault in his famous essay “What is 
an author?”: particular aspects of the author’s real or imagined biography, in this instance 
including notably “race” or national origins, are seen by the reader as pertinent to the text, 
and as providing a legitimate or even crucial means of making sense of it.
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These aspects in turn determine the types of question to which the texts will be 
subjected, and play a crucial role in situating critics’ interpretation in relation to the 
political referents of postcolonial criticism. Indeed, even in the first part of this 
chapter, the questions I raised concerning the relation of the text to issues of cultural 
authenticity and language were determined by my identification of the writer as 
‘African’, and ‘postcolonial’. If we admit that the reasons why we may become 
interested in Lopes’s text have in part to do with an interest in the political realities 
that constitute its subject matter, it seems difficult to ignore Lopes’s life altogether, 
as it is one of the channels through which his text can be connected to those realities. 
However, although Thomas’s reading seems to conform to this approach, in practice, 
the way in which his interpretation of Le Pleurer-rire’s aesthetics comes to shape his 
account of Lopes’s biography (rather than the opposite) suggests both a certain 
reluctance to reduce the text to the intentions and personal circumstances of its 
author and a difficulty in engaging explicitly with the origins of this reluctance. I 
would argue that these hesitations have to do precisely with an unacknowledged 
attachment to the notion of literary autonomy that politicized approaches seem to 
question. As Deepika Bahri writes, ‘The liberation of the text for interpretation 
beyond its pragmatic context constitutes some of what we have come to recognize as 
the ideological power of literature’, and ‘freeing the text from transparent auctorial 
intention’ is a crucial aspect of this literary ‘liberation’.109 Thomas’s attempt to 
reconcile Lopes’s text and his biography is thus a means of concealing the tensions 
between, on the one hand, his investment in literary aesthetics (which leads Thomas 
to provide an interpretation that does not actually reduce the novel to the historical 
and political facts of the author’s life) and, on the other hand, his political argument 
(which brings Thomas to offer a revisionist account of Lopes’s intentions in order to 
reconcile his ‘literary’ interpretation with his apparently political perspective).  
This selective attention to postcolonial authors’ real-world actions has been the 
object of severe critiques, notably from Chris Bongie, who recently launched a series 
of controversial discussions about figures such as Edouard Glissant and Lyonel 
Trouillot. The latter case is particularly resonant with the issues raised in this 
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chapter: relying on a number of biographical and historical elements, Bongie accuses 
Trouillot of using literary fiction to disguise his own partisan agenda as democratic. 
According to Bongie, Trouillot belongs to a group of ‘conservative intellectuals 
whose seemingly benign appeals to “civil society” tacitly promote the interests of the 
neo-liberalizing/colonizing nation states that overthrew Aristide as well as those of 
the unelectable politicians and industrialists in Haiti who supported the coup’.110 
Bongie’s misgivings are particularly directed against a recent reading of Trouillot’s 
Bicentenaire by Martin Munro, who argues that the novel is an attempt to rethink the 
cycle of ‘hatred and revenge’ in Haitian history, and that Trouillot’s work, by 
underlining the various forms of ‘interdependence’ that connect the different social 
classes of Haiti ‘is pushing toward a more complex understanding of personal and 
collective identity and destiny in Haiti, and [...] thereby offers a potential way out of 
the repetitive, circular history that revenge engenders’.111 According to Bongie, 
Munro’s interpretation of the novel de-historicizes it and obfuscates the ‘anti-
Aristide agenda’ that is ‘insinuated’ through its pages:  
What soon becomes clear to anyone with a modicum of knowledge of the text, and of 
contemporary Haitian history, is that Munro is able to ground his approving emphasis on 
archipelagic “interdependence” in the novel only through an extremely distorted 
presentation/occlusion of its historical framework. […] What we have here is an obvious 
diversion away from what the novel is actually representing, namely the student protests that 
month against Aristide’s government, part of a wave of anti-government protests that took 




Bongie therefore argues that in failing to link the demonstrations represented in the 
novel to the real anti-Aristide protests that took place, and by turning them into an 
example of ‘interdependence’, Munro is in fact bolstering the ‘anti-Aristide’ (and, 
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according to Bongie, ‘anti-democratic’) content of the text. This, for Bongie, is 
representative of a more general attitude in postcolonial criticism: 
Our exemplary literary critic’s unwillingness to move beyond Trouillot’s own flattering self-
representation as a “non-partisan” author, a man possessed of a self-evident “respect of 
democratic norms”, is not idiosyncratic but exemplary of a generalized tendency in 
(Francophone) postcolonial studies to avoid any full reckoning with the scribal dimension of 




However, one may wonder what this ‘full reckoning’ would imply. It may be 
tempting at this point to emphasize all that would be lost, were we to simply dismiss 
the elaboration of a literary fiction as ‘diversionary tactics’.114 But this would of 
course only confirm what Bongie considers (in this article at least) a misplaced 
investment in ‘the speculative fiction of literary value’.115 It is therefore more 
strategic to wonder what exactly would be gained through such an approach. Indeed, 
if the aim is to denounce the political duplicity of a number of postcolonial 
intellectuals, and to expose how claims to ‘literary greatness’ legitimize and 
authorize their political interventions, the only way to avoid condoning their ‘de-
historicizing moves’ would consist in refusing to read them ‘literarily’ and to reject 
their claims to fictionality. But if we sacrifice our investment in aesthetic value and 
autonomy in the name of political responsibility, then, as I suggested earlier, it is not 
clear why we should spend any more time on texts such as Bicentenaire or Le 
Pleurer-rire (let alone on other academics’ interpretations of these novels). For 
instance, attempting to evaluate more clearly what Lopes’s historical role has been, 
fleshing out the very incomplete account I outlined in this second part of the chapter 
and trying to establish clear responsibilities might seem a more politically valuable 
activity – in which a close analysis of Le Pleurer-rire would play a limited role.  
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This does not imply that Bongie’s remarks are irrelevant, quite the contrary, but that 
both Bongie’s reconnection of Munro’s reading with Trouillot’s politics and my own 
biographical corrective to the interpretation of Lopes’s text are only interesting as 
complements to the readings they dispute. It is only if we primarily care about the 
task of interpreting Bicentenaire or Le Pleurer-rire that criticizing these 
interpretations can be relevant. Or to put it otherwise: we cannot claim for our 
critiques of these interpretations a different source of legitimacy than the one that 
prompted them in the first place, i.e. an (overt or covert) attachment to the aesthetic 
value of literature. Bongie’s remarks do not matter because of their political import, 
but rather because they underline some troubling contradictions within the practice of 
literary criticism and shed new light on the text at hand. A ‘reckoning’ with the 
‘scribal’ dimension of literature can therefore only be partial and self-contradictory. 
In the case of Lopes, it may appear important to discuss the potential tensions that 
arise between, for instance, a text-based analysis of the representation of censorship 
(in which the ‘avertissement’ might be read as a ‘subversive’ parody, undermining 
both censorship and the expectations it creates) and the actual relation with 
censorship that the text might have had in real life (in the light of which the 
‘avertissement’ might be interpreted as an exploitation of the trope of censorship in 
order to conceal the real political role of the author). But we cannot escape the 
paradox that it is precisely an attachment to literature as such that leads us to probe 




The Trouble with Chinua Achebe’s 




My discussion of Lopes in the previous chapter emphasized the necessity to 
distinguish between our political and aesthetic investments in texts, highlighting the 
tensions and contradictions that arise when critics fail to do so. In this second chapter 
and in the next one, I will both extend and nuance this argument, by showing how an 
awareness of this theoretical distinction needs to be combined with an attention to the 
fact that these investments are not only interdependent at a theoretical level, as I 
suggested in my discussion of Chris Bongie’s article, but also intertwined in the 
ways we experience and interpret texts. This chapter will explore these issues by 
examining Achebe’s treatment of postcolonial dictatorship in his novel Anthills of the 
Savannah.116 By comparing Anthills with the model of the ‘roman à thèse’, which 
was analysed by Susan Suleiman in Authoritarian Fictions, I will argue that in 
Achebe’s novel, the deciphering of a political message and its destabilization by 
‘literary’ interpretations operate in close relation to each other, as two coexisting 
polarities of the reader’s experience.  
The work of Chinua Achebe constitutes an inescapable point of reference if one is to 
consider the relations between the political and the aesthetic in the context of 
postcolonial Africa. The seminal role played by Achebe, both as a writer and as a 
theorist, has been crucial in shaping debates about African literature, and his attempt 
to define the role of the African writer against Western representations of the 
aesthetic remains widely influential. Achebe thus offers an interesting counterpoint 
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to Lopes’s position, as his reflexions on literature have long been characterized by a 
deep scepticism, or even hostility, vis-à-vis the notion of aesthetic autonomy (as 
suggested by his scathing remark that ‘Art for art’s sake is just another piece of 
deodorized dog-shit’).117 His arguments have often opposed the social function of 
African arts and literature to what he describes as the disempowering and 
individualistic conception of art in Western societies: 
In the beginning, art was good and useful; it always had its airy and magical qualities, of 
course; but even the magic was often intended to minister to a basic human need, to serve a 
down-to-earth necessity, as when the cavemen drew pictures on the rock of animals they 
hoped to kill in their next hunt! 
But somewhere in the history of European civilization the idea that art should be accountable 
to no one, and needed to justify itself to nobody except itself, began to emerge. In the end it 
became a minor god and its devotees became priests...
118
 
Achebe’s comments, like many similar discourses that oppose Western and African 
literatures, insist on the divided character of Western societies.119 This division, 
generally attributed to the prevalence of modern scientific thought and/or capitalism, 
implies the separation of ethics and aesthetics, art and politics, or of the artist and 
society, and is opposed to the unity between the work of art and the world that is said 
to characterize African cultures. Consequently, in Achebe’s argument, African art is 
the product of society in its entirety and the artist is one member of the community 
among others: ‘There is no rigid barrier between the makers of culture and its 
consumers. Art belongs to all and is a “function” of society’.120 This insistence on the 
functional role of art was most famously expressed in Achebe’s 1965 essay ‘The 
Novelist as Teacher’, which asserted that the vocation of the African novelist was to 
teach Africans about the positive aspects of their own past:  
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I would be quite satisfied if my novels (especially the ones I set in the past) did no more than 
teach my readers that their past – with all its imperfections – was not one long night of 
savagery from which the first Europeans acting on God’s behalf delivered them.
121
  
These declarations raise difficult issues for literary critics, as Achebe’s ambition to 
appropriate the tools of literary representation, and more specifically the genre of the 
novel, in order to pursue an agenda radically opposed to the notion of aesthetic 
autonomy leaves open the question of the interpretive models one should use in order 
to make sense of his novels.  
These questions have been central to the study of African literatures more generally 
and have been the object of intense discussions since the inception of the field. Some 
critics have argued that ‘Western’ theory is not able to account for African artistic 
productions and have called for a differentiated mode of engagement with them.122 In 
his classic 1972 study The Emergence of African Fiction, Charles Larson complained 
that the reception of African literature had often been polarized between benevolent, 
anthropological approaches that privileged the ethnographic content of the texts, and 
a dismissive attitude on the part of Western literary critics, who focused on their own 
notions of aesthetic value without attending to the cultural specificities of these texts: 
‘One might generalize by saying that the anthropologists have reviewed African 
writers favourably because they have been interested in African cultures per se, and 
the literary-trained critics have been unsympathetic simply because they have 
attempted to force the African writer into a Western literary tradition to which he 
does not always belong’.123 Larson described this as ‘a problem of comparative 
aesthetics’ and argued for a new form of literary interpretation that would not 
overlook the ‘literariness’ of African fiction but would ‘look at African writing not 
only for whatever its similarities with Western literary forms may be, but also – once 
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we have fully identified these – for what is different, and therefore, African’.124 This 
idea of an irreducible cultural difference has led to various attempts at ‘africanizing’ 
literary theory. One could mention for instance Zadi Zaourou’s redefinition of 
Jakobson’s functions of language.125 Zaourou argued that in the context of an African 
‘national renaissance’, using Western theories to analyse African literature would be 
illegitimate and contradictory.126 Drawing from both myths and works of 
anthropology, he asserted that the African view of the universe is ‘unitary’, and that 
language is not separated from the world but part of it, as a fundamental 
‘inseminating force’.127 As a consequence, the African view of language transcends 
all the oppositions at work in Western theory:  
Dans le contexte d'un tel mode de pensée, l'unité des contraires est loi commune et 
quotidienne et cette loi s'affirme partout. En linguistique, elle consacre, d'un point de vue 
pratique, la réduction de la contradiction entre signifié et signifiant, entre contenu et forme 




This in turn led him to claim the existence of two specifically African functions of 
language: the ‘symbolic’ and ‘rhythmic’ functions, both of which are said to 
illustrate the close link between language and society. 
More recently, the political, cultural and economic violence underlining the 
emergence of African literature and ‘non-Western’ literatures in general has been 
explored anew by Nicholas Brown in his 2005 book Utopian Generations. Brown 
emphasizes that the inclusiveness of the concept of ‘World Literature’ tends to 
conceal that cultures occupy asymmetrical positions within the structures of global 
capitalism. According to Brown, the prevalence of the concept of ‘literature’ in the 
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interpretation of cultural contents of various geographical and historical origins is the 
result of a process of cultural homogenization, which has led to the eradication of 
genuine cultural diversity: 
If world literature does not spring spontaneously from a host of freely developing cultural 
equals but rather represents the exploitation of geographic and cultural diversity by a limited 
ensemble of economic and cultural forms, we might ask to what extent “non-Western 
literature” is a contradiction in terms. [...] Can we say of the Inkishafi (a verse meditation 
occasioned by the passing of the city-state of Pate in what is now Kenya, by the late classical 
Swahili poet Sayyid Abdallah bin Ali bin Nasir) that we do not work a well-intended but 
nonetheless violent transformation by understanding it with reference to the concept of 
literature? What we usually call “non-Western” literature is rarely the expression (like the 
Inkishafi) of some other culture, if by that we understand some other set of norms and rules 
that has developed along its own internal logic; rather, it must be thought of in terms of the 
positions that economically, ethnically, sexually, and geographically differentiated subjects 
occupy within the single culture of global capitalism that has more or less ruthlessly 
subsumed what was once a genuinely multicultural globe.
129
 
To such conceptions, other critics have opposed the necessity of engaging more fully 
with the ‘literariness’ of African texts, and have denounced the tendency of critics to 
reduce African writers to the status of native informants. These arguments became 
frequent in the 1980s, when nationalist theories of culture and language were 
increasingly challenged. Thus, in La Littérature africaine et sa critique (1986), 
Locha Mateso complained:  
Lorsqu’on entreprend de lire les ouvrages de critique littéraire africaine produits ces vingt 
dernières années, on constate une certaine identité dans la manière de structurer les matières 
traitées. L’une des singularités de cette critique réside dans l’attention quasi-exclusive 
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According to him, this approach reproduced the attitude of colonial powers toward 
the literary production of colonized people, which systematically emphasized the 
informative dimension of literature at the expense of aesthetics: ‘L’héritage colonial 
subsiste néanmoins sous la forme insidieuse d’un discours condescendant et 
louangeur polarisé par la “négritude” des auteurs. Cette critique n’a souvent cure de 
la valeur intrinsèque des œuvres. C’est l’auteur en tant que noir qui est visé et 
consacré. […] La littérature africaine n’est plus qu’un témoignage sur l’africanité ou 
la négritude’.131 In Mateso’s view, by refusing to address African texts as aesthetic 
productions, critics were denying African literature the dignity of full-fledged artistic 
production and, paradoxically, the impulse to characterize African literature as a 
political discourse led to the reproduction of colonial attitudes.  
*   * 
* 
Anthills of the Savannah represents an interesting focus for these issues, as the novel 
was written at a time when the cultural nationalism that underpinned much of 
Achebe’s famous critical positions had reached a crisis, following the tragic 
evolution of many African states after independence.132 When Anthills was first 
published in 1987, more than twenty years had passed since the publication of 
Achebe’s previous novel, A Man of the People (1966). In this period of deep political 
instability, Nigeria had experienced several military coups and three years of a 
traumatic civil war (1967-1970) following the secession of the South-eastern region 
of Biafra, which was eventually reintegrated into the state. Achebe, himself a 
member of the Igbo ethnic group that is in the majority in Eastern Nigeria, was 
strongly involved in supporting Biafra’s independence and in promoting its cause. 
This context played a central role in the reception of Anthills, as many attributed 
Achebe’s long silence as a novelist to ‘the unmanageableness of this social and 
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political turmoil as a subject for fiction’, wondering whether Nigeria’s recent history 
would lead to a revision of his positions on the social and political role of the 
writer.133 In some of his statements following the publication of the text, Achebe did 
appear quite keen to nuance his earlier positions. For instance, in a 1987 conversation 
with Jane Wilkinson, he went back to the notion of ‘the novelist as teacher’ to 
disavow the way it had been received: ‘I was not thinking of the kind of teacher who 
prescribes. A good teacher never prescribes; he draws out. Education is a drawing 
out of what is there, leading out, helping the pupil to discover, to explore...’134 
However, his comparison, a few lines earlier, between the novelist and ‘the great 
teachers, like Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Buddha or Plato’ should deter us from 
overstating his reconsideration of writers’ social relevance.135 
Anthills is also a particularly appropriate object of inquiry because of the prominent 
place it gives to the role of intellectuals and of literature. Indeed, a striking feature of 
Anthills of the Savannah compared to many novels that deal with dictatorship is the 
somewhat peripheral role played by the dictator. The novel is set in a fictional 
country named Kangan, in which Sam, the Army Commander, has been brought to 
power by a coup. But the real focus of the narrative is the tragic fate of three 
intellectuals in his entourage, Ikem, Chris and Beatrice, who all act as narrators at 
some point in the text. Ikem and Chris are former school friends of Sam’s; they hold 
degrees from Europe, and occupy important functions: Chris as Commissioner for 
Information, and Ikem as the editor of the National Gazette. Beatrice, a beautiful and 
bright woman who became a close friend of Ikem’s while studying in London, is 
Chris’s girlfriend. Sam is only a secondary character, mostly described from the 
outside, through the vision of the other characters (except for the second chapter, in 
which a third-person narration espouses his point of view). Sam’s main function in 
the narrative is to provide an object through which the three main characters’ 
conflicting and changing perceptions of Kangan’s political situation are rendered 
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visible. It is thus difficult to get an entirely coherent picture of him: according to 
Chris, Sam is ‘a very intelligent person’ (11), whereas Ikem describes him as ‘never 
very bright’ (44). Similarly, Chris’s narrative in the first chapter depicts Sam as a 
cruel manipulator, whereas Ikem insists that ‘he isn’t a monster’ (42). By drawing 
our attention away from the dictator himself to the production of discourses about 
him, Anthills highlights the crisis of the role of the intellectual created by 
postcolonial dictatorship, and the difficulty of adapting the previous models of 
intelligibility and narration through which politics was perceived.  
As Simon Gikandi suggested, Anthills thus represents the postcolonial predicament 
as a ‘crisis of meaning’ in which ‘the old narratives of liberation, which assumed that 
the nation would be the fulfilment of human freedom, no longer have legitimacy’.136 
This aspect is reinforced by the complex narrative structure of the novel, which 
alternates between third-person narratives with various foci and first-person 
narratives by the three main characters. These frequent shifts of point of view place 
the emphasis on the difficulty of making sense of the postcolonial situation, which is 
also at the heart of the characters’ concerns. For instance, at the beginning of the first 
chapter, Chris meditates on his own failure to understand when the situation got out 
of hand: ‘looking back on the last two years it should be possible to point to a 
specific and decisive event and say: it was at such and such a point that everything 
went wrong and the rules were suspended. But I have not found such a moment or 
such a cause although I have sought hard and long for it’ (2). Comparably, in Chapter 
7, Beatrice’s retrospective account of the events starts with her difficulty in finding a 
beginning: ‘For weeks and months after I had definitely taken on the challenge of 
bringing together as many broken pieces of this tragic history as I could lay my 
hands on I still could not find a way to begin’ (75).  
The centrality of narration as a theme in the novel is also illustrated by its many 
references to the role of the ‘story’. The topic is discussed when a delegation from 
Abazon, a rebellious province plagued by drought, travels to the capital in order to 
ask for the government’s help. An elder member of the delegation, who is described 
in highly positive terms (‘the power of his utterance held everyone captive from his 
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very first words’ (112)) makes a long and highly applauded speech in favour of 
Ikem, who is also originally from Abazon. Among many statements in praise of 
story-tellers, the old man argues: 
The sounding of the battle-drum is important; the fierce waging of the war itself is important; 
and the telling of the story afterwards – each is important in its own way. I tell you there is 
not one of them we could do without. But if you ask me which of them takes the eagle-
feather I will say boldly: the story. [...] 
Why? Because it is only the story can continue beyond the war and the warrior. It is the story 
that outlives the sound of war-drums and the exploits of brave fighters. It is the story, not the 
others, that saves our progeny from blundering like blind beggars into the spikes of the cactus 
fence. The story is our escort; without it, we are blind. (113-114) 
It is noteworthy that the story is not celebrated primarily for its aesthetic qualities but 
for its social and political role in transmitting knowledge and linking together the 
experiences of past, present and future generations. Furthermore, the use of the term 
‘story’ is significant as it implicitly erases the separation between oral and written 
literatures and situates Ikem’s writings in the continuity of traditional story-telling. 
This is reminiscent of the many arguments that have attempted to offer a genealogy 
of modern African literatures grounded in African traditions, and more particularly in 
oral literature, in order to counter the idea that African writers have simply 
accommodated Western forms and genres. These issues have remained central to 
much criticism in the field of African literature, as exemplified by Abiola Irele’s 
contention that:  
The literature in the European languages is now generally recognized, in its formal 
significance, as an effort to approximate to the oral model, albeit within a literate tradition 
taken from the West; it is this feature that marks the most important African writing of 
contemporary times. The point that emerges here is that, through these two channels, the oral 
tradition continues to function as a fundamental reference of African expression, as the 
matrix of the African imagination.
137
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This desire to establish a distance from Western notions of literature may find 
another echo in the novel’s depiction of an English editor named Dick. Dick is said 
to be running a poetry magazine in Soho, entitled Reject. This magazine specializes 
in the publication of manuscripts which have been rejected by other poetry 
magazines. His Englishness is strongly underlined throughout the passage, and he is 
first designated as a ‘guest from England’ (51). His tone is described by Chris as 
‘offensively patronizing’ (52) and his attitude towards Kangan is marked by 
profound lack of interest and deep ignorance. This, combined with Reject’s avant-
garde ambitions (‘we exploded the pretensions of the poetry establishment and their 
stuffy party organs’ (53); ‘the most significant development in British poetry since 
the war’ (53)) may allow for an interpretation of Dick’s character as a stand-in for 
modern (or post-modern) European literature. Thus, the depiction of Dick’s 
confusing expressions could be read as a mockery of modernist celebrations of 
ambivalence and indeterminacy:  
Actually he has an extremely expressive face if by expressive one means a constant 
procession of shadowy grimaces all of them indeterminate. You cannot look at him and say: 
now he is sad, or he is enjoying himself now. You always have to wait and figure it out and 
still you are not entirely sure. And then all of a sudden you are angry with yourself for letting 
your mind engage with so much trouble on something so inconsequential. (56) 
At this point, one may wonder whether these clues should also be read as indications 
concerning Anthills’ own project, in which case it might seem more appropriate to 
consider the novel as an instance of ‘the story’ and to privilege its moral, political 
and social teachings rather than its ‘literary’ ambiguities. This position has been 
taken by a number of critics, who have based their interpretation of the novel on 
Achebe’s earlier statements regarding the role of the writer. For instance, Omar 
Sougou argues that ‘In Anthills of the Savannah, Achebe remains faithful to the 
didacticism which he conceives of as being the onus of the writer whose mission 
precludes non-commitment’.138 Comparably, Viney Kirpal has argued that:  
Achebe has always seen Nigerian “writers” as the direct descendants of storytellers rather 
than of literate writers in the Western sense. [...] Therefore, instead of formalistic 
                                                          
138
 Omar Sougou, ‘Language, Foregrounding and Intertextuality in Anthills of the Savannah’, in 
Critical Approaches to Anthills of the Savannah, ed. by Holger G. Ehling (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
1991), pp. 35-54 (p. 35). 
69 
 
experiments and intellectual language games, it is a fictional blueprint for political and social 
regeneration that Achebe has given us in Anthills.
139
 
Following a similar approach, David Maughan Brown contends:  
the novel is the fictional product of 21 years of political experience and contemplation on the 
part of a highly, and deservedly, respected author convinced of the functional obligations of 
literature and of the writer’s duty to teach and lead his or her people, and accordingly it must 
invite analysis in these terms.
140
 
As a consequence, Maughan Brown explains that he will adopt a mode of reading 
that moves away from notions of aesthetics and literariness in order to privilege the 
message of the text and its potential ideological impact:  
My intention in this article is to examine, through an analysis of the novel which is more 
interested in symptomatic readings than purely aesthetic evaluations, the kind of solution 
proffered, the extent to which it relates to Achebe’s non-fictional assertions about the African 
“masses” and revolution, and the novel’s potential for “determining” the course of Nigerian 
history rather than merely reporting it.
141
  
Comparably, this desire to find a political message in Anthills has led a number of 
critics to draw direct links between fiction and reality. Thus, the characters’ voices 
have often been conflated with Achebe’s own discourse: ‘Achebe presents his 
thinking most directly through the figure of the controversial editor, Ikem Osodi’;142 
‘The main attribute of the “new radicalism” Achebe’s fictional surrogate in the novel 
Ikem Osodi expounds would be...’;143 ‘I will concentrate here on the use Achebe 
makes of Ikem as the primary vehicle for his message’;144 ‘Ikem, who embodies the 
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message of Achebe’s political ideology’; 145 ‘in examining Ikem’s, and by extension, 
Achebe’s propositions...’;146 ‘It is significant that there is no disguise in Beatrice’s 
origin. She is Igbo like Achebe himself: through her, Achebe states his own position 
on the woman question’.147 Likewise, although Anthills of the Savannah is set in an 
imaginary country, Kangan has consistently been treated as interchangeable with 
Nigeria: ‘The oration, and the novel, amount to a sweeping critique of every portion 
of Kangan’s (Nigeria’s) elite’; 148 ‘Politics in Nigeria, [Achebe] notes in Anthills, had 
no relation to “the lives and concerns of ninety-nine percent of the population”’.149 
These interpretations were strongly influenced by the publication, four years before 
Anthills, of Achebe’s non-fictional essay The Trouble with Nigeria (1983), in which 
Achebe offered a diagnosis of the present situation of the country, insisting 
particularly on the failure of Nigeria’s political leadership. For Neil ten Kortenaar, 
the novel ‘is a working out of Achebe’s concerns in The Trouble with Nigeria: 
Nigeria’s leaders have placed their own interests before those of the nation’.150 
Pushing the argument further, Charles E. Nnolim even suggests that in the light of 
The Trouble with Nigeria, readers should revise their apprehension of all of Achebe’s 
literary works, as the publishing of this book proves that Achebe’s concern is really 
with Nigerian realities and that too much attention has been paid to the formal 
aspects of his writing:  
in The Trouble with Nigeria, Achebe the novelist, finally drops his mask and comes out in 
propria persona to address readers who, over the years, while correctly appreciating the 
felicities embedded in his story-telling techniques have failed to grasp his message; readers 
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who seem to have come to a packed theatre in which great drama is being enacted, and 
decided only to watch the audience.
151
  
Following this interpretation, Nnolim claims that ‘in Anthills of the Savannah, he 
[Achebe] demonstrates that he has lost hope in the ability of the military to solve the 
political and economic problems in Nigeria’.152 This type of reading can be justified 
by a number of striking echoes and similarities between Kangan and Nigeria, which 
have been listed by Neil ten Kortenaar:  
Much of Kangan is recognizably Nigerian. It is located in West Africa on the Niger River. 
The character’s names – Reginald Okong, Beatrice Okoh, Joe Ibe, Ahmed Lango – are 
plausibly Nigerian and not, for example Ghanaian. There are references to the National 
Electric Power Authority (NEPA), to Lord Lugard College (Lugard was the British founder 
of Nigeria), and to an oil boom. If Kangan represents Nigeria, the dissident province Abazon 
corresponds to Igbolan (Eastern Nigeria), the one province out of four that does not go along 
with the President’s wishes, in a national referendum, much as Eastern Nigeria sought to 
separate from the other three regions of Nigeria in 1967. The people from Abazon have 
names like Okele, Mgbafo, and Ikem Osodi – good Igbo names. They speak Igbo as well: 
Ikem writes that the ancestry used to say Nneka, Igbo for “Mother is supreme”.
153
 
In addition, some elements of the novel offer noticeable resonances with details of 
Achebe’s own biography: the name of Chris Oriko, one of the four main characters 
in the novel, is strongly reminiscent of Achebe’s associate, the Igbo poet and 
publisher Christopher Okigbo, who died during the Biafran war.154 Similarly, some 
of Ikem’s declarations converge with Achebe’s extra-textual interventions around the 
time of the novel’s publication. For instance, the quotation of Walt Whitman used by 
Ikem to define his position as an intellectual: ‘Do I contradict myself?/Very well then 
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I contradict myself/(I am large, I contain multitudes)...’ was used in a very similar 
manner by Achebe in his 1986 Nigerian National Merit Award Lecture.155 
As a consequence, many discussions of the book have focused on the evaluation of 
Achebe’s political ‘prescriptions’ for Nigeria and Africa more generally. The critic 
Olugesun Oladipo thus complains that Anthills advocates a ‘reformist social vision’ 
that is ‘inadequate as a model for an African revolution’.156 Yet a significant portion 
of these critics seem to have experienced a certain frustration in their search for the 
political message of Anthills. For David Maughan Brown, not only is there a strong 
discrepancy between Anthills and the ‘populist’ ideas expressed by Achebe in essays 
and interviews, but the novel itself is full of internal contradictions: ‘contradictions 
and confusions can be discerned at all levels in Anthills of the Savannah, from the 
fictional devices used, through to the solutions being proposed’.157 This diagnosis is 
shared by Olawale Awokisa, according to whom ‘Anthills of the Savannah fails to 
make a coherent statement’.158 Awokisa’s analysis relies mostly on the expectation 
that each character should embody a particular position and that Achebe should 
reveal his approval or disapproval of this position through a positive or negative 
depiction of the character. Awosika therefore complains about the ambiguity of 
Chris: ‘At this point we want to fall back on the author. We suspect that his 
conception of this character is faulty. If Chris is a “good guy” why did he have so 
much to do with Sam? If he is a “bad guy” why, then is he oriented so much with the 
clean ones? Chris does not represent any coherent values in the story’.159  
Paradoxically, these attempts to read Anthills as a political reflexion reveal the 
inevitable tension that arises in any attempt to interpret Achebe’s text in a strictly 
‘non-literary’ manner. Indeed, although Maughan Brown and Awokisa choose to 
reject and criticize these ambiguities, their readings bump up against the very 
complexities of meaning that ‘literary’ approaches would valorize. Conversely, the 
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elements that seem to have motivated critics such as Maughan Brown and Awokisa 
to look for a directly political message in the novel have sometimes been perceived 
as heavy-handed and potentially detrimental to the aesthetic quality of the work. 
Thus, Elleke Boehmer notes that ‘In creating a “populist inclusiveness”, Achebe may 
to some extent be suspected of deliberate design. This impression is reinforced by the 
rather determined development of the novel’s two main heroes [Chris and Ikem]’,160 
while David Carroll argues:  
The larger question, addressed with characteristic urgency, is: why and how has the history 
of this fictitious African country become so embittered? Some answers begin to emerge 
through the main characters as their privileged world crumbles around them and they 
undergo a forced re-education. This is the least successful part of the novel. They have to 
learn too much too quickly and they can only do so through a series of revelations, 
conversions, startling insights, which frequently make these sophisticated characters appear 
both inconsistent and unrealistically naïve.
161
 
In the light of these comments, it seems that the didactic and aesthetic dimensions of 
Anthills tend to impinge on each other, and to create conflicting expectations 
concerning the function of the novel. Rather than privilege either of these 
possibilities, my own approach will consist in exploring the complementariness 
between them and to question the alternative between political and aesthetic readings 
which has often polarized the interpretation of African literatures. 
*   * 
* 
To make my argument, I will place my analysis of the text in relation to Susan Rubin 
Suleiman’s 1983 study of the genre of the roman à thèse in Authoritarian Fictions, 
as I believe this will provide key insights for the interpretation of Achebe’s novel. 
The comparison between the two texts is also interesting from a theoretical 
perspective, because Suleiman’s ambition in Authoritarian Fictions was not only to 
foreground the existence of a literary genre, but also to question what constituted at 
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the time (and to a large extent still constitutes) the dominant conception of the 
‘literary’. By focusing on the roman à thèse, her project explicitly privileges texts 
which, because they go against the openness to interpretation and polysemy that is 
often regarded as the hallmark of ‘literariness’, have been marginalized as objects of 
critical attention.162 At the same time, Suleiman’s analysis, which offers a distinctly 
formalistic and structuralist reading of these novels, is clearly situated within the 
very critical methodologies that have led to the marginalization and devalorization of 
the texts she discusses.163 Indeed, Suleiman’s intention is not to reject these 
approaches, but to question the way in which a certain definition of ‘literariness’ has 
come to exclude the impulse to link the texts and the realities to which they 
apparently refer. Of particular interest for the general argument of my thesis is 
Suleiman’s reworking of Roman Jakobson’s distinction between the communicative 
and poetic functions of language. Suleiman moves away from the idea of a hierarchy 
between these two functions, according to which literature is characterized by the 
domination of the poetic function and can therefore be neatly opposed to the ‘non-
literary’ text, which is dominated by the communicative function. Instead, her 
argument emphasizes the manner in which these two functions actually coexist, 
sometimes uneasily, within the categories of the ‘literary’ and the ‘non-literary’, 
thereby creating a porosity between them:  
But if we evoke Roman Jakobson’s terminology, we must recall that according to Jakobson 
the hallmark of a “poetic” text (in the broad sense of a text characterized by “literariness”) is 
that in it the communicative functions of language are subordinated to the poetic function – 
the latter not being limited to literature in verse, of course. [...] To say about a literary text or 
genre, then, that it is “as much” oriented toward communication as toward poetry seems to be 
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to ignore the principle of the hierarchy of functions, for either a text is oriented chiefly 
toward communication (in which case it is not “literary”), or it is “literary,” but in that case 
the communicative function must be subordinated to the poetic one. And yet, every reader 
feels – even if that feeling is no more than intuitive – that in certain literary texts, the 
domination of the poetic function is “stronger,” or perhaps more exclusive, than in others: a 
sonnet by Mallarmé seems more exclusively oriented toward the palpability of signs than, 
say, Hugo’s poem about the two Napoleons, “Le Châtiment”.
164
 
I quote Suleiman at length here because of the role this paragraph ascribes to the 
‘feelings’ experienced by the reader in motivating her redefinition of the relation 
between ‘the poetic’ and the ‘communicative’ functions. Indeed, as I noted in the 
Introduction and as will emerge more clearly in the following chapters and in the 
Conclusion, the notion of experience will be crucial to my own argument about the 
relation between aesthetics and politics. In this paragraph, Suleiman suggests that it 
is precisely because of the paradoxical and heterogeneous experiences that literary 
texts can elicit that we should regard the ‘communicative’ and ‘poetic’ functions of 
language as existing on a continuum. In this regard, the roman à thèse constitutes a 
privileged object of inquiry: ‘the greatest interest of the roman à thèse lies in its 
hybrid character, generating tension between two opposing tendencies: the 
simplifying and schematizing tendency of the thesis, and the complicating and 
pluralizing tendency of novelistic writing broadly conceived’.165  
This tension also plays a fundamental role in Anthills, and the novel shares a lot of 
characteristics with the roman à these as defined by Suleiman. However, my aim in 
this discussion is not to determine whether Anthills of the Savannah really belongs to 
the genre (this point is disputable: Suleiman argues that the roman à thèse is usually 
a realist novel, whereas Achebe’s novel is characterized by a complex narrative 
structure and the presence of mythical elements) but rather to shed some light on 
how its rhetorical and structural characteristics both build up and disappoint the 
expectation that Anthills will supply a clear political message, or even a lesson. 
Suleiman considers that one of the most important traits of the genre is that ‘romans 
à thèse formulate, in an insistent, consistent, and unambiguous manner the thesis (or 
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theses) they seek to illustrate’.166 In other words, what characterizes a roman à thèse 
is a certain eagerness to tell readers what it means. According to Suleiman, one of the 
main devices through which this is achieved is ‘the structure of apprenticeship’. This 
structure, which Suleiman derives from Lukàcs’s analysis of the Bildungsroman, 
consists in the evolution of one or several characters from a state of ignorance and 
passivity to one of knowledge and action, whereby the character discovers the nature 
of his or her true self and attains a form of authenticity.167 In a roman à thèse, this 
authenticity usually lies in the character’s recognition of the validity of a specific 
doctrine.168 There are also reversed forms of apprenticeships, or ‘negative 
apprenticeships’, in which the characters evolve toward a state of inauthenticity and 
unhappiness, but both types of apprenticeships have a similar exemplary function: 
the positive apprenticeship shows the behaviour that the reader should imitate, while 
the negative one is intended to be dissuasive.  
The main narrative line of Anthills of the Savannah corresponds to exactly such a 
structure, and describes the positive apprenticeship of its three main characters, 
Chris, Ikem and Beatrice. Chris is perhaps the one who undergoes the most striking 
transformation. At the beginning, he is presented as a disenchanted young 
intellectual, who, having lost not only his political illusions but also his capacity for 
moral indignation, collaborates with the dictatorial regime of Sam, ‘His Excellency’. 
His moral apathy appears right after the opening of the novel, when after a 
humiliating confrontation with Sam during a cabinet meeting, Chris explains: ‘it 
meant nothing to me – no inconvenience whatever...’ (2). Later, he comments 
cynically on the self-abasement of his colleagues: ‘I find their actions not merely 
bearable now but actually interesting, even exciting’ (2) and justifies public 
executions by saying that ‘from all accounts, [people] enjoyed the spectacle’ (36). 
Chris’s apprehension of the world is dominated by irony and distance, and he 
describes his position as ‘detached clinical disinterest’ (2), or as that of someone who 
sees ‘through a telescope’ (4) – as Simon Gikandi writes, ‘Chris claims the authority 
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of the ironic gaze that can penetrate the masks of power’.169 However, although he 
collaborates with the dictator, Chris does possess a number of positive traits and he is 
depicted as highly intelligent, a quality exemplified by a tirade on nations and 
dictators, which leaves his friend Ikem ‘infuriated and impressed for though he 
[Ikem] may be a great writer yet when it comes to speaking off the cuff he is no 
match for Chris’ (68). His apprenticeship is fostered by the murder of Ikem, which 
forces him to realize the monstrous nature of the regime he has been working with 
and to move from his dispassionate stance to opposition and clandestinity. His 
evolution culminates in his redemptive death, while saving a young student-nurse, 
Adamma, from being raped by a police sergeant. This evolution is highly dramatized 
as Chris is made to utter what is apparently one of the main theses of the novel in his 
last breath: just before dying, he pronounces a few words, which, we are told, 
‘sounded like The Last Grin’ (200). The importance of this enigmatic phrase is 
amplified by the fact that its true meaning is only revealed at the very end of the 
novel, when the surviving characters finally manage to make sense of it. Emmanuel, 
a young intellectual who was travelling with Chris, renders it as ‘the Last Grin’, 
whereas Adamma says that she heard ‘the last green’ (213). The significance of this 
dialogue is reinforced by the fact that Adamma, who is consistently depicted as 
extremely shy, remains silent for most of the novel, thus making her intervention an 
exceptional event. At first, it seems obvious that Emmanuel’s proposition must be 
right, since ‘the last green’ does not immediately make sense. But – after a carefully 
studied delay – Beatrice recognizes the right interpretation: it was really ‘The last 
green’, a reference to the nursery rhyme ‘Ten Green Bottles’. To ensure that nothing 
is left in the vague, Beatrice states all the implications of this reference:  
Chris was only just beginning to understand the lesson of that bitter joke. The bottles are up 
there on the wall hanging by a hair’s breadth, yet looking down pompously on the world. 
Chris was sending us a message to beware. This world belongs to the people of the world not 
to any little caucus, no matter how talented... (215) 
In fact, the reader had already been prepared for that interpretation, since not long 
before his death, Chris had referred to the green bottles, using it to illustrate a similar 
point on the role of leadership: ‘Who are we? The trinity who thought they owned 
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Kangan as BB once unkindly said? Three green bottles. One has accidentally fallen; 
one is tilting. Going, going, bang! Then we becomes I, becomes imperial We’ (176). 
This hesitation between the two interpretations of Chris’s last words draws attention 
to the evolution of the character. If Chris’s last words had been ‘The Last Grin’, this 
would have remained in line with his earlier ironic attitude. The ‘grin’ is reminiscent 
of Chris’s duplicitous playacting at the beginning of the novel, especially when, at 
the end of the ministers’ meeting, he laughs ‘quite ostentatiously’ in front of his 
colleagues (9). The replacement of ‘The Last Grin’ by ‘the last green’, or rather, the 
fusion of the two meanings through the misunderstanding (after all, Chris did smile 
and manage an ultimate joke while he was dying), summarizes Chris’s 
transformation and his new understanding of what Beatrice aptly calls ‘the lesson’. It 
is also significant that the meaning of the phrase could only be deciphered through a 
joint effort in which Adamma was included, along with Emmanuel and Beatrice, as 
this confirms the idea that intellectuals need to listen to the rest of the people 
(although it is nevertheless Beatrice, herself an intellectual, who has the last word on 
the issue). In his last breath, Chris has finally attained a state of authenticity, both in 
knowledge (the ‘lesson’) and action (the rescue of Adamma), as opposed to the 
detachment and passivity of his earlier attitude. But this enlightenment comes too 
late, and it is only through the heroic circumstances of Chris’s death that a final 
redemption can be achieved.  
The second main apprenticeship of the novel is that of Ikem Osodi. Ikem’s initial 
point of view is more or less the opposite of Chris’s. He is a talented poet, the editor 
of the National Gazette, and an open critic of the regime, against which he writes 
incendiary editorials. Contrary to Chris’s ironic stance, his discourse is decidedly 
committed, with strong revolutionary undertones. He summarizes his own attitude 
with these words: ‘Those who mismanage our affairs would silence our criticism by 
pretending they have facts not available to the rest of us. [...] Our best weapon 
against them is not to marshal facts, of which they are truly managers, but passion’ 
(35). Just as Chris’s intelligence was tainted by a measure of cynicism, Ikem’s 
political courage is accompanied by smugness and a tendency to make snap 
judgements. He entertains little doubt about his own insights and seems quite 
confident that his writing is politically efficient. It is clear to him, for instance, that 
79 
 
the prohibition of public executions owes a lot to one of his editorials (39), while he 
concludes his own description of Sam with: ‘I am sure I am right’ (43). In fact, Ikem 
seems to be able to produce definitive opinions on virtually any subject, as his 
constant pronouncements suggest: ‘A man should wake up in his own bed. A woman 
likewise’ (34), ‘They are their own worst enemy, women are’ (34), ‘The Emperor 
may be a fool but he is not a monster’ (42), ‘It does not seem to me that the English 
can do much harm to anybody today’ (47). In addition to this arrogance, Ikem is 
characterized by an extremely condescending stance toward women, which Beatrice 
regards as ‘the only chink in his revolutionary armour’ (59). This misogyny is 
notably illustrated by Ikem’s attitude towards Elewa, his illiterate girlfriend. Because 
he detests ‘the very notion of waking up and finding [...] somebody naked and 
unappetizing’, Ikem usually sends Elewa home in the middle of the night, even 
though this clearly upsets her. During their first argument on the topic, Elewa speaks 
in pidgin and Ikem replies to her, in formal English, ‘your compliment to my stamina 
notwithstanding, the reason is really quite simple’, which he describes as ‘totally and 
deliberately over her head’ (33). Ikem’s unsympathetic attitude to women is also 
reflected in the provocative manner in which he describes his enjoyment of hearing 
his neighbour beat his ‘beautiful wife’: ‘There is an extraordinary surrealistic quality 
about the whole thing that is almost satisfyingly cathartic’ (32), and in his 
amusement at the fact that the only answer a neighbour received after trying to alert 
the police was: ‘So Therefore?’ (32).  
However, this self-righteousness and sexism are both ‘corrected’ in the course of the 
novel, and just like Chris’s, Ikem’s transformation is carefully dramatized. Ikem 
explains his new opinions to Beatrice during his final visit to her home, which takes 
place during a ‘huge and unseasonal tropical storm’ (85) – a use of the pathetic 
fallacy that underlines the inner turmoil of the character. After telling Beatrice that 
he has ‘come on a mission the like of which [he had] never undertaken before’ (88), 
Ikem commences a speech which revolves around two main topics, women and the 
value of political reformism. Ikem starts with a long apology for his previous 
chauvinism and acknowledges that ‘assigning to women the role of a fire-brigade 
after the house has caught fire and been virtually consumed’ is not enough (88). His 
new position on the matter is that it belongs to women to decide for themselves 
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which role they intend to play in modern society: ‘I can’t tell you what the new role 
for Woman will be. I don’t know. I should never have presumed to know. You have 
to tell us’ (90). This new, humble attitude is also a departure from Ikem’s previous 
arrogance, and Ikem exposes his decision to renounce the certainties of revolutionary 
thought in favour of reformism and ideological complexity: ‘Reform may be a dirty 
word then but it begins to look more and more like the most promising route to 
success in the real world’ (91). To which he adds a few lines later: ‘In the vocabulary 
of certain radical theorists contradictions are given the status of some deadly disease 
to which their opponents alone can succumb. But contradictions are the very stuff of 
life’ (91). After the speech, Ikem and Beatrice kiss, a transgression which is yet 
another reflection of the magnitude of the event, and is underscored by Beatrice’s 
strong physical reaction: ‘Everything inside me was dissolving, my knees were 
giving way under me; I was trembling violently and I seemed to be struggling for air’ 
(92). At the end of the passage, as a validation of what has just been said, we read 
that the storm has died without the characters noticing. But again, this conversion 
comes too late to save Ikem, who will eventually be assassinated by the regime. His 
death, however, is preceded by a kind of apotheosis, during which Ikem exposes his 
new ideas in a lecture at the university. The delirious reactions of the audience and 
the positive appreciation of the lecture by the narrator who describes it as ‘so well 
crafted and so powerfully spoken’ (141) leave little doubt as to the validity of Ikem’s 
new-found credo: the character has eventually reached a state of authenticity.  
Yet, in spite of this apparent readiness to offer theses and ideas, the interpretations 
Anthills puts on display are sometimes counteracted by other effects, which create 
uncertainty as to the overall meaning of the novel. This appears already in the third 
apprenticeship of the novel, that of Beatrice, whose personal and political growth is 
somewhat more complicated than that of Chris or Ikem. The character of Beatrice 
has often been perceived by critics as the sign of a complete revision of Achebe’s 
previous positions on the role of women. For instance, Rose Achonolu contends that 
‘in this work, one could argue that Achebe’s women have definitely evolved in 
course of time, from the outsiders they tend to be in the traditionally set works, to 
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their present near-centre position as possible insiders’.170 Similarly, even though he 
acknowledges the limits of Achebe’s vision of women, Omar Sougou argues: ‘By 
creating Beatrice as an outstanding female character, Achebe recasts the view of 
women apparent in his previous work’.171 Another critic, David Ker enthusiastically 
claims that ‘everything about her is meant to remove the prejudices men have held 
about women. [...] Beatrice is a confident woman who knows what she wants. She is 
indeed the new emancipated Nigerian woman, bright, intelligent, career-oriented, 
tough and as committed to worthy causes as her male counterparts’.172 Yet such 
interpretations have been contested by other critics, according to whom Anthills 
maintains women in a subordinate position. For instance, while acknowledging the 
importance of Beatrice as Achebe’s ‘first sustained female subject’, Simon Gikandi 
suggests that ‘one is not quite certain that Achebe, in trying to design a new role for 
this character, has escaped the mythologies that surround the lives and experience of 
women (she is often defined by some quite stereotyped notions about women such as 
the power of intuition over thought, feelings over reason)’.173 Ifi Amadiume goes 
further and argues that ‘As for the author’s commitment to feminism, we find that the 
story has already taken shape before the female characters are introduced. The 
females in fact come in as “subordinate” or in “service relationship” to the men’.174 
Reading Beatrice as representative of the condition of women more generally seems 
all the more tempting as her own narration displays a strong concern for this issue. In 
fact, many of her reflexions have a strong feminist ring to them: ‘I was determined 
from the very beginning to put my career first and, if need be, last. That every 
woman wants a man to complete her is a piece of male chauvinist bullshit I had 
completely rejected before I knew there was anything like Women’s Lib’ (80-81). 
She is also the one who helps Ikem understand that his vision of women is 
                                                          
170
 Rose Achonolu, ‘Outsiders or Insiders?: Women in Anthills of the Savannah’, in Eagle on Iroko: 
Selected Papers from the Chinua Achebe International Symposium 1990, ed. by Edith Ihekweazu 
(Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1996), pp. 311-321 (p. 320). 
171
 Sougou, pp. 35-54 (p. 52). 
172
 Quoted in The Politics of Memory, ed. by Ifi Amadiume and Abdullahi A. An-Na’im (New York: 
Zed, 2000), p. 61. 
173
 Gikandi, Reading Chinua Achebe, pp. 145-146.  
174
 Amadiume, 147-157 (p. 148). 
82 
 
inadequate, and his final realization that women should play a more prominent role 
in society has clearly been inspired by her own assertion that:  
giving women today the same role which traditional society gave them of intervening only 
when everything else has failed is not enough, you know, like the women in the Sembene 
film who pick up the spears abandoned by their defeated menfolk. It is not enough that 
women should be the court of last resort because the last resort is a damn sight too far and too 
late! (84)  
But if at the beginning of the novel Beatrice is presented as an educated, intelligent 
woman, she is also, like Chris and Ikem, a flawed character. Her main weaknesses 
are individualism and an ignorance of her own culture. She thus describes herself as 
somewhat ‘suspicious’ and declares that she ‘never embarked on anything beyond 
[her] own puny powers’ (80). Moreover, she displays a certain contempt for less 
enlightened women, like her maid Agatha, a narrow-minded, born-again Christian, 
whose relation with Beatrice is characterized by continuous tensions and petty 
arguments. Most of these flaws are corrected at the end of the novel, when after 
having lost Ikem and Chris, Beatrice opens up to other people and invites Ikem’s 
pregnant girlfriend, Elewa, to come and live with her. Inspired by the memory of 
Ikem, she also acquires a new-found sympathy for Agatha: 
[Ikem’s] last visit at her flat had risen with his death to dominate her consciousness of him 
and driven earlier and even later memories firmly into the background. [...] 
this consciousness was now, at the ebb-tide of her anger impinging on despised Agatha, who 
had wilfully placed herself until now beyond the reach of Beatrice’s sympathy by her dry-as-
dust, sanctimonious, born-again ways; yes, impinging on her of all people and projecting on 
to the screen of the mind a new image of her; and in the background the narrator’s voice 
coming through and declaring: It is now up to you women to tell us what has to be done. And 
Agatha is surely one of you’. (169) 
The dramatic eruption of this mental ‘narrator’, combined with the description of 
Elewa who, a few lines earlier, is said to be radiating a ‘strong, spiritual light’, a 
‘new luminosity’ and a ‘touch, distinct, almost godlike’, gives this passage the 
appearance of a mystical revelation (169). The validity of Beatrice’s new attitude is 
further confirmed at the end of the section, when she apologizes for rebuking Agatha 
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and places her hand on the maid’s shoulder, to which Agatha replies with ‘a sunrise 
of smiles’ (170). 
Such quasi-divine interventions occur several times in relation to Beatrice, often to 
correct her own view of herself. The most striking instance can be found in Chapter 
8, when a third-person narrator offers a number of clarifications and corrections 
following Beatrice’s narration in Chapter 7. This narrative voice differs from the 
third-person narrator we can find in other chapters of the novel (namely Chapters 2, 3 
and all the chapters following chapter 8), as it is the only one to make its own 
intervention visible and to designate itself by the pronoun ‘we’: ‘that we are 
surrounded by deep mysteries’ (93); ‘she was born as we have seen into a world 
apart’ (96); ‘Barely, we say though’ (96). This use of ‘we’ is not only a classic 
author’s plural, which confers particular authority to what is being said, but also 
appears to represent the collective voice of tradition. This narrative voice thus draws 
a connection between Beatrice and the myth of Idemili, a female deity whose 
function is to create a balance with the male principle of ‘Power’: ‘to bear witness to 
the moral nature of authority by wrapping around Power’s rude waist a loincloth of 
peace and modesty’ (93). However, according to the narrator, Beatrice is unaware of 
her own connection to Idemili, and only ‘carr[ies] a vague sense more acute at 
certain critical moments than others of being two different people’ (96). This 
ignorance is explained by Beatrice’s education in ‘schools which made much about 
the English and the Jews and the Hindu and practically everybody else but hardly put 
in a word for her forebears and the divinities with who they had evolved’ (96). In 
fact, not only did this make her ignorant of the ‘traditions and legends of her people’, 
but Beatrice, according to the narrator, ‘came to barely knowing who she was’ (96). 
The paragraph then ends with this enigmatic sentence: ‘But knowing or not knowing 
does not save us from being known and even being recruited and put to work’ (96), 
which suggest that in spite of her ignorance of her own role, the character of Beatrice 
will be ‘put to work’ to illustrate something of which she is unaware. 
Indeed, all through the novel, Beatrice unwittingly plays the role defined for her in 
chapter 8 and acts as a kind of prophetess, announcing the tragic fate that awaits 
Chris and Ikem. She issues several explicit warnings, such as:  
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I see trouble building up for us. It will get to Ikem first. No joking, Chris. He will be the 
precursor to make straight the way. But after him it will be you. We are all in it, Ikem, you, 
me and even Him. The thing is no longer a joke. (105)  
This prophetic role, which is reinforced in the quotation above by the implicit 
reference to St John the Baptist, ‘the precursor’ of Jesus Christ, is acknowledged in 
Beatrice’s conversations with the other characters. For instance, during an argument, 
Chris accuses her of ‘[s]creaming at [him] like some Cherubim and Seraphim 
prophetess of something’ (103), and later comes to perceive her love-making as a 
powerful rite: ‘Clearly this was her grove and these her own peculiar rites over which 
she held absolute power. Priestess or goddess herself? No matter’ (104). To this, 
Beatrice herself replies: ‘I do sometimes feel like Chielo in the novel, the priestess 
and prophetess of the Hills and the Caves’ (105).175 Beatrice also foresees the grim 
unfolding of the story in less explicit ways. For instance, the threat she perceives in 
the voice of an officer, Major Ossai, at the end of a presidential party, prefigures the 
Major’s decisive role in Ikem’s assassination: ‘The soft voice conveying the news of 
the car waiting below had done it. Her sense of danger had been stabbed into 
hypersensitivity by the menace of that voice – quiet as before but flashing ever so 
briefly with that glint of metal’ (97). Later, when detecting a strange expression on 
Ikem’s face, she senses the tragedy that awaits him: ‘Was it the look of a prospective 
martyr who has successfully trained his soul’s gaze to look past the blurred 
impending ordeal to the sharply focused crown of glory far beyond’ (134). Finally, 
during her last encounter with Chris, she has ‘a powerful premonition that Chris and 
she had tonight come to a crossroad’ (181), while in the last chapter, the events of the 
last weeks are described as ‘the weeks of ill omen presaging the bloody events of 
November’ (202).  
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unconscious role as a ‘priestess’.  
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However, the fact that this role as a prophetess remains mostly unconscious, and that 
Beatrice is somehow ‘known’, ‘recruited’ and ‘put to work’ in ways she does not 
entirely understand creates a contradiction with one of the main lessons of Ikem’s 
apprenticeship: that women should decide for themselves which role they ought to 
play. The authoritative intervention of the narrator in Chapter 8 may even appear as 
an ironic undermining of this statement, as Beatrice is compared to ‘the village 
priestess who will prophesy when her divinity rides her, abandoning if need be her 
soup-pot on the fire, but returning again when the god departs to the domesticity of 
kitchen or the bargaining market-stool behind her little display of peppers and dry 
fish and green vegetables’ (96). This role is obviously quite different from the career-
oriented aspirations she originally expressed, and Beatrice’s ignorance about her true 
self makes her ill-equipped to articulate her own role as Ikem suggested. The 
contradictions that emerge if one attempts to interpret Beatrice’s actions and attitudes 
as a ‘message’ concerning women’s condition and social role has been 
acknowledged by Amadiume who notes that ‘Even with Beatrice, we find that there 
are inconsistencies in the development of her supposed strong and independent 
character in lines such as when Chris says that she asks “inconvenient questions like 
a precocious child”’.176 Amadiume also points out that although Ikem’s new feminist 
credo states that women should not be confined to ‘the role of the fire-brigade after 
the house has caught fire’, ‘This is exactly what Achebe has had women to do in this 
novel – pick up the pieces after the three green bottles get shattered’.177  
*   * 
* 
These inconsistencies in the didactic structure of the novel are reinforced when one 
examines more closely one of the main themes of the text, namely the ‘power’ of 
writers and story-tellers. In addition to the structure of apprenticeship, another central 
characteristic of the roman à thèse analysed by Suleiman is redundancy. Drawing on 
Barthes’s previous use of this notion, Suleiman argues that romans à thèse are 
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inhabited by an ‘obsessive fear to communicate meaning’.178 This closure of 
interpretation is achieved through the accumulation of clues, signs, symbols, hints or 
authorial interventions, aimed at establishing the ‘true’ meaning of the text and at 
dissuading the reader from seeking any other interpretation than the one it provides. 
This corresponds well to the strategies used in Anthills, where theses are not only 
repeated, but also communicated through different devices, such as statements, 
exemplary narratives, symbols, or connotations. Thus, Ikem’s belief in the 
significance of the story is repeated a number of times, through different means. It is 
first explicitly stated when Ikem vehemently opposes the idea that his editorials 
‘achieve nothing’, and it is implicitly confirmed later, when it is recalled that Ikem’s 
editorials saved a friend of his, Mad Medico, from deportation. This belief in the 
power of words is later repeated by the old emissary from Abazon, whose positive 
depiction, combined with the deferential reaction of the audience, grants the idea a 
certain authority. Furthermore, the old man’s argument about the capacity of the 
story to outlive the warrior is again repeated in the last chapter of the novel, when 
Emmanuel manages to convince Beatrice that ideas can actually survive people, by 
means of the written word: ‘It wasn’t Ikem the man who changed me. I hardly knew 
him. It was his ideas set down on paper’ (207).  
However, this openly stated message concerning the power and importance of the 
writer is destabilized by the very episode that is supposed to illustrate it: Ikem’s 
lecture at the university. The lecture is presented to us as a successful, highly 
influential speech, and its importance is dramatized through a lengthy description of 
the surrounding context. First, we are told that an immense crowd had come to listen 
to Ikem: ‘Every seat in the two-thousand-capacity Main Auditorium was taken and a 
large overspill sat or stood on gangways or peeped in through doors and windows 
from the two side-corridors running the length of the hall’ (140). Furthermore, the 
reader’s expectations are heightened by the narration of the different contretemps 
that arise and delay the speech: the absence of a functioning microphone, ‘last-
minute consultations by the organizers’, and introductions. Then, Ikem himself, 
before actually starting the lecture, takes some time to say that his speech is a 
meditation rather than a lecture and to mention the old representative from Abazon as 
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his source of inspiration. At this point, the reader is likely to feel the same impatience 
as the students in the auditorium. But ironically, contrary to the students who actually 
get to hear the speech, the reader’s expectations remain unfulfilled, as the narrator 
does not quote a single word from the lecture. All we are told is:  
It was a brief presentation, twenty to twenty-five minutes long, that was all; but it was so 
well crafted and so powerfully spoken it took on the nature and scope of an epic prose-poem. 
It was serious but not solemn; sometimes witty without falling into the familiarity of banter. 
(142) 
The description is positive but it is also deliberately vague, as the series of 
restrictions make it practically impossible to imagine the speech: ‘brief’ but with ‘the 
scope of an epic prose-poem’; ‘serious but not solemn’; ‘witty without falling into 
the familiarity of banter’. In fact, this description could be said to conceal much more 
than it reveals. 
This disappearance of Ikem’s speech is all the more striking as its narrative and 
ideological function in the novel seems crucial. Ikem’s lecture is the result of the 
intellectual and political maturation he has undergone throughout the novel, and it is 
supposed to offer the synthesis of his declarations to Beatrice, of the things he has 
learnt from the old Abazonian, and of his realization that intellectuals need to restore 
their links with the people (130-131). Ikem seems to have at last discovered what his 
new role as an intellectual living in the postcolonial period might be, and before the 
lecture begins, we are told that he ‘smiled inwardly at the impending coup d’état he 
would stage against this audience and its stereotype notion of struggle, as indeed of 
everything else’ (141), which suggests both the magnitude of Ikem’s ambition and, 
in line with the metaphor of the ‘coup d’état’, the revolutionary character of his 
ideas. This impact is later confirmed in the last chapter, when Emmanuel declares: 
‘The ideas in one lecture by Ikem changed my entire life from a parrot to a man’ 
(207). The importance and the intelligence of Ikem’s speech are also conveyed 
through the enraptured reaction of the students, who are ‘silently entranced’ (142) 
and frenetically call for more: ‘Its sudden end was like a blow and it jolted them into 
shouts of protest. Calls of Fire! Fire! More! More! And even Opposed! Soon turned 
into a rhythmic chant when Ikem sat down’ (142). Incidentally, if we can conjecture 
that the students ask for ‘more’ speech and ‘oppose’ Ikem’s decision to stop 
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abruptly, the shouts of ‘Fire!’ are somewhat more ambiguous. Although ‘Fire!’ may 
be used to convey the students’ state of excitement, the context suggests that it could 
also be a reference to ‘shouting fire in a crowded theatre’, a phrase commonly used 
in the United States to refer to forms of expression that are deemed uselessly 
dangerous and therefore not protected by freedom of speech. By shouting ‘Fire!’ in 
the crowded lecture theatre, the students may be signifying that Ikem’s speech has 
inspired them to transgress absolutely all the limits placed on their own freedom of 
speech, regardless of the potential risks. This would confirm Ikem’s solemn warning 
just before his lecture: ‘storytellers are a threat. They threaten all champions of 
control, they frighten usurpers of the right-to-freedom of the human spirit’ (141). In 
any case, the equivocal nature of the students’ exclamations also provides a further 
example of the way ambiguities in meaning keep disrupting the didacticism of the 
novel.  
Thus, at a first level, the ellipsis of Ikem’s speech could work as an extreme case of 
interpretative closure. The lecture is meant to repeat and synthesize some of the main 
ideas already expressed in the novel: we know about the genesis of Ikem’s lecture, 
and we know what its main ideological orientations are. By forbidding the reader to 
actually read his declarations, Anthills is ensuring that the narrator’s assessment of 
the lecture will not be challenged by any ‘incorrect’ reading. But this vanishing of 
Ikem’s discourse is also highly equivocal and could be read as a complex mise en 
abyme of the double-edged nature of Anthills of the Savannah: a multiplicity of 
devices are used to create the promise of a message, which ‘exists’ only fictionally. 
In the fictional world represented by the novel, Ikem’s lecture has been told, and the 
right words have been found to make sense of the postcolonial situation. But this 
ideological resolution only exists in the novel’s fictional universe, whereas for the 
readers of Anthills, Ikem’s lecture remains a gap and an absence: ironically, the very 
element which is supposed to illustrate the power of the story-teller turns out to be a 
vanishing of the writer’s discourse.  
Comparably, the resolution that emerges in the last chapter is a purely fictional and 
metaphorical one. In this chapter, a new community is gathered in Beatrice’s house 
for the naming ceremony of Ikem and Elewa’s newborn child. This enlarged 
community offers a stark contrast with the little intellectual ‘caucus’ initially formed 
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by the main characters, and a variety of social sectors are represented: Beatrice’s 
maid (Agatha), a market woman and her husband (Elewa’s mother and uncle), a taxi-
driver (Braimoh), the president of the Student Union (Emmanuel), a young officer 
(Captain Abdul Medani), as well as the student-nurse who was saved by Chris 
(Adamma). The idea that this scene symbolizes social renewal and inclusiveness is 
further confirmed by the fact that Beatrice goes against tradition and gives a name to 
the baby instead of letting a man do it, thus foreshadowing a new social role for 
women. The child, who may be read as a symbol for the future of the country, is 
named Amaechina, ‘May-the-path-never-close’, a phrase that is described as a 
Kangan version of ‘hope that springs eternal’ (206). This hopefulness is echoed by 
the numerous prayers Elewa’s uncle pronounces, such as ‘May she have life’, ‘What 
happened to her father, may it not happen again’, or ‘May this child be the daughter 
of all of us’ (210). However, as several critics have underlined, this apparent solution 
is only a fictional one, and it is hard to see this chapter as a ‘blueprint’ for the future 
of Nigeria. Simon Gikandi writes for instance that ‘The naming of Elewa’s new baby 
is a narrative (imaginary) resolution to the paradoxes and problems of an “alienated 
history”’,179 while Elleke Boehmer has suggested that ‘Anthills, the African story as 
novel, carries its own vision of the future in appropriately figural terms. Achebe’s 
“transposition” is in a number of ways, quite clearly, an avoidance technique, 
literally, a displacement of the problem’.180 
In fact, the novel itself stages the distance between this symbolic solution and 
political realities: the community gathered into Beatrice’s house has somehow cut 
itself off from the wider historical context in which another military coup has taken 
place and another leader has eliminated Sam. This new regime does not raise much 
hope, as it is using torture and murder exactly as the old one (203). Thus, while the 
group within Beatrice’s house is calling for the advent of a better future, outside, 
history is repeating itself. This has led Olawale Awosika to complain that Anthills 
offers only a “baseless promise of salvation” instead of a proper political solution. 181 
But it is perhaps only by accepting this limit that the study of fiction can transcend, 
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through imagination, the conceptual and political impasses of the postcolonial 
context. This takes us back to the alternative I discussed earlier, between an approach 
to fiction motivated by its social and political relevance, or an interpretation of it as 
an autonomous aesthetic object whose value lies in its literary destabilization of 
“ordinary” communication. Rather than treat these two possibilities as mutually 
exclusive, the previous pages have drawn on this tension to propel the interpretation 
of the novel. A more realistic approach to the political concerns of postcolonial 
studies probably means that critics must accept that literature can only produce a 
“displaced” answer to political questions. But contrary to what prevalent notions of 
“literariness” would suggest, this does not imply that the desire to find political 
insights into the text is misguided. The impulse towards political realities and 
concrete solutions, which is simultaneously invited and frustrated by Anthills, is 
crucial to the reading experience, and in fact, it is only in relation to this impulse that 
the more “literary” ambiguities of fiction can appear.  
To conclude, I would like to go back to one of Ikem’s provocations. At the beginning 
of the novel, in response to Chris’s claim that his editorials achieve nothing, Ikem 
retorts: “But supposing my crusading editorials were indeed futile would I not be 
obliged to keep on writing them?” (35). Although its primary function is to illustrate 
once more Ikem’s boldness, there might be a more serious point to be teased out of 
this line: with this paradox, Ikem dismisses the alternative between the notion of a 
radical autonomy of literature, which Achebe has so often criticized, and the idea that 
the value of fiction lies in its ability to effect political change. In fact, Ikem seems to 
ground the writer’s social “obligation” not in the direct political effects of his or her 
texts but precisely in their distance from the political. Ikem goes on to lament, 
jokingly, that Chris cannot understand this “logic” anymore, but it is possible that 
this relation can only be expressed and understood in the form of a paradox. At least, 
this is what is suggested by Achebe’s novel, whose response to the corruption of 
anticolonial nationalist ideals by new oppressive regimes took the form of a 
paradoxical project: a roman à thèse that refuses to provide its readers with a clear 









One of the most successful fictions produced about African dictatorship in recent 
years is Kevin MacDonald’s film The Last King of Scotland (2006), a loose 
adaptation of Giles Foden’s popular novel of the same title about Ugandan dictator 
Idi Amin Dada.
182
 The film is a psychological thriller that depicts the tribulations of a 
fictional Scottish doctor, Nicholas Garrigan (played by James McAvoy), who 
becomes Amin’s personal physician and adviser. The plot focuses on the relationship 
between the two men, blending fiction and historical reconstitution in intriguing 
ways, in order to perform a gradual disclosure of the dictator’s deranged personality. 
With a worldwide gross revenue of more than $48 million (for a production budget 
of $6 million), the film was a commercial success, and accumulated over 20 major 
distinctions and award nominations.183 For his interpretation of Amin, Forest 
Whitaker was named best actor at the Academy Awards, the Golden Globes, the 
Screen Actors’ Guild and the BAFTAs, to mention but a few, while the film won the 
2007 BAFTA awards for Best British Film and for Best Adapted Screenplay.  
The success of The Last King of Scotland highlights a crucial aspect of 
representations of African dictatorships, which has not yet appeared in previous 
chapters: their potential appeal as products of popular culture and mass 
entertainment. This raises new issues in our reflexion on aesthetics and politics, not 
only because it introduces a new medium, but also because it implies differences in 
terms of reception and impact. For instance, it might be argued that the popularity of 
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The Last King of Scotland brings a new rationale for privileging a directly political or 
ethical examination, since it is more likely to have had an influence on the general 
public. Furthermore, whereas both Achebe’s and Lopes’s novels were situated in 
fictional countries, the Last King of Scotland takes as its subject a real historical 
character, which makes the question of the relation between the film and historical 
realities all the more pressing. However, this chapter will show that even if we 
decide to focus on political or ethical issues, these are inevitably perceived and 
filtered through the prism of aesthetics and genre. My discussion will also shed light 
on an issue which has not been addressed explicitly in the previous chapters, namely 
the relation between the kind of experiences I have been describing and the notion of 
aesthetic value. Both Achebe and Lopes are commonly regarded as great African 
writers, and it may have seemed that my own exploration has so far relied on an 
implicit, and perhaps narrow, conception of literary value. Although this chapter will 
show that perceptions of aesthetic value are indeed central to the way we experience 
filmic or literary texts, it also suggests that the act of judgement implied in these 
perceptions is only one aspect of the complex ways we relate to these works. 
To pursue this argument, I will place The Last King of Scotland in relation to two 
other filmic representations of Amin’s rule. The first is a work of nonfiction: the 
1974 documentary Général Idi Amin Dada: autoportrait by Franco-Swiss director 
Barbet Schroeder, which was made while Amin was still in power. Amin agreed to 
cooperate fully with the film, which he saw as an opportunity for self-promotion. In 
reality, in front of Schroeder’s camera, the dictator’s attempts to manipulate the 
audience backfired, in a comic exposition of his incompetence and delusions. The 
second film is a British-Kenyan coproduction released in 1981 and entitled Amin: 
The Rise and Fall (also known as The Rise and Fall of Idi Amin).184 Contrary to 
Schroeder’s respected documentary, which was claimed as a source of inspiration by 
Kevin McDonald, this film by Kenyan director Sharad Patel has been virtually absent 
from discussions of The Last King of Scotland. Indeed, with its basic 
cinematography, poor acting, repetitive screenplay, and immoderate taste for bloody 
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violence, Amin: The Rise and Fall is commonly regarded as belonging to the realm 
of ‘exploitation cinema’ – a term I will discuss later on. The events of Amin’s reign 
seem to have been a pretext for an accumulation of violence, and as one appreciative 
reviewer comments on a fan site: ‘never does [sic] more than a few minutes seem to 
pass by without the viewer being treated to a scene of death by firing squad or of 
someone being stabbed, shot, roasted alive, shoved over a cliff, fed to the crocodiles 
or, if they’re fortunate, escaping with just a brutal drubbing at the hand of Amin’s 
hired goons’.185 
At first sight, the critical respectability of the three films seems to coincide with their 
degree of historical credibility: Schroeder’s film has been received as a reliable 
document and is considered a classic documentary, now distributed in the Criterion 
DVD collection, whereas the outrageous Amin: The Rise and Fall is regarded as an 
‘exploitation flick’ and is no longer discussed outside a few fan websites and internet 
forums. The Last King of Scotland stands somewhere in-between, and is mostly 
considered a ‘middlebrow’ entertainment, as suggested by its success in mainstream 
award competitions and the absence of reviews in publications such as Screen or Les 
Cahiers du cinéma. This relation between the perceived truthfulness of a film and its 
respectability was pointed out in a review of The Last King of Scotland by the French 
newspaper Libération: ‘Jusqu’ici les satrapes tropicaux n’ont guère inspiré de 
fictions au cinéma. Trop casse-gueule, peut-être, pour les réalisateurs “blancs”, 
surtout s’ils sont originaires de l’ancienne puissance coloniale. Du coup, les potentats 
africains ont plutôt été abonnés aux documentaires’.186 The implication is that 
because a documentary is supposed to be more historically accurate, it is ethically 
preferable to a work of fiction. This hierarchy and the assumptions on which it relies 
are what the following discussion will question.  
Before I examine these three films, it will be useful to consider more closely the 
specific issues raised by Amin as a topic for filmic representations. Amin, who ruled 
over Uganda from 1971 to 1979, is perhaps the best example of African dictators’ 
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marketability. Already in the early 1970s, Alan Coren published a satirical column in 
Punch entitled ‘Bulletins from Idi Amin’, in which he adopted Amin’s point of view 
to comment on international affairs. Amin also featured in Mad Magazine, as well as 
several movies, including two American TV films about the 1976 Entebbe hostage 
crisis: Victory at Entebbe (1976) with Elizabeth Taylor, Burt Lancaster, and Anthony 
Hopkins, as well as Raid on Entebbe (1977), with Charles Bronson. In addition, 
Amin has been the subject of many books. As early as 1977, Time argued that ‘Big 
Daddy has already inspired what amounts to a budding literary subgenre’, including 
fictional thrillers, plays, and a series of nonfictional studies.187 Giles Foden’s best-
selling novel and Kevin MacDonald’s film are thus only the latest manifestations of 
this ongoing fascination. This popularity was partly the result of Amin’s own efforts 
to seek publicity, notably through an infamous succession of telegrams, in which, 
among other provocations, he wished Nixon a ‘speedy recovery from Watergate’ and 
explained to Kurt Waldheim that ‘Hitler and all German people knew that Israelis are 
not people who are working in the interest of the world and that is why they burned 
the Israelis alive with gas in the soil of Germany’. These provocations, combined 
with the horrific violence of Amin’s regime and the extravagant rumours about his 
supposed cannibalism, made him a sensational topic for Western media. 
This abundance of ‘entertaining’ representations of Amin’s reign appears even more 
striking when compared to the dearth of serious historical studies on the topic.188 The 
source most often quoted in discussions of Amin is State of Blood, the testimony of 
his former Health Minister, Henry Kyemba. Published in 1977 while Kyemba was in 
exile in Great Britain, State of Blood was marketed as ‘the inside story of Idi Amin’s 
reign of fear’ and described Amin as ‘the Hitler of our time’.189 The sensationalistic 
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character of the ‘fully illustrated’ book is obvious enough, as suggested by the 
checklist of atrocities detailed on the back cover, which are advertised as so many 
treats for the reader (see illustration below). However, Kyemba’s account was mostly 
received as historically reliable, especially in the United Kingdom. An editorialist at 
The Times commented: ‘President Amin’s rule of terror has now been finally 
documented by an unimpeachable eye-witness and his regime becomes as much a 
matter for world condemnation – and even more sanctions – as that of Rhodesia or 
South Africa’.190 Similarly, The Guardian wrote a piece which reiterated Kyemba’s 
accusations, arguing again for the authenticity of his testimony: ‘As Minister of 
Health Mr Kyemba was uniquely placed to pin down the truth of what happened to 
Archbishop Luwum and Mrs Bloch’.191 Significantly, the testimony has not yet been 
discredited and is still used in contemporary discussions of Ugandan history. In 
2005, Martin Meredith’s acclaimed and bestselling book on the history of Africa 
since independence, The State of Africa, still relied heavily on Kyemba’s account as 
its main source about Amin’s rule.192 In 2007, Kyemba was also interviewed by some 
Western and African media to give his opinion on the accuracy of The Last King of 
Scotland – which he described as ‘not a bad attempt at history’ in The New York 
Times,193 although he criticized it in Kampala’s New Vision:  
Being a historian by profession, I find the film quite shallow. Since Ugandans are not very 
good at writing history, someone who does it for them should do it very well. My book 
would have given a better story. I do not mean it had it all. State of Blood was recorded at the 
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actual time the events were taking place and it is not fiction. But at least, a lot of stories were 
taken from my book.
194 
That Henry Kyemba’s lurid version of history should remain the main reference in 
current discussions of Amin says something about the limited knowledge available in 
the general public, as well as about the ‘commodification’ of Ugandan history which 
seems to have taken place. The sensationalism of the publication does not necessarily 
imply that it is inaccurate, but it seems quite clear that other concerns, such as 
commercial success and entertainment value, shaped the way it was written and 
published. In this respect, Kyemba’s ambivalent appraisal of The Last King of 
Scotland is quite revealing: it is not clear whether ‘My book would have given a 
better story’ means that it would have provided a more factual basis or that it would 
have been superior from a narrative and dramatic point of view.  
                
Front and back covers of the British edition of Henry Kyemba’s State of Blood (1977) 
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This imbalance in representations of Amin points to a tension between the ethical 
and the aesthetic. Amin’s reign, like that of many dictators, provides an appealing 
story with a powerful, larger-than-life character, strong comic potential and horror, 
that many journalists, filmmakers or novelists may want to use. However, the 
exploitation of this topic as a source of aesthetic enjoyment may well be considered 
ethically questionable. These issues were unmistakably a part of the reception of The 
Last King of Scotland. In The New York Times, for instance, Manohla Dargis 
described the film as ‘a period fiction with a high-gloss historical finish’ but 
concluded that ‘the misery of other people makes for unsettling entertainment’.195 In 
this context, one might be tempted to argue that representations of Idi Amin should 
not be judged only on their aesthetic merit or entertainment value, but that they raise 
a number of concerns, in which, for instance, historical truth may legitimately appear 
central. First of all, the relative ignorance of the general public concerning Amin 
certainly increases the responsibilities of a film like The Last King of Scotland, since 
a large part of its (mostly Western) audience will not have the necessary knowledge 
to appraise the historical representation of the film. This ethical pressure toward 
historical truthfulness is further heightened by the very atrocity of Amin’s crimes: his 
regime is said to have been responsible for the death of over 300,000 people. In 
addition, focusing on Amin could easily appear (as the Libération review of The Last 
King of Scotland suggested) as an unscrupulous attempt to capitalize on the West’s 
fascination with a negative African character, who has come to embody not only the 
failures of independent regimes on the continent, but also many of the racist clichés 
about Africa. As we will see, the filmmakers sought to avoid such problems by 
claiming the film played a pedagogical role, giving audiences access to historical 
truths. This is also how a number of commentators received it. However, this chapter 
will argue that even when critics apparently give priority to this ethical concern with 
truth, the role of historical truth itself actually plays a limited role in the way the film 
comes to be perceived. The paradox, as we shall see, is that while such concerns 
seem to be prompted by the fear of ‘aestheticizing’ Amin’s regime, perceptions of 
truth in filmic representations are largely dependent on aesthetics.  
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*   * 
* 
As a white director seeking to expose the insanity of an African dictator, in a 
documentary partly financed by the right-wing newspaper Le Figaro, Barbet 
Schroeder was taking great risks of being accused of racism. As a matter of fact, a 
few reviewers did make this accusation: in Les Cahiers du cinéma, Serge Daney 
suggested that ‘le film, tel qu’il est fait, ne peut fonctionner (être vu, lu, aimé) que 
s’il réactive le racisme latent de son public’.196 But these reactions remained in the 
minority. For the most part, Général Idi Amin Dada: Autoportrait enjoyed an 
enthusiastic reception, with quasi-unanimous praise flowing from sources as diverse 
as Le Figaro and the communist L’Humanité. This success seems to have had a lot to 
do with Schroeder’s deft use of the rhetoric of documentary objectivity, which 
apparently convinced the majority of critics that his portrayal was simply a truthful 
representation of Amin. This is already suggested by the subtitle ‘autoportrait’, 
which attributes authorship to Amin himself. Schroeder indeed contended: ‘je n’ai 
jamais influencé le général, le film est un autoportrait, coïmprovisé avec nous et en 
totale indépendance financière’.197 Thus, L’Aurore described the film as ‘effrayant 
par son objectivité’, and in Le Quotidien de Paris, Henry Chapier argued:  
Lorsqu’on se trouve en présence d’un tel phénomène de la nature, aucun besoin de le mettre 
en scène : il faut, au contraire, lui laisser la direction des opérations, prendre la mesure de son 
narcissisme délirant, et le filmer tel qu’en lui-même, il se voit forger [sic] par sa propre 
légende. 
Barbet Schroeder ne saurait donc être accusé d’avoir abordé son sujet avec un quelconque 
parti pris : son regard sur l’Ouganda, et le portrait qu’il nous donne du président, c’est à 
travers les jeux du général Amin qu’on le voit ; s’il manque par exemple – dans ce 
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Chapier’s description of Amin as a ‘phenomenon of nature’, and of the film (which 
he refers to as a ‘document’ rather than a ‘documentaire’) as devoid of any ‘mise en 
scène’ clearly endorses Schroeder’s claim to neutrality. The subjectivity which is 
reflected in the film is supposed to be Amin’s own, the fact that the film constantly 
focuses on him is explained by Amin’s ‘delirious narcissism’,199 and even the 
omission of issues such as economics is attributed to Amin’s incompetence. 
Comparably, the critic from the communist L’Humanité, who contended that the 
film’s sponsors were probably hoping to mock Africa and Africans, exonerated 
Schroeder on the grounds of his ‘objectivity’, which, according to him, thwarted 
those initial intentions: ‘Il s’est […], je crois, totalement et très sincèrement effacé 
devant le sujet humain, devant le sujet social abordé’.200 As these comments suggest, 
the notion that what the documentary was representing was only the truth played a 
crucial role in assuaging the ethical and political concerns that might otherwise have 
been raised.  
The tumultuous developments which followed the film’s release allowed Schroeder 
to take his claims to neutrality even further. Schroeder had sent a shorter version of 
his film to Amin, who declared himself entirely satisfied with it. But upon hearing 
that European audiences were laughing in screenings of the finished documentary, 
Amin sent emissaries to report on its actual content and on the audiences’ reactions. 
He then rounded up a hundred and fifty French expatriates in Kampala and used 
them as hostages to force Schroeder to make some cuts. Amin asked for and obtained 
four cuts, totalling 2 minutes and 21 seconds. The first one involved archive footage 
of public executions, which Schroeder used to introduce his portrait, probably to 
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prevent viewers from taking Amin as a mere buffoon. The second cut follows a 
particularly tense and theatrical Cabinet meeting, in which the Foreign Minister is 
scolded by Amin for being ‘weak’. In the finished version of the film, Schroeder had 
inserted a comment saying ‘two weeks later, the body of Michael Ondoga, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, was found in the Nile. He was replaced by a former model, 
Princess Bagaya, who holds a law degree from Oxford’, accompanied by a shot of 
the minister’s face and a black and white picture of his replacement. The third cut is 
a sequence where Schroeder and Amin share a laugh about a telegram sent by Amin 
to Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere: ‘I want to assure you that I love you very 
much and if you had been a woman I would have considered marrying you although 
your head is full of grey hairs. But as you are a man that possibility does not arise’. 
Finally, Amin also asked that the last sentence of the documentary be cut, which 
said: ‘After a century of colonisation, let us not forget that it is partially a deformed 
image of our own selves that Idi Amin Dada reflects back at us’. All the cuts, except 
this last sentence, have now been reintegrated into the Criterion edition DVD. This 
censorship was widely publicized by Schroeder and the missing scenes were 
indicated in the film. Audiences were presented with a note detailing the content of 
the cuts that said: ‘This has now become a film by Idi Amin Dada, with Barbet 
Schroeder as an assistant’.201 However, Schroeder’s disclaimer is of course highly 
ironic, and if Amin’s final cuts, flagged within the film, prove something, it is not 
that he had control over the film but rather the opposite. In cutting only 2’21 minutes, 
Amin revealed his inability to understand how and why the film was ridiculing and 
undermining him. Amin’s incompetence and deranged personality shine throughout, 
and to take just one example, his proud exhibition of the ‘Protocol of the Elders of 
Zion’ as a classified document proving the existence of an Israeli plot to conquer the 
world’s holy places probably did as much to discredit him as any of the passages he 
chose to censor.  
 Throughout the film, Schroeder successfully draws an opposition between his own 
purported neutrality and the orchestrated nature of Amin’s self-representation, 
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thereby making him entirely responsible for the artificiality and subjectivity of the 
portrayal. Schroeder and his crew follow Amin with mobile equipment and 
frequently interview him. The focus is usually on Amin, and outside Schroeder’s 
brief introduction, there is no narration, or music – except for the music internal to 
certain scenes (music that, the credits insist, was composed by Amin himself). On 
occasion, archive footages or photographs as well as voice-over comments by 
Schroeder are inserted, in order to introduce a sequence or offer complementary 
information, all of which often corrects or qualifies Amin’s claims. However, 
Schroeder’s comments are always phrased in the most impersonal manner, with no 
reference to his personal opinions. This creates the impression that Amin is the one 
guiding us through his own regime, while Schroeder is only offering factual 
illustrations or correctives. In addition, the director and his crew remain very much a 
semi-presence. Schroeder’s questions and prompts are usually heard, but he does not 
normally appear directly on screen, and we never hear him engaging in conversation. 
In some scenes, one can nonetheless sense the influence of a manipulative off-screen 
relationship between Amin and the director.202 This is the case when, for instance, 
Schroeder eagerly asks Amin to ‘tell us a story’ or heartily laughs with him in order 
to encourage his confidences. But crucially, even in these moments, Schroeder 
encodes himself not as an authorial presence, but as a mere relay for the spectator’s 
curiosity and amusement.  
Amin, on the other hand, is presented as obsessed with mise-en-scène. The editing 
carefully includes several of his comments on the making of the film. For instance, 
on a boat cruise, we hear him say ‘this is a very good picture you can get’. Similarly, 
in a scene in which Amin organizes a military exercise, simulating the capture of the 
Golan Heights, the focus stays on him rather than on the operations. Amin can be 
seen rushing the cameraman and shouting ‘Film! Film the helicopter’ while pointing 
at the sky. This theatricality is reflected at the thematic level of the film, which, 
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crucially, features mostly a series of enactments, or events which already imply 
staging: military drills, parades, public speeches. Furthermore, when the artificiality 
of a scene is not sufficiently self-evident, Schroeder explicitly uses voice-over 
comments to expose Amin’s heavy-handed manipulations. For instance, when Amin 
examines some weapons which have supposedly been captured by his soldiers, 
Schroeder tells us: ‘the General has already reviewed these arms several times’. 
Another noteworthy intervention occurs in a scene which represents Amin’s 
helicopter landing near a village and the enthusiastic welcome of the population. A 
series of medium-shots show women and children assembling, under the direction of 
soldiers. Schroeder’s voice is then heard: ‘as with many other scenes in this film, the 
people’s welcome in a small garrison town was specially organized for the film’. At 
this point, Amin’s helicopter appears and we see first a long shot of the well-ordered 
crowd, and then another shot following the graceful movements of the helicopter as 
it lands, stirring up the sand of the trail. But with typical irony, the frame is then 
displaced in order to focus on the ‘extras’, who have to run away from the dust 
stirred by the helicopter in the most disorderly fashion, thus ruining the whole effect 
of majesty. The irony is reinforced by the fact that this scene may read like a parody 
of the imposing opening of Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, in which Hitler’s 
plane lands on the city of Nuremberg to be welcomed by an enthusiastic crowd.
203
 
The issues raised by Schroeder’s film may also be reminiscent of the controversy 
surrounding Riefenstahl’s ‘documentary’, especially the much debated issue of 
whether or not the events depicted, and particularly the enthusiasm of the German 
crowd, had been staged for the cameras. Some of Riefenstahl’s defenders argue that 
the film is not a work of propaganda and claim that it only recorded the theatricality 
of the 1934 convention of the Nazi party. According to Thomas Hinton, for instance, 
the close-ups of faces in the crowd are only an attempt ‘to approximate on film the 
induced hysteria’ of the participants.204 But even if one were to accept this 
interpretation, it is quite clear that Riefenstahl’s film does not expose the 
manipulation at work and in fact strives to espouse the mise-en-scène of the event. 
Here Schroeder does exactly the opposite and relies on the constructedness of the 
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scene he shoots to convey his own claim to documentary neutrality.205 Indeed, by 
being able to demystify Amin’s (unconvincing) attempts to create a fantasized vision 
of himself and the world around him, the film is able to further its own claim to 
documentary realism. 
The build-up of this tension between Amin and Schroeder is what serves as the main 
driving force of the film. A striking characteristic of Schroeder's documentary is its 
apparent absence of story line. Its progression does not seem to obey any obvious 
chronology, be it that of Amin’s life, of the events depicted, or that of the making of 
the film. On the surface, the narrative may even appear slightly repetitive. Contrary 
to The Last King of Scotland, Schroeder’s film is not organized around the gradual 
revelation of Amin’s crimes; the disclosure of Amin’s atrocities happens right at the 
beginning, with the inclusion of archive footage of public executions. Instead, the 
documentary is structured around the confrontation between the objective director 
and the deluded, attention-seeking dictator, who tries to turn the film into a work of 
propaganda. This is particularly well illustrated in a passage where Schroeder starts 
interviewing Amin in the gardens of Entebbe Palace, among some of his eighteen 
children. We learn that this interview was simultaneously filmed by Ugandan 
television, and was later broadcast as part of national news, Schroeder and his crew 
becoming proof of the international interest and admiration Amin claimed to inspire. 
On the images from Ugandan Television, the framing is wider than in Schroeder’s 
shots, so that the director and his collaborators appear directly on screen. These 
images were re-used by Schroeder, who inserted excerpts of this televised version of 
the discussion into his own interview. The artificial and mediated character of the 
scene broadcast by Ugandan Television is underlined by the fact that the Ugandan 
version of the interview was captured on a television set, which was included in the 
frame. The black and white imagery contrasts heavily with the immediacy of 
Schroeder’s colour photography, and the comically lifeless delivery of the Ugandan 
anchorman makes the scene sound like a badly acted play. Again, Amin’s attempt to 
turn the documentary into a means of propaganda is used to foreground the 
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‘naturalness’ of Schroeder’s own images, and enables the documentarist to present 
his version as the reality of the scene, while the Ugandan news broadcast appears less 
competent and a partial distortion. 
               
          Schroeder’s interview of Amin    Broadcast by Ugandan television  
This tension between Amin’s version of reality and Schroeder’s finds its resolution 
in the last shot of the film, which consists of a close-up of Amin’s face, in complete 
silence, except for his loud breathing sounds. The image is completely at odds with 
the relaxed and humorous persona that is on display during most of the documentary: 
Amin’s eyes are moving quickly, and a rapid succession of emotions crosses his face, 
making him look in turn threatening, vulnerable, bored, scared, and suspicious. The 
shot seems to have been taken from a previous scene, in which Amin is addressing 
an assembly of doctors. This is visibly a stressful occasion for him and at several 
moments, Amin appears overwhelmed, incapable of addressing the questions of this 
educated audience in a convincing manner: he wrings his hands, congratulates them 
on their remarkable achievements in primary school and advises them not to get 
drunk. His uneasiness is deftly underlined by the soundtrack, in which Amin’s heavy 
sighs and gulping sounds have been amplified. In the final images, this context is 
now erased, and the doctors are no longer seen or heard. The shot, certainly one of 
the most poignant in the film, becomes the visual conclusion of the portrayal and 
arguably works as the film’s final ‘moment of truth’. It constitutes the triumph of the 
supposed objectivity of the director over a frightened Amin, whose disturbed 
subjectivity seems finally exposed. Initially, the images were accompanied by 
Schroeder’s last voice-over comment: ‘After a century of colonization, let us not 
forget that it is partially a deformed image of our own selves that Idi Amin Dada 
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reflects back at us’. The function of this sentence, modelled on Jean Rouch’s 
introduction to Les Maîtres fous (‘Et ce jeu violent n’est que le reflet de notre 
civilisation’206), was to encourage self-reflexivity on the part of European audiences, 
and according to Schroeder, it ‘attempted to explain the character and sought to 
avoid racist nuances in the film’.207 Beyond the last-minute critique of colonialism, 
the choice of words is significant: Amin is said to ‘reflect back’ the European 
audience’s own image, but in insisting on this direct reflection, the sentence is 
implicitly leaving out the mediating role of the film itself. Thus, one critic 
commented enthusiastically about this shot: ‘Rien n’est imposé. Rien n’est dicté. 
Tout est à voir, à décrypter, à regarder, à attendre et à entendre’.208 From this 
perspective, this last image not only appears objective but is supposed to contain 
‘everything’: the whole truth about Amin is there, waiting to be deciphered.  
   
Schroeder’s final close-up. 
All this highlights one of the most impressive achievements of Schroeder’s film, i.e. 
its complex manipulation of the codes and expectations associated with documentary 
realism. Insisting on Amin’s own mise-en-scène offered Schroeder an ideal foil 
against which to present his own images as objective. This strategy engaged and 
displaced what Bill Nichols has described as the most basic assumptions defining the 
documentary form, namely the belief that what is represented on screen has not been 
staged for the purpose of being filmed: 
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Since documentary does not address the fictive space of classic narrative but historiographic 
space, the premise and assumption prevails that what occurred in front of the camera was not 
entirely enacted with the camera in mind. It would have existed, the events would have 
unfolded, the social actors would have lived and made a presentation of themselves in 
everyday life irrespective of the camera’s presence. 
Though subject to extensive qualification and subversion, this serves as a founding premise, 




By insisting on the fact that everything has been staged by Amin, Schroeder is 
introducing the divide between fiction and nonfiction within his own documentary, 
only to reassert its claim to nonfictionality. Indeed, the whole film is constructed as a 
rejection and a demystification of Amin’s fictions, but this fictionality is presented as 
the exclusive property of the profilmic scene and does not contaminate Schroeder’s 
‘document’.  
In exploring these strategies I of course have no intention of defending Amin, and I 
do not necessarily wish to imply that Schroeder’s images are ‘untrue’. Indeed, 
opposing the presence of Schroeder’s subjectivity and authorial interventions to 
‘truth’ would be reproducing the very opposition of objectivity and subjectivity that 
was staged in the film. As Michael Chanan writes:  
It is one thing to recognize this dose or dimension of subjectivity in the image. It doesn’t 
follow that it is therefore not a true image. For that would be to assume an equation in which 
the subjective is opposed to the objective, and the objective is identified with truth.
210
 
Rather, the point I have wanted to emphasize is that judgments on the political and 
ethical aspects of the film were deeply influenced by the fact that it was perceived as 
a mere representation of reality; yet this perception was itself the result of a complex 
play with the aesthetics of documentary.  
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*   * 
* 
It is certainly a tribute to the compelling character of Schroeder’s last shot that Kevin 
McDonald chose to edit it into The Last King of Scotland, just before the closing 
credits, thereby reinforcing its status as a repository of Amin’s true character. In fact, 
this is only one of several intertextual echoes between them. In addition to this direct 
quotation, some scenes from the documentary have been re-enacted as part of the 
fiction. The most noticeable is a scene in which Amin cheats in a swimming race 
with some of his collaborators, who would obligingly let him win anyway. In the 
documentary, Amin blocks the way for his competitors, which may still seem 
inadvertent, while in the film, the cheating is made more obvious as Amin jumps in 
the water before the race has started. Both scenes were shot at the same swimming 
pool in Kampala’s Sheraton hotel, and in both cases, Amin comes first and receives 
the servile congratulations of his entourage. Another echo is discernible in the way 
Amin reminisces over his deprived childhood and training in the British army. In the 
documentary, the confidence is addressed to Schroeder, while in the fiction, Amin is 
speaking to Garrigan. Both tirades start with similar sentences, respectively: ‘I come 
from very poor family, I wanted to tell you this’, and: ‘I come from very poor family, 
I think you should know this’. More generally, Whitaker seems to have made 
extensive use of the documentary to build his performance, borrowing some of 
Amin’s gestures as they appear in the more informal conversations in the 
documentary, such as pointing his finger at his interlocutor while laughing. 
This eagerness of The Last King of Scotland to somehow establish a connection with 
Schroeder’s portrayal points towards one of the film’s main difficulties: not being a 
documentary. Whereas Schroeder was able to thwart accusations of racism by 
claiming to have only captured the reality of Amin’s foolishness, the makers of The 
Last King of Scotland found themselves in a more complicated situation. On the one 
hand, the nature of the subject demanded that a level of historical accuracy should be 
respected: being based on historical facts not only provides an ethical justification for 
the film, but also constitutes an important part of its dramatic appeal. On the other 
hand, the film being a fiction, the filmmakers did not have the same latitude to 
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excuse the potentially racist or stereotypical aspects of the narrative in the name of 
documentary truth. Thus, the screenplay carefully tiptoed around many of the 
elements that made Amin a popular tabloid figure, such as his declarations about 
Hitler, his suspected syphilis (a scene treating this question was shot but edited out), 
or his rumoured cannibalism (the rumours are only mentioned once, by Amin 
himself, who vehemently denies them). In one of the most noted scenes of the film, 
Amin was even given the opportunity to respond to the attacks of Western journalists 
during a press conference, in which he craftily seduces the press. The ways in which 
the film attempted to negotiate between, on the one hand, the pressures towards 
historical truth and, on the other hand, the necessity to produce a socially acceptable 
portrayal of Amin, constitutes one of the most interesting and problematic aspects of 
the production. 
The first strategy used by the filmmakers to legitimate their representation consisted 
in claiming a degree of historical truthfulness. First, the film is introduced by this 
message: ‘This film is inspired by real people and events’, and nowhere are the 
alterations or condensations operated by the narrative detailed or explained, thus 
suggesting that it sets out to be a basically faithful historical chronicle. Comparably, 
the film ends with a return to historical time and reality. The ending depicts 
Garrigan’s flight from Uganda, hidden among the hostages of the (historical) 
Entebbe crisis. After a last close-up of Garrigan’s bruised and bloody face in the 
plane, a text appears which stitches the two temporalities of history and fiction back 
together: ‘48 hours later, Israeli forces stormed Entebbe and liberated all but one of 
the hostages’. There follow a few archive images of Uganda after Amin’s demise and 
during Amin’s rule, some information on Amin’s killing of more than 300,000 
Ugandans, and, finally, the insertion of Schroeder’s close-up. The notation ‘48 hours 
later’ is particularly striking since, located as it is after a shot of Garrigan, it seems to 
situate those historical events ‘48 hours after Garrigan’s flight from Uganda’, i.e. 48 
hours after a fictional event, rather than 48 hours after the release of the non-Israeli 
hostages from Entebbe. In doing so, the film suggests a continuity, if not an 
equivalence, between its own temporality and that of history, as well as between its 
own images and the archives it quotes.  
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The film’s inscription within history was also strongly present in its promotional 
materials, which played an important role in setting audiences’ expectations. For 
instance, much emphasis was placed on the fact that The Last King of Scotland was 
shot in Uganda, with a largely Ugandan crew – an exceptional fact, as most 
commercial films set in Africa are shot in Nigeria or South Africa, regardless of the 
actual country depicted. This argument has been used by both MacDonald and 
Whitaker to counter any suggestion that the film was a ‘Hollywood-filtered’ and 
‘white’ representation of Africa. Giles Foden, in an account of the film’s premiere in 
Kampala, quotes Whitaker as saying ‘Almost half the crew was Ugandan, a great 
proportion of the cast was Ugandan, and the people who advised me on how to play 
Amin were Ugandan. Those things infused themselves into the movie’.211 Kevin 
MacDonald also underlines in the DVD commentary of the film that minute attention 
was given to historical details, and that great efforts were made to retrieve, for 
instance, Amin’s car or Amin’s tailor. Whitaker’s performance was also central to 
the film’s claim to truthfulness. Not only did it earn The Last King of Scotland an 
Oscar, it was also the focus of much of its reception. Indeed, virtually no review or 
interview failed to dwell on Whitaker’s acquired resemblance to Amin and on his 
extreme form of method acting: Whitaker learned Swahili and the accordion, spent 
weeks with Amin’s family and friends, and stayed in character during most of the 
shoot, eating only the same food Amin would eat, and never parting from his new 
Ugandan accent.212 In the DVD commentary, the director claims that during the 
shooting of Amin’s speech to the crowd at the beginning of the film, some of the 
Ugandan extras actually thought that it was the real Amin and wondered why he was 
repeating the same speech several times.213 The representation of Whitaker’s 
performance as a near case of possession or haunting reverses the terms in which 
Amin’s own performance as himself in Schroeder’s documentary was perceived. In 
the documentary, it was paradoxically the inauthenticity of Amin which served to 
‘naturalize’ the documentary, whereas in Macdonald’s fiction, it is the notion of a 
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genuine merging between Whitaker and his character which was used as a signal for 
the film’s authenticity.  
But, as I said before, although these claims to historical truthfulness were a means of 
avoiding accusations of racism, the film also mobilized another set of strategies, this 
time through its fictional framing. In spite of its inscription in real historical events, 
the film’s aesthetics leave no doubt as to its fictional nature: there is no play with the 
conventional codes of documentary (interviews of ‘witnesses’, out-of-focus shots, 
shaky images, underexposure, etc.); the camera has unlimited access even to the most 
private moments of the characters’ lives; and each scene is filmed from different 
angles, which are seamlessly edited together. This aesthetic code creates a set of 
expectations different from that of a documentary or nonfictional representation. As 
Bill Nichols argues in Representing Reality, recent works of criticism have 
increasingly underlined the proximity between fiction and nonfiction, particularly 
their shared dependence on narrative conventions. But, as Nichols emphasizes, in 
spite of this common textuality and constructedness, and even if we admit that 
‘documentariness’ and ‘fictionality’ may not reside in ontological particularities of 
the filmic text, the distinction between them nonetheless intervenes at the level of the 
viewer’s expectations:  
Documentary shares the properties of a text with other fictions – matter and energy 
are not at its immediate disposal – but it addresses the world in which we live rather 
than worlds in which we may imagine living. This may be partly a matter of 
conventions and expectations, but it makes a fundamental difference.
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As Nichols puts it a few pages later, fiction only purports to represent ‘a world’, 
however realistic it might be, while documentary creates the expectation that it will 
represent ‘the world’. Even those documentaries that try to acknowledge their own 
subjective or ideological biases do not claim to represent just ‘a world’ but ‘a view 
of the world’.215 Consequently, it seems reasonable to assume that audiences will not 
look for a factual account in an openly fictional narrative and that few would 
consider a fictional representation as offering direct access to reality. In this 
situation, truth still plays a role, but this time the model at work is that of 
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vraisemblance, in accordance with Gérard Genette’s definition: ‘Le récit 
vraisemblable est […] un récit dont les actions répondent, comme autant 
d’applications ou de cas particuliers, à un corps de maximes reçues comme vraies par 
le public auquel il s’adresse’.216 The narrative is thus judged in relation to accepted 
representations of the social world, informed by conceptions of what is ‘possible’ 
and ‘acceptable’, rather than in relation to historical accuracy.  
The filmmakers were therefore able to capitalize on the insertion of the fictional 
Garrigan in order to give another meaning to the depiction of Amin’s regime. The 
description of Amin’s rule is indeed inscribed within a larger narrative framework in 
which the selfish and reckless Garrigan, who has chosen to turn a blind eye to 
Amin’s crimes and to become his close collaborator, is gradually made to face the 
consequences of his actions, as he himself becomes the victim of Amin’s madness 
and brutality. The presence of Garrigan displaces the focus away from Amin to a 
critique of the white man’s perception of him, thereby transforming the Scottish 
doctor into a representative of the Western world’s irresponsibility vis-à-vis Amin 
and Africa. To highlight this, I would like to turn to one of the few negative 
appraisals of The Last King of Scotland, published by novelist Vanessa Walters in 
The Guardian’s ‘Comment and Debate’ section. Walters criticized the film for the 
high degree of attention it gives to the white Garrigan, and described it as ‘a white 
story for white audiences’.217 She explicitly distanced herself from the film’s other 
reviewers and argued that its success came from manipulating clichés about Africa:  
Most reviewers have failed to clock the fact that “the white man trying to save ethnic man” 
from himself is a well-worn caricature. Nor do they question the other easy stereotypes that 
crop up in the film. Apart from the scary men running around Uganda with AK47s, there is a 
plethora of scantily clad go-go-dancers and other exotic, sexually available women to be 
bedded by Garrigan – including one of Amin’s wives.
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It might be retorted that Walters’s argument fails to do justice to the complexity of 
the film’s strategies. First, Walters grounds her argument on a theory according to 
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which ‘moviegoers want to watch people they are interested in: themselves; and they 
demand the all-important catharsis at the end of the film to provide them with a new 
understanding about who they are. And since the majority of the western film-going 
public is white, then that self on screen must also be white’.219 Although the notion of 
a radical incapacity of white audiences to identify with black characters is highly 
disputable, it is true that throughout the film the spectator is invited to share 
Garrigan’s experiences. But this process of ‘identification’ has more to do with 
narrative strategies than with any immediate empathy based on racial solidarity. It is 
Garrigan’s unrest which provides the starting point of the story, as he decides to 
travel to Uganda in order to escape the quiet and uneventful life that awaits him in 
Scotland. Throughout the narrative, Garrigan is present in all sequences and the 
spectator discovers Amin and Uganda at the same time as he does. In fact, Amin is 
always seen in his presence, and is entirely perceived through their relation, from 
Garrigan’s perspective. The film itself, in its colour palette, rhythm and music, 
reflects Garrigan’s interiority. The first part, characterized by lush landscapes, a 
luminous, saturated photography, and festive music, transmits something of 
Garrigan’s initial wonder and excitement. In the second part, nightly or interior 
scenes become predominant, and the film’s rhythm becomes more erratic as Garrigan 
discovers Amin’s horrifying violence. This proximity to Garrigan’s point of view is 
also underlined visually at several points. For instance, during a party scene in which 
Garrigan gets drunk and broods over his own predicament, the camera reflects his 
drunkenness and inner turmoil through a series of flashbacks and visual effects that 
mimic his mental and physical state of confusion. 
 
The photography mimics Garrigan’s drunken vision. 
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This focus on Garrigan’s own vision of reality is crucial: taken as reflections of 
Garrigan’s irresponsible and hedonistic perception of Uganda, the groovy music, the 
children running alongside the car, and the sexually available women can be 
recuperated within a critique of the Scottish doctor’s exoticizing vision. For instance, 
when Garrigan is blamed by Amin for coming to Africa only ‘to fuck and take 
away’, the film seems to form a retrospective judgement on the way the character 
easily seduced black women in the first half. This is what was suggested by Kevin 
McDonald, in his comments on the ethical and political difficulties of representing 
Amin:  
I wouldn’t have made the story if it had just been about Idi Amin and Uganda. It’s up to a 
Ugandan or African film-maker to tell Idi Amin’s story, but the experience I understand is 
what it’s like to be a young Scot going to Africa, because I’ve done that myself. So the film 
is told from Garrigan’s point of view and is about the relationship between Britain and 
Uganda. Still, I was wary about using the Third World as an exotic backdrop and having a 
white hero, which is why Garrigan is morally ambiguous.
220
  
In reality, Walters’s accusations and Macdonald’s self-consciousness are two faces 
of the same coin. By espousing the point of view of Garrigan, the film is able not 
only to represent, but in fact to reproduce the enjoyment experienced by the 
character, while later disavowing its own representation of Africa by conducting a 
critique of Garrigan. If we accept Walters’s premise that ‘scary men running around 
Uganda with AK47s’ and exotic, sexually available women contribute to a 
stereotyped vision of Africa, there is no doubt that the film capitalizes on it at the 
same time as it criticizes it.  
But beyond this contradiction lies another one. Although the two strategies of 
historical and fictional legitimation seem to be oriented toward a same objective, i.e. 
avoiding accusations of racism, their coexistence raises a number of difficulties. At 
first, The Last King of Scotland’s exploration of the imagined relationship between a 
historical character, Amin, and a fictional one, Nicholas Garrigan, seems to be driven 
by history. The film is carried by two converging narrative lines: the history of 
Amin’s reign, the main points of which need to be respected by the film, and the 
unfolding of Garrigan’s fictional doings. Asked in an interview about the 
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delimitation between fiction and history in his film, Kevin Macdonald argued: ‘tout 
ce qui se passe en public est vrai ; tout ce qui relève de la sphère privée, en revanche, 
est inventé’.221 Indeed, at the beginning, Garrigan is simply ‘pasted’ into the most 
important historical events, but has no impact on them. Thus, he arrives in Uganda 
during Amin’s coup and is present when an attempt is made on Amin’s life by some 
of Obote’s partisans. His agency is limited to imagined but plausible events in 
Amin’s private life, with little historical significance: a minor car accident, Amin’s 
panic over some digestive troubles, an intervention in an architectural competition, 
Amin’s son having an epileptic seizure. Of course, the insertion of Garrigan does 
disrupt some historical facts. For instance, Garrigan takes the place of one of the 
characters after which he was modelled, Amin’s Scottish advisor Bob Astles, who 
played a significant role in managing Amin’s public relations and bore little 
resemblance to Garrigan. But overall, it can be said that the first half of the film 
maintains a rather clear distinction between the public dimension of Amin’s rule, in 
which the narrative follows historical facts, and the private sphere, in which the story 
is driven by fictional vraisemblance.  
This precarious balance between history and fiction becomes significantly more 
complicated in the second part of the film. The turning point of Garrigan’s 
involvement with Amin is the moment when he denounces Jonah Wasswa, Amin’s 
Health Minister, whom he saw in conversation with an unknown white man in a bar. 
This will lead to the assassination of the minister by Amin, and to a reversal of his 
relationship with Garrigan. After hearing from a British official that Wasswa was not 
conspiring but only trying to secure a pharmaceutical deal in order to help the 
population, Garrigan decides to leave the country, but Amin forces him to stay. This 
event, which establishes the loss of Garrigan’s innocence and his participation in the 
brutality of the regime, remains on the side of fiction but crosses the line between the 
private and public spheres, which so far separated history from fiction. Jonah 
Wasswa is a fictional character, and if his execution is reminiscent of the fate of 
Amin’s Foreign Minister mentioned in Schroeder’s documentary, the circumstances 
of the two events are too different to be conflated. The ambiguity of this episode 
resurfaces when Garrigan is confronted by a diplomat of the British Foreign Office, 
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who shows him pictures of the murders and torture organized by Amin. In the images 
Garrigan is looking at, archive photographs of Amin’s victims have been mixed with 
pictures of the fictional Jonah Wasswa’s assassination and interspersed with re-
enactments of the scenes. In the DVD commentary, Macdonald confesses his initial 
qualms about mixing historical and fictional pictures in this scene, but to justify his 
decision argues ‘we are telling a true story’. This suggests again the ambiguous ways 
in which claims to historical faithfulness work in the film, as it is not clear whether 
archive pictures are used to make the fictional ones look more credible, or whether 
the use of fake archives is justified by the fact that they nonetheless serve the film’s 
general commitment to truthfulness. 
This involvement of Garrigan in the historical part of the story grows with Amin’s 
transformation into a brutal tyrant. The escalation of violence in the movie is 
triggered by Garrigan’s affair with Amin’s wife, Kay – an invention of the film’s 
screenwriters which does not appear in Foden’s novel. Kay gets pregnant and, 
desperate to get rid of the baby, travels to her village to undergo an abortion, as 
Garrigan is unable to perform the operation. When she is seen again, in an unusually 
gory scene, her body has been dismembered and sewn back together, with her arms 
in the place of her legs and vice-versa. Amin’s responsibility for this is clearly 
established in a later scene, in which he tells Garrigan ‘I made an example of her’. 
Here, Garrigan’s destiny has become closely intertwined with actual historical 
events, as the real Kay Amin did disappear in mysterious circumstances. Accounts of 
the events diverge but many agree that Kay, who had been repudiated along with two 
of Amin’s other wives, had an affair with a doctor. She fell pregnant and asked him 
to perform an abortion. Her dismembered body was then found in the boot of her 
lover’s car, who had just committed suicide. If many consider Amin the probable 
instigator of her murder, his guilt has never been clearly established. Amin always 
maintained that Kay died during the abortion and that the doctor and his assistant had 
dismembered the body in order to disguise her death as a ritual crime. This is also the 
version supported by Henry Kyemba’s otherwise merciless indictment of Amin:
I do not believe, as I first did, that Amin had a direct hand in Kay’s death. If he had ordered 
her murder, he would never have chosen such a complicated way to have it done. There 
would have been no need to court publicity when she could have simply disappeared without 
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The representation of Kay’s death in The Last King of Scotland was also explicitly 
criticized in an article published in 2007 by two Ugandan journalists who, after 
investigating various reports and testimonies, concluded: ‘Although there has never 
been an explanation as to what really happened prior to and immediately after Kay’s 
death, investigations leave no doubt that Kay’s death was a result of excessive 
bleeding during a failed abortion’. 223 
It is therefore in the incertitude of the historical record that the film chose to place 
one of its most disturbing scenes. In this instance, the necessity of taking Amin and 
Garrigan’s relationship forward led the film to choose between several unattested 
versions of the events, perhaps at the expense of historical accuracy. A particularly 
troubling detail is the fact that The Last King of Scotland may not only have distorted 
historical facts but also exaggerated the horror by sewing Kay’s legs to her torso and 
her arms to her hips. Indeed, testimonies concur to say that the body had been 
dismembered and then sewn back together, but the inversion featured in the film 
seems completely apocryphal and mostly motivated by the quest for graphic 
spectacle. In the documentary enclosed with the DVD edition, both James McAvoy 
and Forest Whitaker express a level of discomfort at the fact that, as Whitaker says, 
‘that image will stick with people... and yet it is not true’.224 Andrea Calderwood, the 
producer of the film, contends on the other hand that it was used to show Amin’s real 
violence and offered ‘a powerful moment to dramatize Idi’s stream of mind’.225 The 
ambiguity of the word ‘dramatize’ is quite fitting here as the scene merges its two 
meanings of ‘putting into dramatic form’ and ‘exaggerating’. In this defence of the 
scene, Calderwood’s argumentation hangs precariously between truth and 
vraisemblance and provides a good illustration of the film’s increasing confusion 
between the two: according to her, the scene communicates something true about 
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Amin, namely that he was so violent and deranged that he could have killed and 
mutilated his wife, even though claiming that he did may actually be untrue.226  
The encroachment of fiction over the film escalates when the screenplay starts toying 
with the possibility that Garrigan might assassinate Amin to avenge Kay’s death. 
Obviously, the necessity of maintaining a level of historical credibility means that 
this attempt cannot succeed. Garrigan gets caught, leading to the film’s other most 
graphic scene, in which he is hanged by two hooks, stuck in his pectorals. This 
development is set at the same time as the hostage crisis at Entebbe airport, and 
Garrigan’s torture is located in the airport’s duty-free shop. The gruesome treatment 
of the fictional character eclipses the exploration of the Entebbe crisis, which is 
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supposed to be taking place in the next room. Significantly, while torturing Garrigan, 
Amin makes this pronouncement: ‘We are not a game, Nicholas. We are real. This 
room here, it is real. I think your death will be the first real thing that has happened 
to you’. Within the diegesis, this sentence is a rather straightforward condemnation 
of Garrigan’s irresponsible quest for adventure, while the duty-free shop offers a 
metaphor of the capitalist and touristic commodification of Africa in which his self-
indulgent behaviour participates. Amin’s lines bring a conclusion to the theme of the 
white character’s derealization of Uganda, which has been running throughout the 
film. For instance, after the attack against Amin, we see Garrigan putting water on 
his face, as if to wake himself up from a bad dream. Similarly, after sleeping with 
Kay for the first time, Garrigan laughs at the apparently absurd idea of Kay and him 
in his parents’ living room, highlighting how unreal everything seems to him. But 
Amin’s lines also resound as a commentary on the narrative itself and illustrate the 
fiction’s ambiguous claims to truth. Indeed, when Amin contends ‘this room is real’, 
he is referring to the space of the duty-free shop, where the fictional torture of 
Garrigan is happening, whereas by focusing on the action going on in this room, the 
film is precisely taking the emphasis away from the real historical Entebbe crisis, 
which is re-enacted in the next room. Paradoxically, Amin’s critique of Garrigan’s 
derealization of Africa is thus inserted into a passage which epitomizes the 
prevalence of fiction over history in the second part of the film.  
The constant substitutions of vraisemblance and truth culminate at the end of this 
scene, when Garrigan is saved by the self-sacrifice of his Ugandan colleague, Dr 
Junju, who frees him and consequently gets killed by Amin’s hitmen. The motivation 
of the character is hard to see: the two men are not friends but rivals, and Junju, who 
used to be Amin’s physician before Garrigan’s arrival, openly resents Garrigan’s 
hedonism and carelessness. To conceal this lack of vraisemblance, a dialogue is 
introduced in which Garrigan asks Junju why he is acting so selflessly. The doctor 
answers:  
Frankly, I don’t know. You deserve to die. But dead, you can do nothing. Alive, you might 
just be able to redeem yourself... I am tired of hatred, Doctor Garrigan. This country is 




At this decisive and melodramatic moment, the film’s narrative seems to be claiming 
a testimonial and even pedagogical function, since Garrigan’s final escape is justified 
by the necessity to tell ‘the truth about Amin’. The invraisemblance of the black 
character’s action is justified by his own speculations about the need to make the 
story sound vraisemblable to Westerners, in terms that are reminiscent of Walters’s 
argument concerning ‘white audiences’ and their empathy vis-à-vis white characters. 
Thus, the film seems to offer a justification for its own focus on a fictional white 
character in its treatment of Ugandan history: it is necessary to its vraisemblance. 
But ultimately, within the diegesis, Garrigan’s story must be believed because it is 
the truth, whereas at the metanarrative level, the film’s play between truth and fiction 
could be seen as a betrayal of this claim.  
My aim in emphasizing these inventions and ambiguities is not simply to highlight a 
lack of historical accuracy in the film. As I said before, the film is clearly a fiction 
and it would make little sense to judge it as if it were a documentary. Numerous 
reviewers registered this issue: in the French newspaper La Croix, the film was said 
to be ‘plus attentif à l’esprit qu’aux faits’ and to be really about ‘une certaine attitude 
occidentale qui fait de l’Afrique un “terrain de jeu”’.227 Comparably, the reviewer in 
The Guardian described the film as ‘a riveting satire of white Europe’s horrified 
fascination with Africa as a Conradian heart of darkness’.228 In accordance with the 
expectations created by the film’s aesthetic and generic affiliation to fiction, most 
critics have paid less attention to its factual aspects than to its capacity to convey a 
more general truth, be it about Amin or Europe’s relation to Africa. In fact, as 
implied by this criticism from Le Figaro’s reviewer: ‘on hésite entre l’histoire 
évènementielle et le romanesque au point de douter de la vérité du tyran à la fois naïf 
et monstrueux, et de croire à la réalité du jeune médecin’, most reviewers were aware 
that fictional and factual events had been mixed and that the two could not be told 
apart simply by focusing on textual clues.229 Even if the reviewer of the Los Angeles 
Times did complain that ‘It’s a bit of a letdown to discover the events depicted are 
only partially factual’, the fact that the partial factualness of the film is only ‘a bit of 
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a letdown’ and not, say, ‘a dangerous mystification’, suggests that the film was not 
really expected to produce an accurate account of Amin’s rule.230  
Reviewers therefore focused more on the propriety and sensitiveness of the 
representation than on its accuracy. However, this leads to a paradox: part of the 
reason why the ethical and political aspects of the film’s representation matter is that 
it deals with historical realities, but these realities played a fairly limited role in the 
assessment of The Last King of Scotland’s treatment of history. Indeed, when critics 
discussed the film’s engagement with history in ethical terms, these discussions 
mostly remained at the level of vraisemblance. For instance, a reviewer in The 
Financial Times complained that in the second half, the ‘film’s government by 
historical credibility is overthrown by the rule of hokum and Hollywoodism’. Here, 
the elements the critic uses as examples are not linked to its lack of historical 
accuracy but to its ‘over-accumulation of action-thriller jeopardies’, which threaten 
its vraisemblance. In Sight and Sound, Dave Calhoun criticized a group of recent 
films featuring Africa for their failure to ‘engage fully with African reality’, which 
he blamed ‘in part on ignorance or complacency’ and on ‘crude commercial 
pressure’.231 His article discusses the tendency to favour colourful landscapes over 
political issues and violence, and notably admonishes Michael Caton-Jones’s 
Shooting Dogs (2005) for failing to show ‘the full horror’ of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. His argument is therefore about truth and the necessity to offer an adequate 
representation of reality. For him, the graphic violence depicted in The Last King of 
Scotland is a positive point, as it communicates something of the truth of Amin’s 
regime:  
To MacDonald’s credit, the one scene of violence is uncompromisingly harsh: we watch one 
of Amin’s ministers being shot and see the sliced-up body of one of his wives. But one can 
only wish that the film had given us less of the winsome Scot and the lush interiors of 
Amin’s palace and more of the terror that is a rising plume of smoke in the distance.
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Yet as I discussed earlier, the two instances of violence Calhoun refers to are not 
entirely factual: Wasswa’s assassination is a fictional event, and the notion that Kay 
was murdered and ‘sliced-up’ by Amin is contested. Calhoun’s criticism invokes 
historical truth but ultimately his interpretation of the film remains at the level of 
vraisemblance, since the scenes are not examined for their own truth but for their 
ability to illustrate a general opinion that Calhoun holds to be true, i.e. that Amin was 
a cruel tyrant. A similar stand was taken in the New Statesman by Ryan Gilbey, who 
criticized the alleged lack of violent imagery in the film. For him, the final reminder 
that Amin killed over 300,000 people only reveals the failure of the story to 
communicate fully the extent of his crimes: ‘viewers unfamiliar with this fact will 
struggle to reconcile the death toll with what the film has shown’. His article 
mentions the images of Kay’s body as the only mitigating element, insisting that they 
are nevertheless insufficient: 
We witness a dismemberment, shot in the picture’s characteristically lurid fashion. But it is 
asking a lot for this murder to symbolize 300,000 deaths, and ultimately the film-makers fail 




Gilbey’s critique is premised on the assumption that the film should inform its 
audience about Amin’s real crimes. But even though Gilbey seems to oppose his own 
position to that of the uninformed viewer, his review does not mention the fact that 
making Kay’s murder stand for Amin’s atrocities more generally is all the more 
disputable as it relies on unascertained facts. Comparably, in a recent article on 
afropessimism in contemporary films about Africa, Martha Evans and Ian Glenn 
criticize The Last King of Scotland for offering a truncated version of history and 
‘diluting social judgment’ about Amin. Paradoxically, they simultaneously attack the 
film for not relaying the ‘claims that Amin carried out many of the assassinations 
personally’, and for including an attack on Amin’s life, which, for them, ‘serves to 
justify some of his paranoia about his position’.234 Again, this criticism operates at 
two conflicting levels: it criticizes the fiction for not being historically accurate, but 
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the attack on Amin’s life represents a real historical event, since Obote’s partisans 
did attempt an ill-organized putsch in 1972. Further examples of this confusion 
between truth and vraisemblance include comments from Le Monde’s critic, who 
seems to have entirely internalized the film’s version of the events and describes the 
historical Amin as ‘un homme qui fit mutiler et assassiner sa femme parce qu’elle lui 
avait été infidèle’,235 while The Sunday Times dismisses the same episode as 
‘unnecessary’, making it sound like a fiction invented by the screenwriters: ‘The plot 
gets bogged down, in the final part, in an unnecessary story line involving Amin’s 
wife and her need for an abortion’.236 This brief survey of the film’s critical reception 
suggests that the focus on the ethical or political aspects of the film’s representation 
has often led critics to overlook complex issues surrounding the construction of the 
narrative, which in turn raises significant ethical issues regarding the film’s treatment 
of history. As in my discussion of Schroeder’s documentary, this analysis again 
illustrates how ethical or political judgments are deeply influenced by perceptions of 
the truthfulness of a representation, which are in turn shaped by narrative strategies 
and assumptions regarding vraisemblance that do not, in fact, give the audience any 
firm basis on which to appraise the film’s actual accuracy.  
*   * 
* 
If the makers of The Last King of Scotland tried to establish, through intertextual 
references, a relation of filiation with Barbet Schroeder’s respected documentary, by 
contrast, Amin: The Rise and Fall offers precisely the kind of cliché-ridden, 
sensationalist depiction with which they did not want to be associated (especially as 
these elements do crop up in The Last King of Scotland, as illustrated by the 
treatment of Kay’s death). Amin: The Rise and Fall offers graphic reconstitutions of 
Amin’s atrocities, with numerous scenes of beating, torture and murder, 
complemented with a few soft-core passages illustrating Amin’s intense sexual life. 
The film also contains a very explicit depiction of Amin’s alleged cannibalism – a 
popular theme of European gory cinema in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which 
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saw the release of the most famous specimens of the sub-genre: Cannibal Holocaust 
(Italy, 1979) and Cannibal Ferox (Italy, 1981). Cannibalism features in two scenes, 
which have sometimes been held responsible for the rumours about Amin.237 In the 
first one, Amin’s physician is looking for ice and finds two human heads in the 
dictator’s freezer, next to a bag of frozen peas. Amin, who suddenly appears behind 
him, rolls his eyes and says: ‘Doctor! For an African you are looking very white! [...] 
Every time there is a change of power in Africa, a few heads must roll’ – a dialogue 
which does little to mitigate the racist undertones of the scene. In the second scene, 
after ordering the murder of chief justice Benedicto Kiwanuka, who criticized the 
regime’s abuses of power, Amin goes to the morgue and demands to be left alone 
with the body.238 He then recites a ritual formula, and ingests a piece of Kiwanuka’s 
flesh, which, as noted by several viewers, bears a disconcerting resemblance to a raw 
slice of bacon.239 
                
                      Amin’s freezer.                                   Amin performing ritual cannibalism. 
The general structure of the film consists of a linear juxtaposition of vignettes, which 
follow quite closely the chronology of Amin’s reign, from his 1971 coup to his flight 
into exile in 1979, after the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda. Famous historical 
episodes, such as the eviction of Uganda’s Asian community, Kay’s death, or the 
Entebbe hostage crisis are interspersed with other, imagined or lesser-known 
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episodes, aimed at exemplifying Amin’s violent and lubricious character. For 
instance, a scene features a man being force-fed with his own ear, while another 
depicts a woman stabbing herself to death, in a last-ditch attempt to escape Amin’s 
lust. However, the horror that such unrestrained violence may provoke is largely 
offset by the many inadequacies of the production. The dialogues are rife with 
stereotypes (‘you can kill me, General, but you cannot kill the spirit of the Ugandan 
people’); occasional disconnections between lip movements and voices suggest that a 
few actors may have been dubbed during post-production; and the overall quality of 
acting – especially Joseph Olita’s histrionic interpretation of Amin – has been 
commended mostly for ‘add[ing] to the trashy feel of the film’.240 As a result, the 
general aspect of the production has been variously likened to ‘a particularly sadistic 
television movie’, the Thunderbirds TV series, or ‘a demented comic book brought 
to life’.241   
This combination of luridness and artlessness has led Amin: The Rise and Fall to be 
associated with the loose category of ‘exploitation cinema’. As Thomas Doherty 
writes, exploitation is a category with historically shifting but overlapping 
meanings.242 The term, which initially referred to advertising strategies, was used 
from the late 1940s to describe low-budget films shot by independent producers, who 
exploited sensational or taboo topics. Since the 1960s, ‘exploitation’ has acquired a 
looser meaning, with the apparition of subcategories relating to the specific subject 
that is being exploited, such as ‘sexploitation’, ‘nazisploitation’, ‘blaxploitation’, and 
so on. In the process, the term seems to have taken on a more aesthetic signification. 
Indeed, according to Eric Schaefer, the generally poor conditions of production of 
the ‘classic exploitation film’ (shabby sets, heavy reliance on stock footage, 
continuity errors, basic camerawork and editing, poor recording, etc.) have resulted 
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in the emergence of a conscious cinematic style, in direct contrast to the codes of 
Hollywood pictures.243  
Readings in terms of exploitation entail, once again, a number of assumptions 
concerning the relation between truthfulness, ethics and aesthetics. In recent decades, 
exploitation cinema has been the object of ‘cult’ or ‘fan’ phenomena and has 
received increasing attention from a highly sophisticated audience, often the same as 
avant-garde cinema.244 This ‘paracinematic audience’, to use Jeffrey Sconce’s term, 
has developed specific reading strategies, which consist in imagining the poor 
conditions of shooting and the (supposedly) unethical intentions of exploitation 
filmmakers. Exploitation fans thus adopt a decidedly ironic approach to 
representation by injecting intentionality where there might only be incompetence, 
and explicitly place themselves in opposition to the norms of legitimate culture. One 
of the main characteristics of this reading protocol is the destruction of any claim to 
diegetic ‘truth’. The expectation raised by exploitation cinema is that events or 
phenomena, which may be real or not, will be represented in the most visual and 
titillating manner, and that truth claims will be made when they might serve the 
film’s sensationalism, irrespective of whether what is shown is actually true or not. 
As Eric Schaefer argues, exploitation is a form of cinema in which truth and falsity, 
fiction and nonfiction, the real and the imaginary, are all subordinated to the 
unethical imperatives of ‘spectacle’.245 Consequently, the only truth acknowledged 
by exploitation fans is that of the film’s own production. This is what Jeffrey Sconce, 
following the fanzine Zontar, calls ‘badtruth’, i.e. ‘that moment when the narrative 
logic and diegetic illusions of cheap exploitation cinema disintegrate into a brutally 
blissful encounter with profilmic failure’.246 Then, writes Sconce, ‘The “surface” 
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diegesis becomes precisely that, the thin and final veil that is the indexical mark of a 
more interesting drama, that of the film’s construction and sociohistorical context’.247  
The influence of this approach can be detected in most accounts of Rise and Fall, 
which, as suggested by the reviews I quoted earlier (as well as my own summary), 
insist primarily on the ‘profilmic failures’ of the production. The disruption that this 
form of reading creates for the historical referentiality of the film is exemplified by 
the following commentary about the ‘raid on Entebbe’ sequence:  
If I didn't know about the Israeli commando raid, I would have had no idea that was what 
was going on – partly because it just sort of happens, and partly because the Israeli 
commandos look like they were outfitted in the Wal-Mart Halloween aisle. 
Part of the failure is in the budget. It's not easy to communicate the mass extermination of 




In this case, cinematic incompetence thwarts the work of representation, allowing the 
viewer’s attention to be diverted away from the content of the film towards the 
(imagined) scene of its production. The same reviewer also illustrates how readings 
in terms of exploitation entail a number of speculations on the unethical intentions of 
the filmmakers: 
Sharad Patel was sitting around one day, wondering what he could contribute to a world still 
reeling from wars and terrorism and hostage situations, from gas rationing and out of control 
inflation. It was the dawn of the 1980s, and in a world where a drastically escalating Cold 
War brought with it the promise of mutual assured destruction at almost any moment, 
thrusting us all into a dusty future in which we strut about in big shoulderpads and assless 
leather pants, what could one man do to contribute something positive, something that would 
give this world hope during such troubling times? What could one man produce, what could 
he make that would lift our spirits, make us cheer – maybe even make us believe again?  
If your answer to this profound question is, “He could make a sleazy exploitation pic about 
1970s cannibal dictator Idi Amin!” then you, too, could be Sharad Patel!
249
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Yet a number of elements of Amin: The Rise and Fall do not entirely fit with a 
reading in terms of exploitation. For instance, a closer examination of the film 
reveals an unexpected degree of historical accuracy, starting with the cast, who 
present a baffling resemblance to the historical characters they play. Indeed, as noted 
by the review of the film in The Times, Rise and Fall appears like ‘a series of 
tableaux vivants, with well cast lookalikes in the main roles’.250 This attention to 
period details culminates in the episode devoted to the imprisonment and liberation 
of Denis Hills, a British journalist who had been imprisoned by Amin for calling him 
a ‘village tyrant’. Hills agreed to play his own role in Rise and Fall, and the narrative 
is supplemented by the insertion of archive images, representing James Callaghan’s 
visit to liberate him. More generally, the screenwriter, Wade Huie, seems to have 
made a close study of Henry Kyemba’s State of Blood, and it turns out that most of 
the shocking images in the film are not pure inventions. Indeed, even though it 
obviously exploits common fantasies about African dictators, the freezer scene I 
described before is based on persistent and never firmly contradicted rumours. For 
instance, in a 1979 interview with Abraham Sule, a member of the State Research 
Bureau (Amin’s militia), published in the South African magazine Drum, we read 
this testimony: 
Drum: There have been incredible stories of human heads stored in fridges in Amin’s 
residence. How true is this? 
Sule: I have seen about five heads of people at Cape Town Villas. They were in a type of 
fridge. At one time we were told to go to the Cape Town Villas and remove the fridge 
because there was going to be a reception there for some foreign delegates. We were to move 
the fridge to an island which Amin used for a hideout. To be able to carry the fridge, we had 
to dismantle it, and this was when we saw the contents. The heads had fallen off their 
positions inside when the fridge was tilted so as to be carried out.
251
 
This story also cropped up in Amin’s obituaries in 2003, notably in the testimony of 
Brian Barron, the BBC’s Africa Correspondent between 1977 and 1981. In Barron’s 
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recollections of his arrival in Kampala right after Amin’s demise we find this 
passage: 
we headed for Amin’s living quarters in Nile Mansions. The priority was to search the 
refrigerators because of persistent reports that he sometimes kept the heads of his victims in 
the freezer. 
With relief, we found no evidence to back this up.
252
  
If this last sentence casts doubt on the veracity of these rumours, it nevertheless 
suggests how widespread and persistent they were, without completely invalidating 
them. Similar observations may be made regarding the second scene of cannibalism, 
which, far from being a lurid invention of the screenwriters, turns out to have been 
strongly inspired by Kyemba’s book:  
On several occasions when I was Minister of Health, Amin insisted on being left alone with 
his victim’s bodies. Such was the case when the acting Chief of Staff, Brigadier Charles 
Arube, was murdered in March 1974. Amin came to see the body while it was in the 
mortuary of Mulago Hospital; he ordered the deputy medical superintendent, Dr. 
Kyewalabaye, to “wait outside”; Amin then went in by himself for two or three minutes. 
There is of course no evidence for what he does in private, but it is universally believed in 
Uganda that he engages in blood rituals. Hardly any Ugandan doubts that Amin has, quite 
literally, a taste for blood. [...] 
I have reason to believe that Amin’s practices do not stop at tasting blood: on several 
occasions he has boasted to me and others that he has eaten human flesh.
253
  
In highlighting this, I do not want to downplay the film’s opportunistic attitude. It is 
obvious from the examples mentioned above that far from seeking a balanced 
representation of Amin, the screenplay systematically favours the most shocking 
interpretation. In the last case, the filmmakers obviously made a deliberate choice to 
sensationalize the anecdote by representing directly what, as Kyemba reluctantly 
admits, remains a rumour. In addition, the historical value of the episode is of course 
not certain, since assessing it would require a minute examination of Kyemba’s 
book. Rather than manifesting a pedagogical ambition or an ethical commitment to 
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truth, following existing sources might simply have been a way to avoid spending 
too much time and money writing a screenplay, when so many sensational anecdotes 
were readily available and could be advertised as ‘true stories’. But it is also possible 
that Rise and Fall was not initially intended to be only an ‘exploitation’ film. In 
some African countries, for instance, the film seems to have enjoyed a reception in 
which the category of ‘exploitation’ did not operate. In a 2005 Kenyan article, Patel 
was thus described as a brave and politically committed director: ‘Patel, a young 
Kenyan film-maker was eager to expose Amin’s murderous government and his 
brutal reign. Amin was in power in 1976 when Patel launched his movie plans, and 
he knew that making a movie on Amin then was risky’.254 Another Kenyan journalist 
compared Rise and Fall favorably to The Last King of Scotland, and even described 
it as ‘the best biographical account [of Amin] so far’: 
Rise and Fall of Idi Amin, which observers say has been the best biographical account so far, 
was released only a year after the “butcher of Africa” was deposed from power. It recreates 
Amin’s atrocities in graphic detail – eating human flesh, forcing children to view their dead 
mother, making love in a car [sic] to name but a few.
255
 
It is also possible that at the time of its release, Rise and Fall’s engagement with 
history was taken more seriously. The film was rated X in the UK,256 and The New 
York Times labelled it a ‘suitably bloody exploitation film’,257 but David Robinson in 
the Times thought that it set out ‘to be a straight neo-documentary record of the eight 
years of Amin’s presidency’, albeit a not so subtle one.258 In the United Kingdom, the 
diffusion of the film coincided with the campaign against the ‘video nasties’ of the 
early 1980s, which in 1984 led the Thatcher government to institute a new system of 
censorship (Video Recording Act), banning videos that featured extreme violence. 
Even though Rise and Fall is sometimes featured in recent anthologies of the nasties, 
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it did not figure on the list of banned videos established by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.259 This may be explained by the fact that Rise and Fall is significantly 
less violent than some of the most famous ‘nasties’, but one may also conjecture that 
its historical subject matter appeared as a mitigating element.  
Ultimately, speculations on the real intentions of the filmmakers are likely to remain 
fruitless. But what these potential variations in the film’s reception suggest is that 
perceptions of referentiality and faithfulness depend primarily on audiences’ 
conceptions of aesthetic value and generic conventions. Thus, the modalities of 
Amin: The Rise and Fall’s contemporary reception as an exploitation film has led to 
a neutralizing of its historical content, and the reasons why the film has usually not 
been regarded as historically credible are mostly based on its aesthetic aspects, and 
on the unethical intent that audiences have inferred from them. Contrary to what 
happened in the reception of Général Idi Amin Dada and The Last King of Scotland, 
the historical accuracy of Rise and Fall has been regarded as not only secondary, but 
in fact superfluous:  
I really doubt anyone renting a movie called Amin: The Rise and Fall, made by the man who 
would later executive produce Bachelor Party, and with a cover depicting an insane drawing 
of a screaming Idi Amin is picking the movie up thinking, “Hey, I might learn a thing or two 
about history from this!” Unless, that is, they are the same people who rent A Knight's Tale 
because they’ve “always wanted to learn more about those King Arthur times.” [...] That 
there is any historical accuracy at all is nice, but it's hardly the reason this movie is around. 
Movies like this exist to parade around a big fat cannibal in a little bathrobe.
260
 
Besides, although many reviews on fan websites do mention the film’s relative 
accuracy, claiming that it might be somehow educational, it seems that the film’s 
relative factualness did not influence the viewing experience itself. Indeed, the 
realization that the film’s narrative can be backed up by existing accounts only 
intervened after watching it, and often as a surprise: 
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Beyond the blood, violence, and the occasional tit though, there’s still some education to be 
had from watching something like this. Even after you filter out the urban legends a lot of 




Perhaps most shocking of all is that the dynamics on screen are more or less strictly in line 
with the various biographies written on Amin and Uganda through the turbulent 70’s. Few 
liberties seem to have been taken by the film makers, perhaps it is just the film’s 
sensationalist manner that suggests that the material is somewhat removed from reality.
262
 
In both examples, the film’s partial adherence to the historical record had to be 
proven either by ‘accounts seen from more credible sources’, or by ‘various 
biographies’ of Amin. The historical knowledge acquired by the viewers did not 
come from the film, but in spite of it. In the end, it seems that despite the desire of 
the paracinematic audience to escape the ‘illusions’ of filmic diegesis and to refuse to 
confuse reality with its representation, these viewers nonetheless operate a conflation 
between ethics, truth and aesthetics that is not so different from ‘mainstream’ modes 
of reception.  
*   * 
* 
What emerges from the analysis of these three filmic portrayals of Amin is the 
importance of aesthetic and generic conventions in our perception of a film’s ability 
to tell the truth, but also the impossibility of using these aspects as a reliable criterion 
to assess the actual historical accuracy of a film. Perceptions of truth and 
referentiality seem to have been central to the way the political and ethical value of 
these films has been judged, but it is clear that these judgements were nonetheless 
deeply influenced by aesthetics. Thus, although the level of respectability of the three 
films under discussion seems to reflect their level of historical credibility (with 
documentary as the most legitimate form of representation), paradoxically, historical 
truth (or our limited knowledge of it) plays a very secondary role in the perception of 
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this credibility. This is not to say that aesthetics are necessarily manipulative: 
whereas reviewers of The Last King of Scotland have sometimes been misled by the 
conflation of truth and vraisemblance, in the case of Général Idi Amin Dada, 
Schroeder’s manipulation of documentary conventions does not necessarily imply 
that his representation of Amin is inaccurate or unreliable. In highlighting this 
confusion, I am not trying to argue that these films should be judged according to 
their properly historical value, or on the contrary that it is illegitimate to examine 
them with such concerns in mind. Rather, my aim in this chapter has been to 
emphasize the complexity of the experience these works create, and the central role 
that these potential confusions play in it. In this process, the notion of historical truth 
comes to play a deeply ambiguous role, working at the same time as the ethical 








Since the publication of his landmark collection of essays De la postcolonie in 
2000 (with a nearly simultaneous publication in English in 2001 under the title On 
the Postcolony), Cameroonian theorist Achille Mbembe has become one of the 
most influential analysts of the postcolonial predicament in Africa.263 Initially 
trained in history and political science in Cameroon and in France, Mbembe made 
a large part of his early career in the United States, where he settled in the late 
1980s. He then took the head of the Codesria (Conseil pour le développement de la 
recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique) in Dakar, from 1996 to 2000, before 
moving to South Africa, where he works today. This chapter will focus on what 
remains to date Mbembe’s most famous article, ‘Provisional Notes on the 
Postcolony’, which was first published in 1992. As Michael Karlstrom writes, this 
text ‘has become a canonical contribution to the literature on postcolonial African 
politics, yet [...] has also proved difficult to digest and build upon’.264  
The choice of this article is not only motivated by its influence on recent debates 
about postcolonial regimes and its centrality to the career of a prominent African 
intellectual, but also by the particular questions it raises concerning the relation 
between aesthetics, politics and knowledge. In previous chapters, the texts I have 
been discussing all belong to a sphere of cultural production, that of literary and 
cinematographic representations, which has been conventionally associated with 
the category of the ‘aesthetic’. (Even in a case such as Amin: The Rise and Fall, the 
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fact that it has been denied the status of a legitimate work of art still implies a 
judgement on its aesthetic value.) This, as we have seen, has had significant effects 
on the reception of these works as well as on the paradoxical forms of referentiality 
they have created. Mbembe’s ‘Provisional Notes on the Posctolony’, by contrast, is 
not only a (presumably) non-fictional text, but also belong to a genre of writing, 
that of the academic article, which is not spontaneously or primarily identified with 
the realm of the aesthetic. The topic of the text, which deals with dictatorial 
regimes in post-colonial Africa, situates it broadly in the field of political science, 
in which issues of referential adequacy and truth conventionally prevail over 
formal concerns. Yet in the ‘Notes’ aesthetics play a crucial role. At the level of its 
explicit argument, Mbembe’s analysis of postcolonial dictatorship concentrates on 
the ‘aesthetics’ of these regimes, thus pointing to the possibility of perceiving 
social and political objects aesthetically. In addition, as I will show in this chapter, 
the text of the ‘Notes’ itself gestures toward a form of writing which uses the 
contradictory and multidirectional character of the aesthetic experience in order to 
move beyond the current discourses and counter-discourses that define the 
postcolonial predicament of Africa. This raises an important issue, which will 
provide the central problematic of this chapter: can the aesthetic, in spite of the 
equivocations I described in the previous chapters, serve as the foundation for an 
alternative form of knowledge?  
Mbembe’s project emerges in response to a number of challenges facing the 
production of knowledge about Africa. Two of them are particularly relevant to my 
discussion. The first is the epistemological crisis of the social sciences that 
emerged from the late 1960s onward. The introduction of De la postcolonie offers 
a detailed analysis of the quandary in which these disciplines are placed, and makes 
a daunting inventory of the epistemological transformations they have undergone:  
l’éclatement de l’univers des sciences sociales et le recul du modèle newtonien qui servait 
de cadre de référence et de modèle, en dernière instance, de rationalité scientifique; la perte 
de crédibilité des “grands récits” (croyance en l’inéluctabilité du progrès rationnel, en le 
sujet individuel, en une vérité universelle); l’affirmation générale de la multiplicité des 
mondes et des formes de vie ; la reconnaissance de l’existence de savoirs distincts du savoir 
dit scientifique (cas des savoirs narratifs); la pluralité des formes d’invention de la 
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As Mbembe makes clear, his work seeks to take these changes into account, and it 
has indisputably been influenced by the various turns (linguistic, rhetorical, 
interpretive, narrative, etc.) taken by the social sciences.266 However, as suggested 
by his rejection of ‘postmodern nihilism’, and his defiance towards ‘extremist’ 
positions that would deny the existence of any graspable reality beyond language 
and narrative, one of the aims of his reflexions is to negotiate, from within these 
shifts, a position where expressing some truth about Africa is still possible.267 
Mbembe’s work also emerges from the growing critique of the Négritude and 
Afrocentrist movements in Francophone Africa, following the disappointment 
generated by post-independence regimes. This movement is linked to the 
discussions surrounding the social sciences, in that it is partly through the 
appropriation of the methods of the social sciences (particularly of history, 
linguistics and ethnology) that Afrocentrist and nationalist theoreticians, such as 
Cheikh Anta Diop and Théophile Obenga, tried to prove that far from being 
uncivilized, Africa was actually the source of all civilization.268 After 
independence, the rhetoric of this cultural rehabilitation became increasingly reified 
and instrumentalized by dictatorial regimes – as exemplified by Mobutu’s politics 
of ‘authenticity’ or his invocation of patriarchy as an African tradition to justify his 
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non-democratic regime.269 In the 1970s, a number of critical works emerged, which 
blamed the perceived generalizations of the previous generation and its failure to 
break with the essentialism of colonial thought. Among the most influential of 
these works are Léopold Sédar Senghor: Négritude ou servitude (1971) by Marcien 
Towa; Négritude et négrologues (1972) by Stanislas Adotevi; La crise du Muntu, 
Authenticité africaine et philosophie by Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga (1977); Sur “la 
philosophie africaine”: une critique de l’ethnophilosophie (1977) by Paulin 
Hountondji; and Philosophy and an African Culture (1980) by Kwasi Wiredu. 
These works were discussed and extended by Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, perhaps the 
most famous thinker of this generation, who, in The Invention of Africa (1988), 
attempted a systematic dissection of the discourses on Africa, through the method 
of Foucauldian archaeology. According to Mudimbe, the contestation of 
Afrocentrism constituted a turn away from the subordination of intellectual 
reflexion to political goals, and a displacement of the interest of African thinkers 
towards the production of knowledge and truth: 
The preindependence generation of African intellectuals was mostly concerned with 
political power and strategies for ideological succession. Since 1960, and more visibly 
since the 1970s, a new generation prefers to put forward the notion of epistemological 
vigilance. This generation seems much more concerned with strategies for mastering 
intellectual paradigms about “the path to truth”, with analysing the political dimensions of 
knowledge, and with procedures for establishing new rules in African studies.
270
  
Mbembe’s work follows the effort of this previous generation to diagnose and 
overcome what he has termed the ‘cul-de-sac of the many discourses on Africa’ – a 
situation that could be likened to the ‘déjà-vu’ I described in Chapter 1.271 It is 
probably to describe this situation in which any writing about Africa is necessarily 
reacting to a certain form of epistemological violence that Mbembe often talks 
about ‘une faille’, a rift, as the origin of his own attempt.272 The ‘faille’ not only 
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suggests that a direct engagement with Africa may have been made impossible by 
those discourses that have simultaneously constituted it as an object of discussion 
and failed (failli) to account for it. It also points toward an escape from that 
predicament: ‘Ecrire l’Afrique à partir d’une faille’ is reminiscent of the French 
phrase ‘trouver la faille’, i.e. identifying the weakness of an opponent, or of an 
argument. Mbembe’s attempt thus defines itself not only against the Western 
discourses that have traditionally constituted Africa as the irreducible ‘Other’, but 
also as a rupture with the refutations of these discourses, such as Afrocentrist or 
nationalist celebrations of ‘authenticity’ which, in their systematic opposition to the 
West, have remained trapped within its discursive procedures: ‘any serious critique 
of the West entails, of necessity, a critical revisiting of our own fables and the 
various grammars which, under the pretext of authenticity or radicalism, 
prosaically turn Africa into yet another fiction’.273  
The negative reference to ‘fiction’ in this quotation is worth noting: fiction is a 
recurring theme in Mbembe’s thought, and it occupies an ambivalent position. On 
the one hand, Mbembe has often referred to ‘fiction’ in order to disparage the 
discourses he denounces, exposing on various occasions ‘the realization of […] 
fictions and the fictionalization of the real’ that is produced by postcolonial 
dictatorships, or the proclivity of colonialism to transform its own ‘legends and 
fictions’ into disciplines.274 On the other hand, Mbembe has often celebrated 
religion and literature as two discourses whose fictions and fables can remedy the 
failures of existing conceptual idioms and escape, through the poetic imagination, 
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the epistemological strictures that weigh on the social sciences.275 Mbembe has 
notably acknowledged the profound influence of the Francophone African novel on 
his own understanding of postcolonial dictatorships in Africa:  
From the late 1980s onwards, while many analysts were locked in sterile debates about the 
prospects of Africa’s development, the Francophone African novel was already celebrating 
the demise of the nationalist project and of Africa’s post-independent states’ claim to stand 
for the ‘Father’. At the same time, the novel was alerting us to the apparition on the 
horizon of new, uncommon forces that we did not quite yet grasp and that could not quite 
be said in the then dominant conceptual languages.
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However, Mbembe’s celebration of the African novel as visionary medium and 
repository of a new language, beyond the conceptual impasses of developmentalism 
and nationalism, does not address the issue of the fictionality of the genre, or the 
relation between this fictionality and that of the ‘fictions’ he so often denounces.  
This ambiguity is reinforced by the fact that his own project is marked by a 
contestation of the disciplinary boundaries that have produced the distinction 
between fiction and the social sciences, and between the realm of the aesthetic and 
that of the conceptual. Indeed, Mbembe’s attempt to lift the burden of previous 
discourses consists in large part in elaborating a new form of writing, which would 
be capable of transcending the ‘limits of epistemological imagination’:277  
Face au caractère absurde de la plupart des discours sur le continent, il me semblait qu’une 
manière de sortir du carcan était d’expérimenter avec la langue, et d'abord de tenter de la 
dynamiter. […]  
J’étais à la recherche d'une écriture qui conduise le lecteur à la rencontre de ses propres 
sens. Mais ces rencontres, elles ne m’intéressent qu’en ce qu’elles sont fragmentaires, 
évanescentes, hachées, quelques fois ratées. Il s'agit de rencontres avec des zones 
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surchargées de la mémoire et du présent africains et des régions de la connaissance qui ne 
se ramènent pas aux sciences sociales classiques: la philosophie, les arts, la musique, la 
religion, la littérature, la psychanalyse.
278
 
This emphasis on the reader’s sensual experience, and the attention given to its 
formal qualities, which are echoed stylistically in the passage itself (especially 
through the rhythm of the accumulation ‘fragmentaires, évanescentes, hachées, 
quelques fois ratées’), suggests that Mbembe’s project is also in large part an 
aesthetic one. This aspect was forcefully reaffirmed by Mbembe in a recent 
discussion with Jean Comaroff, in which he insisted on the indissoluble link 
between aesthetics and politics in his thought:  
So what I’m saying is that multiple languages have to be brought to bear on the task of 
bringing Africa back to life in contemporary theorizing — awakening these sleeping bodies, 
in a kind of linguistic epiphany that would incite us to start asking different questions or even 
old ones anew, hearing something different, speaking in tongues, if you wish. Or in any case, 
in a language we never imagined we could ever practice. So I am calling for a kind of 
glossolalia — by which I do not simply mean a matter of stylistics, but a new, radical form of 
criticism that is required by the mere fact of our sharing this world; a world that is, as a 
matter of fact, a multiplicity of worlds and of interlaced boundaries. I have said that, for me, 




Mbembe’s eagerness to point out that his commitment to aesthetics is not merely ‘a 
matter of stylistics’ suggests that the poetic aspect of his work does not simply 
accompany or ornate his arguments but is central to them. Furthermore, the 
Pentecostal references to ‘linguistic epiphany’, ‘speaking in tongues’ and 
‘glossolalia’ gesture toward mystical experiences, in which it is the sudden 
capacity of the preacher to speak a heretofore unknown or unlearned language (‘a 
language we never imagined we could ever practice’) that is the guarantee that 
what he is saying is a divine revelation (and therefore true), rather than the content 
of what is being said – which, in the case of an unknown language, may not be 
immediately intelligible. In likening his own use of aesthetics to these charismatic 
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experiences, Mbembe suggests that his ambition is to create a form of knowledge 
in which the invention of a new writing, the capacity of speaking together multiple 
theoretical languages, would act as a new source of truth. This is further underlined 
by the metaphorical echoes of the theme of resurrection (‘bringing Africa back to 
life’; ‘awakening these sleeping bodies’), which suggest that Mbembe is claiming 
for his writing a kind of immediate performativity. As the following pages will 
examine, this contestation and reconfiguration of disciplinary boundaries, as well 
as the ambiguous role played by fiction in Mbembe’s argument, raise important 
issues for the interpretation of his project.  
*   * 
* 
Before we turn to the discussion of the ‘Notes’, a brief methodological point is in 
order. In tune with the international dimension of Mbembe’s career, there are 
several different versions of the text: initially written in French in 1989 to be 
presented at a meeting of the African Studies Association in Atlanta, it was first 
rewritten and translated into English in 1992, in order to be published by the 
journal of the African Institute, Africa, under the title ‘Provisional Notes on the 
Postcolony’.280 A long extract of the text was also published in the Spring 1992 
issue of Public Culture, under the title ‘The Banality of Power and the Aesthetics 
of Vulgarity in the Postcolony’,281 and a large part of the next issue of the journal 
was devoted to the reception of this abridged text, with a wide range of reactions 
from prestigious contributors.282 In 1995, a fourth version entitled ‘Notes 
provisoires sur la postcolonie’ was published in French by the journal Politique 
Africaine,283 and a slightly revised version of this text later became the central 
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chapter of De la postcolonie, under the title ‘Esthétique de la vulgarité’.284 
Similarly, the English version of the book, On the Postcolony, reproduces the 
article published in 1992 in Africa. These numerous translated and revised versions 
exhibit a number of differences, sometimes quite significant, although these have 
usually been ignored. Choosing which version to study is made all the more 
difficult if we consider that although the paper was initially conceived and written 
in French, it is nonetheless its English version that stirred the most significant 
debates.285 Since my analysis of the text will pay attention not only to the ideas 
expressed in the article, but also to its writing and construction, I will generally 
privilege the version that was written by Mbembe himself, i.e. the French one of 
1995 (the differences between this one and the 2000 adaptation of De la 
Postcolonie are marginal). However, acknowledging the elusive nature of the 
‘Notes’ is indispensible, as its many commentators are not all talking exactly about 
the same text, and I will therefore highlight divergences between versions each 
time this seems relevant.  
The ‘Notes’ explore the exercise of power in Africa and focus more precisely on 
the daily relations of subjection and indiscipline that link the state and its subjects. 
Building upon a vast number of theoretical references including the Bakhtinian 
concept of carnival, the method of Foucauldian archaeology and the work of Comi 
Toubalor on ‘political derision’ in Togo, Mbembe argues that in the postcolony, the 
exercise of power, or ‘commandement’, is marked by a carnivalesque aesthetics of 
obscenity and vulgarity, which leads him to contest Bakhtin’s notion that vulgarity 
is mostly a characteristic of ‘non-official’ cultures.286 A central aspect of the 
obscenity of postcolonial regimes lies in their extravagance: to command, Mbembe 
writes, means ‘éprouver publiquement un certain contentement à bien manger et à 
bien boire; et, comme l’affirme S. Labou Tansi, “pisser le gras et la rouille dans les 
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fesses des fillettes”’ (85). Thus, Mbembe details a number of ‘signs’, such as the 
use of lavish celebrations, the ‘obesity’ of the powerful (and ‘le flot d’excréments 
qui en sont la contrepartie’ (82)), or the uncontrolled licentiousness of government 
officials. The exuberant character of the postcolonial universe is reflected in 
Mbembe’s highly figurative prose, in which the excesses and complexities of the 
postcolony are suggested through dense metaphorical networks, imagery centred 
on bodily functions, and a vertiginous accumulation of theoretical references and 
footnotes. The result is a disturbing and powerful description of a chaotic universe 
ruled by the unbridled ‘jouissance’ and ‘vices’ of those in power (102).  
This postcolonial mode of domination simultaneously produces proliferating forms 
of life (Mbembe mentions for instance that ‘les souverains libidineux de la 
postcolonie ont peuplé leurs contrées d’un nombre inconnu d’enfants naturels’ 
(103)) and horrifying kinds of torture and death. Indeed, in Mbembe’s account the 
defining characteristic of the postcolony is the multiple ways in which the bodies of 
the dominated are constantly used and abused by power. Postcolonized subjects 
can alternatively be forced to celebrate the ruler through dances and songs, or 
violently annihilated by measures of repression, which Mbembe describes as a 
means for the ‘commandment’ to ‘inscribe the dazzle of its signs and pleasures into 
the memory of its subjects’ (‘inscrire dans la mémoire de ses “cibles” l’éclat de ses 
signes et de ses plaisirs’) (90). According to Mbembe, this use of bodies by the 
postcolonial state differs from the violence of colonial governmentality, in that the 
colonial instrumentalization of bodies, despite its excess and arbitrariness, was 
usually justified in economic terms, as a means to increase the obedience and 
therefore the productivity of the colonized subject. For Mbembe, the aim of 
postcolonial commandment is not to make the bodies of its subjects more 
productive, but rather to recruit them for the performance of its own power.287 For 
Mbembe, the postcolonial state seeks to involve its subject in its constant mise-en-
scène, in order to ratify its own fictions and fables: ‘la polité postcoloniale n’est 
capable de produire des “fables”, d’étourdir ses “cibles” et d’inventer le délire qu’à 
partir du moment où le discours du pouvoir et les formes de sa mise en scène font 
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pénétrer ses cibles jusque dans les territoires du fantastique et de l’hallucination’ 
(93). 
This desire of the state to impose its own meanings and representations in the 
deepest recesses of its subjects’ bodies and minds is described by Mbembe through 
the notion of the fetish. The fetish, according to Mbembe, is first of all a magical 
object which imposes a number of meanings as true and incontestable: 
L’argument de base de cette étude est qu’en postcolonie, le “commandement” entend 
s’instituer sur le mode d’un fétiche. Les signes, les langages et les récits qu’il produit ne 
sont pas seulement destinés à devenir des objets de représentation. Ils prétendent être 
investis d’un surplus de sens qu’il n’est pas permis de discuter, et dont on est interdit de se 
démarquer. (78)  
In addition, Mbembe adds a few pages later that the fetish ‘est, entre autres, un 
objet qui aspire à la sacralisation, qui réclame la puissance et qui cherche à 
entretenir une relation intime et de proximité avec ceux qui le portent’ (86). Thus, 
Mbembe describes the portraits of Paul Biya in Cameroon, which are present not 
only in offices, airports, or torture chambers, but also on items of interior 
decoration or on women’s clothes, as an attempt on the part of the state to invade 
even the most intimate sphere of its subjects’ experience (97). 
But this strategy on the part of the state finds its limits in its own chaos, and in the 
‘indiscipline’ of the governed. According to Mbembe, the instability of the 
postcolony inevitably thwarts any attempt to impose on it a single meaning and 
enables the postcolonized subject to mobilize fluctuating and mobile subject-
positions (83). For instance, the dominated are able to create spaces of 
insubordination in the very ceremonials through which the ruler seeks to ratify his 
domination. Paying particular attention to the ways the official rhetoric of 
dictatorial power is parodied and deformed, sometimes inadvertently, through 
jokes, puns or misunderstandings, Mbembe suggests that the dominated are able to 
perform subversive reinterpretations of the state’s rhetoric, in which the mouth, the 
belly and the phallus are the main points of reference (81). This is illustrated by the 
various examples Mbembe borrows from Comi Toubalor, according to whom, 
under Eyadema, the Togolese ‘chantaient, en sous-main, la brusque érection du 
“gros” et “intordable” phallus présidentiel’, or suggested an echo between the 
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party’s acronym ‘RPT’ and the sound of faecal matter falling into a sceptic tank 
(80). These verbal operations, Mbembe contends, perform a desecration of the 
fetish through parody and obscenity, and force the commandment to contemplate 
its own triviality. 
But this conception of indiscipline, which is inspired by various theories of 
informal politics (especially Michel de Certeau’s arts de faire) fails to constitute a 
real opposition to power. According to Mbembe, the dominated’s own obscene 
imagery ends up reinforcing that of the dictatorial state and remains, in fact, 
trapped within the same aesthetic of vulgarity. The ‘Notes’ thus describe the 
relations between postcolonial power and its subjects as a form of ‘promiscuity’ or 
‘conviviality’:  
Les réseaux d’images et les idiomes évoqués plus haut y sont partagés aussi bien par ceux 
que l’on désigne les dominants que par les “dominés”. Le peuple qui rit sur la place 
publique ou sous cape, dans les “maquis” de la vie privée n’est donc pas forcément en train 
de “rabaisser” le pouvoir, de le “tourner en dérision” ou de “résister”. […] 
En effet, dans son désir d’apparat, le monde populaire peut emprunter des formalités ou 
des langages qui reproduisent et amplifient l’obscénité et les excès officiels. En 
contrepartie, le monde officiel peut mimer la vulgarité populaire au cœur même des 
procédures par lesquelles il prétend s’élever à la majesté. (85) 
This ultimately blurs the analytical boundaries between collaboration and 
resistance, which Mbembe deems inadequate to the task of apprehending the 
postcolony.288 For Mbembe, the subjects of postcolonial power and their dictators 
are united within the same aesthetics, and the dominated ridicule the dictator in the 
very same movement that they ratify the forms and symbols of his self-
representation. This leads to a form of reciprocal paralysis, which Mbembe calls 
‘impouvoir’ or ‘zombification’: 
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C’est précisément cette logique de la familiarité et de la domesticité qui a, pour 
conséquence inattendue, pas forcément la résistance, l’accommodation, le 
“désengagement”, le refus d’être capturé ou l’antagonisme entre les faits et gestes publics 
et les autres “sous maquis”, mais la “zombification” mutuelle des dominants et de ceux 
qu’ils sont supposés dominer. C’est elle qui les conduit à se “déforcer” réciproquement et à 
se bloquer dans la connivence, c’est-à-dire dans l’impouvoir. (78-79) 
*   * 
* 
This representation of the relations between the postcolonial state and its subjects 
raises a number of issues. Indeed, although they may share a common ‘aesthetics’, 
it could be argued that the verbal ‘acts’ of the people and the physical violence of 
dictatorial power do not operate on exactly the same level (especially as the 
dominated are deprived of the kind of authority that would transform their words 
into actions). The failure of verbal resistance to constitute a real danger for the 
dictator may be predetermined by factors other than aesthetic convivality. This 
point was made by Tejumola Olaniyan, among others, who argued that Mbembe’s 
discarding of the dominant/dominated alternative in favour of a ‘horizontal 
relationship of equality in powerlessness’ obfuscates real inequalities of power: 
Mbembe shows how both groups are equally capable of dismembering each other, and he 
sees no difference or incommensurability between the ruled’s rhetorical dismemberment 
of the autocrat and the autocrat’s “reciprocal” corporeal dismemberment of the ruled in 
torture chambers and public execution grounds.
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As Olanyian complains, this apparent incommensurability is not addressed at a 
conceptual level within the text. However, it is skilfully smoothed over by 
Mbembe’s writing, through a series of metaphorical conversions between speeches 
and acts. For instance, ‘le rire ou l’indifférence populaire’ are described as not only 
blasphematory, but also as a ‘dévoration’ of power. This is established by a 
succession of metaphors in which people’s puns are implicitly likened to the 
notions of dislocation and dismembering: ‘Ils [les gens du commun] déboîtent les 
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contraintes du sens officiel et, par le fait même, démembrent parfois à leur propre 
insu, les dieux que tendent à être les autocrates africains’ (my emphasis, 87). The 
equivalence between this metaphorical ‘dévoration’/ ‘démembrement’ and the very 
concrete physical abuse inflicted by postcolonial authorities appears clearly in the 
following sentence: ‘Or, si les gens du commun peuvent – même par inadvertance 
– démembrer les dieux qu’aspirent à être les autocrates africains et les “dévorer”, la 
réciproque est vraie, ainsi que l’atteste ce récit de l’exécution publique de deux 
malfaiteurs au Cameroun…’ (my emphasis, 87). In spite of the quotation marks 
around ‘dévorer’ (which provide a last-minute reminder that the word is used 
figuratively), the sentence establishes a striking ‘reciprocity’ between, on the one 
hand, the symbolic violence of the governed against the symbolical body of the 
ruler and, on the other hand, the physical violence of the postcolonial state against 
the material bodies of the ruled. This is reiterated a few pages later when Mbembe 
describes the ceremonial order of the postcolony and writes: ‘il libère un espace de 
plaisir dans la façon même dont il produit la mort: d’où ces applaudissements 
frénétiques qui, au même titre que les balles, étouffent les cris des condamnés’ (my 
emphasis, 91). Again, in placing the applause of the crowd on the same level as the 
bullets of the executioners, Mbembe fuses together two very different forms of 
violence by playing on the polysemy of ‘étouffer’, which can mean both 
‘smothering’ and ‘muffling’. In other words, the equivalence between the 
dominated’s ambiguous forms of resistance and the state’s physical violence is not 
argued at a conceptual level but performed rhetorically by the text.  
A series of comparable displacements between what could be regarded as the 
conceptual and aesthetic levels of the text can be observed in Mbembe’s 
construction of his object of inquiry, the ‘postcolony’. In the second paragraph, 
Mbembe provides the following definition:  
Quant à la notion de ‘postcolonie’, elle renvoie, simplement, à l’identité propre d’une 
trajectoire historique donnée: celle de sociétés récemment sorties de l’expérience que fut la 
colonisation, celle-ci devant être considérée comme une relation de violence par 
excellence. (76) 
It is significant that the postcolony is defined historically and politically but not in 
spatial terms, as an age rather than a place. In the French version, this spatial 
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indeterminacy is confirmed by the first words of the epigraph, taken from one of 
Sony Labou Tansi’s novels, L’Anté-peuple: ‘... l’Afrique, cette grosse merde où 
tout le monde refuse sa place’.290 The idea of ‘refusing one’s place’ is emblematic 
of the elusiveness that characterizes both the location of the postcolony, and the 
epistemological position of the text. First, Mbembe tells us that Cameroon is going 
to serve as the main ‘point d’appui’ of the discussion. This, as Ato Quayson points 
out, is problematic: ‘how does Cameroon come to occupy this discursive position 
of articulating in and of itself the whole reality of the African anguish?’291 This 
choice could be taken to mean that all African countries are somehow 
interchangeable and that one can be used as a metonymy for the whole continent. 
But in reality, even the status of Cameroon as privileged example is not so clear. 
The English version of On the Postcolony reads ‘the focus of my analysis is 
Cameroon’, but the initial idea of ‘point d’appui’ in French is far less precise, and 
actually difficult to translate, suggesting a somewhat looser link between the 
example and the general argument, in which Cameroon is simply used to support 
the discussion, to facilitate it, but is not really its object. As a matter of fact, it is 
only the second half of the text that focuses on Cameroon, whereas in the first part, 
the examples also come from Togo and Kenya.  
The article is thus constantly hesitating between the generality of the unspecified 
postcolony and series of concrete, punctual, sometimes even anecdotal examples, 
which are supposed to authenticate Mbembe’s description. For instance, the 
sweeping generalization that ‘En postcolonie, le pouvoir de punir […] n’a pas pour 
objectif primordial de fabriquer des individus utiles ou d’accroître leur efficacité 
productive’ is only illustrated by one newspaper article from Kenya (88). This issue 
was raised by many critics. In a review of On the Postcolony, Ato Quayson 
remarked: ‘The first thing to note in this regard is the degree to which the 
discussion of Africa has to oscillate between vast generalizations about politics and 
social forms on the continent and specific case studies grounding these 
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generalizations’.292 In a comment on the English translation of the ‘Notes’ in Public 
Culture, Fernando Coronil expressed similar misgivings: ‘The unconstrained flight 
from fragmentary examples to vast generalizations about the postcolony hinders 
the understanding of commonalities among postcolonial societies as well as of 
differences distinguishing them’, while another critic noted about On the 
Postcolony that ‘[t]he ambitious absence of specificity is at the same time the 
work’s greatest flaw and its best quality’.293 
In fact, the constitution of the postcolony as an object of reflexion relies on a series 
of generalizations, extrapolations, and disproportions, as if the choice of examples 
was more determined by their graphic or narrative power than by concerns for 
representativity or scientific credibility. A particularly disturbing and illustrative 
example of this dynamic can be found in the English version of the text, 
‘Provisional Notes on the Postcolony’, which contains a long quotation relating a 
case of sexual abuse by a primary school teacher: 
The incident took place in the second term of the school year 1989-1990. [Jean-Marie Effa 
had told the girl] to go and wait for him at the school toilets, which the child had done 
without question (everyone knows the control teachers have over children at that age). 
When he got there, the master undressed, put his trousers and pants to one side and his 
penis in her mouth. After a few moments he ejaculated. The child said that a white fluid 
came out. The girl spat it out and made herself vomit.
 294
 
Surprisingly, the origin of this quotation is never mentioned. The passage, which is 
presented as an example of the licentious excesses that pervade the postcolony is 
simply introduced in this way: ‘an example is the story of Mr Jean-Marie Effa, a 
master in the primary school at Biyem-Assi who was convicted of having regularly 
had intercourse with the young girls in his class’, with no footnote or reference, and 
no further clarification concerning the nature of the ‘story’ that is being quoted 
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(legal deposition? Journalistic account? Fiction?)295 It seems that it is actually 
through its crude and shocking character that the example is supposed to impress 
itself upon the reader, rather than as a piece of documentary evidence. This 
impression is reinforced if one pays closer attention to the sentence just before the 
quotation: 
In the postcolony diverse forms of cuissage and rights pertaining to them, the concern to 
reproduce and the overabundant life of the flesh complement one another, even if the 
ecstasy of the organs, the excesses of fine food and drink so characteristic of such an 
economy of pleasure are an integral part of a larger world – the world of Sade.
296
  
In representing the postcolony as being part of ‘a larger world’, which is ‘the world 
of Sade’, this sentence suggests not only that the postcolony oscillates between the 
general and the singular, but that the aesthetic continuities Mbembe traces between 
different spheres of experience also cross the boundary between reality and fiction.  
This is confirmed by another surprising series of examples, which are found 
throughout the text: the fictional countries depicted in Sony Labou Tansi’s novels, 
especially La Vie et demie, Les Yeux du volcan and L’Anté-peuple. There are no 
fewer than nine references to Sony Labou Tansi’s novels in the French article of 
1995, including one epigraph, two long extracts, one footnote, and five quotations 
inserted in the main text. The number of these quotations varies slightly from one 
version to the next, but their abundance remains in all versions.297 This presence 
becomes even more intriguing if one considers the different functions Sony’s 
writings are made to perform in the text. Before the first quotation of his work, 
Sony Labou Tansi is duly introduced as a ‘romancier congolais’, and his writing is 
used to show that a point Mbembe made about Togo – that the verbal and written 
acts of the dominated display an obsession with orifices, odours and genitals – goes 
for other African countries too:  
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L’obsession des orifices, des odeurs et des organes génitaux dominait donc les 
configurations togolaises du rire populaire. Encore qu’elle n’était pas absente des actes 
verbaux ou écrits de dominés d’autres pays d’Afrique noire. A titre d’exemple, et à la 
même époque, le romancier congolais S. Labou Tansi n’avait de cesse de décrire ‘les 
hanches fournies, puissantes, délivrantes’ et ‘le cul essentiel et envoûtant des filles’… (81) 
Here, Mbembe is apparently quoting Sony Labou Tansi as a representative of the 
dominated (as debatable as this might be) and treats his novel as a historical 
source.298 But already in the second quotation, things become more blurry. This 
time, Sony Labou Tansi’s text is inserted in the most casual manner, without 
reference to its literary origin, as if it were a prolongation of Mbembe’s sentence:  
Aussi doit-il [le commandement], en outre, fournir la preuve publique de son prestige et de 
sa gloire par une représentation somptueuse et onéreuse des symboles de son statut, une 
exhibition du luxe dans les domaines de l’habillement et du train de vie, et une 
théâtralisation conséquente de ses actes de prodigalité. Ainsi encore, doit-il procéder 
essentiellement par prélèvements et extorsions (impôts, conscriptions diverses, redevances 
de tous genres, confiscations violentes, ponctions…). Dit S. Labou Tansi, les forces 
spéciales  
“venaient pour ramasser les impôts deux fois par an, ils demandaient l’impôt du corps, 
l’impôt de la terre, l’impôt des enfants, l’impôt de la fidélité au Guide, l’impôt pour l’effort 
de le relance économique, l’impôt des voyages, l’impôt de patriotisme, la taxe de militant, 
la taxe pour la lutte contre l’ignorance, la taxe de conservation des sols, la taxe de chasse” 
(84-85) 
The literary quotation is no longer used as an example of how postcolonial regimes 
have been represented, but as a direct account of how postcolonial rulers actually 
operate. This permeability between fiction and non-fiction may seem all the more 
surprising given that the novel quoted here, La Vie et demie, is a text which 
deliberately eschews the conventions of realism and is strongly inspired by magical 
realism and science fiction.299  
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This proximity between Mbembe’s text and Sony Labou Tansi’s intensifies as the 
text progresses.300 Gradually, the latter’s intrusions are indicated less and less 
clearly: references to the novelist’s works start appearing in the footnotes rather 
than in the main text, and after a while, he is only referred to as ‘le romancier’, 
with no footnotes or explicit references to his name or his novels, as is the case for 
the sentence between quotations marks below:
 
 
Ces corps peuvent tout aussi bien être simplement abandonnés à eux-mêmes, recrutés, 
comme le dit le romancier, “par la bière, les vins, les danses, le tabac, l’amour pissé 
comme on crache, les boissons obscures, les sectes, la palabre – tout ce qui peut empêcher 
d’être la mauvaise conscience des Excellences”. (90)  
Simultaneously, Mbembe starts using increasingly small fragments, which he 
patches within his own sentences, and which are subjected to reconfigurations that 
sometimes ignore the logic and context of Sony Labou Tansi’s original text. For 
instance, Mbembe uses a series of small quotations from La Vie et demie to 
describe the licentiousness of bureaucrats, soldiers and officials in the postcolony: 
‘Il faudrait y ajouter les ministres qui découvrent les vierges sur les lits d’hôtels, les 
prêtres qui viennent culbuter “les culs croupissants” des jeunes filles, et leur 
creusant “un délicieux vide dans le ventre”, leur font “crier le ho-hi-hi-hi final”’ 
(102). The phrases in between the double quotation marks are borrowed from La 
Vie et demie, but this provenance is not indicated in the article. Furthermore, they 
are taken from a very different context: in the novel, they are used in reference to a 
priest named ‘Monsieur l’Abbé’, but far from being an account of the character’s 
dissoluteness, the passage relates his unsuccessful attempt to resist his desire for 
one of the main (adult) female characters, Chaïdana.301 Gradually, Mbembe’s use of 
Sony Labou Tansi seems to evolve toward an ambiguous form of appropriation, in 
which Mbembe privileges the stylistic echoes between Sony’s writing and his own 
text without paying attention to the original context of the novels. The quotations 
of Sony Labou Tansi thus seem to be used to convey a form of knowledge about 
the postcolony which is apparently indissociable from the novelist’s phrasing, but 
simultaneously independent from Sony’s original meaning. 
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*   * 
* 
Mbembe’s text has been widely criticized for these epistemological ambiguities, 
both in its initial reception and in its later republication as part of De la 
postcolonie. For instance, in his critical account of On the Postcolony, Jeremy 
Weate described Mbembe's reflexion as ‘a hybrid amalgam of poststructuralist 
semiotics and existential phenomenology’ and argued that it is so full of 
epistemological equivocations that it becomes impossible to discern ‘a clearly 
defined theoretical position, backed up by any semblance of conceptual 
systematicity’.302 The literary intrusions of Sony Labou Tansi could be understood 
as an instance of this apparent confusion, as suggested by the anthropologist 
Fernando Coronil, who commented on Mbembe’s ‘Notes’ in Public Culture: 
Novels are invoked to lend support to Mbembe’s view of the postcolony, without respect 
for the difference between literary and social-science representational conventions and 
their related, but different, truth claims. Texts seem to float as transparent representations 




Although Coronil raises an important point in underlining the different ‘truth 
claims’ and ‘representational conventions’ that define literature and the social 
sciences, the very anti-realism of Sony Labou Tansi’s writing should make it hard 
to believe that fiction and reality could merely have been confused by Mbembe – 
just as in the argument I quoted earlier, Olanyian’s suggestions that Mbembe 
simply ‘sees no difference or incommensurability’ between symbolic and physical 
violence sounds rather implausible. Mbembe’s own response to Coronil’s critique 
suggests as much: ‘I am reproached for not having made the distinction between 
the novel as fiction and historical reality. There is no question of denying the 
asymmetry between the two. However, one must not proceed as if the two 
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symbolic systems do not contribute to the configuration of reality’.304 Indeed, to do 
justice to Mbembe’s project, these displacements through different forms of 
intelligence and argumentation need to be seen as deliberate. 
This point was rightly underlined by Michael Syrotinski, who argues in 
Deconstruction and the Postcolonial (2007) that ‘we cannot separate the 
conceptual register of Mbembe’s writing, with all of its polemical insights in the 
politics of the African postcolony, from the furiously expressive poetic quality of 
his language’.305 Syrotinski has thus offered an extensive analysis of the close 
intertextual relation between Mbembe and Sony Labou Tansi, which also appears 
in many of Mbembe’s other texts. According to him, ‘Mbembe’s use of Sony […] 
is clearly more than just a literary exemplification or allegory of a socio-political 
reality’, and in fact ‘[Mbembe] seems to aspire, in terms of both subject matter and 
style, to Sony [Labou Tansi]’s writing’.306 Syrotinski goes on to offer a joint 
analysis of Mbembe’s and Sony Labou Tansi’s writings and situates them within a 
similar project, which he terms ‘writing Africa’: 
“Writing Africa” as a radically inventive act is, for both Sony and Mbembe, neither a 
matter of representational adequacy, nor a celebration of artistic and expressive 
transgression as a vehicle for counter-hegemonic political contestation. [...] Mbembe’s 
(and Sony’s) “writing” could thus be said to be deconstructive to the precise extent that it 
reaffirms a radical commitment to the future of postcolonial Africa, at the very moment 
when all else seems lost.
307
 
As the parentheses ‘(and Sony’s)’ suggests, Syrotinski’s argument ends with the 
amalgamation of the two figures of Mbembe and Sony Labou Tansi into a same 
poetic project. This is supported by Syrotinski’s convincing analysis of the 
convergences between the two authors:  
so many of Mbembe’s major themes are dramatized in Sony’s novels […]: the power of 
tyrannical potentates taken to absurd extremes; their literally cannibalistic, even 
omnivorous appetites; the grotesque or carnivalesque nature of government in postcolonial 
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African states, as well as the ultimately futile opposition to this commandement; the 
conviviality of the relations between the dominant and the dominated….
308
  
To this, Syrotinski adds that both authors not only show ‘a shared dissatisfaction 
both with ontologically grounded discourses of authenticity, and with oppositional 
radical politics and their illusory promises of liberation’ but that from a stylistic 
point of view, Mbembe’s writing is also ‘very close, performatively, to Sony’s 
restlessly inventive language’.309  
However, these similarities do not solve our initial problem, namely the 
asymmetrical relation to fictionality in Mbembe’s text and Sony Labou Tansi’s 
novels. Mbembe himself has described his relation to Sony Labou Tansi’s writing 
as a ‘silent wrestling’, suggesting through this metaphor not only their close 
proximity, but also an underlying conflict.310 Mbembe’s ‘Notes’ come dangerously 
close to incorporating Sony Labou Tansi’s universe, which would in turn mean 
getting engulfed in the fictional dimension of the novel. Syrotinski deftly 
circumvents this tension by arguing that ‘As is also the case with Sony, “writing 
Africa” for Mbembe does not take the form of a socio-historical document, nor of a 
rhetorical political statement; neither is it escapist fiction, and even less “self-
referential textualism” that is opposed to “life”’.311 According to Syrotinski, 
Mbembe is instead writing ‘from the perspective of a “half-life” or “half-death” or, 
perhaps, echoing Sony’s preface to La Vie et demie, in “flesh passwords” (“en 
chair-mots-de-passe”), or in “those marks made by life alone” (“ces tâches que la 
vie seulement fait”)’.312 In appropriating Sony Labou Tansi’s poetic phrasing to 
displace the generic alternatives he has just dismissed, Syrotinski extends the play 
of substitutions between the conceptual and the poetic that is performed by 
Mbembe and foregrounds the impossibility of containing Mbembe’s project within 
one or the other of these categories. But this emphasis on the stylistic and thematic 
proximity between Sony Labou Tansi and Mbembe has perhaps led Syrotinski to 
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overlook an important difference between the two texts. Indeed, in spite of the 
destabilization of generic distinctions performed by Mbembe’s text, I will argue 
that these distinctions remain nonetheless crucial to the way the text comes to be 
received and interpreted, and that the ‘Notes’ and Sony’s novels create very 
different forms of reading experience.  
Even if one chooses to emphasize the paradoxical impulse toward referentiality that 
can be created by fiction, one still needs to bear in mind that this impulse emerges 
in relation to a number of generic expectations that are likely to differ from the 
ones that appear in the reading of a text identified as non-fictional. The experience 
of reading tends to exceed the norms and rules that are supposed to define it, but 
the nature of this experience, including its excess, is nonetheless shaped by these 
same norms. Thus, the preface to La Vie et demie that Syrotinski quotes from has 
been much discussed for its play with referentiality, especially in this passage 
which denies its link with Africa’s real situation, perhaps in order to emphasize it 
even further:  
La Vie et Demie devient cette fable qui voit demain avec les yeux d’aujourd’hui. Qu’aucun 
aujourd’hui politique ou humain ne vienne s’y mêler. Cela prêterait à confusion. Le jour où 
me sera donnée l’occasion de parler d’un quelconque aujourd’hui, je ne passerai pas par 
mille chemins, en tout cas pas par un chemin aussi tortueux que la fable.
313
 
But whatever referentiality this passage may be creating or disowning, the 
fictionality of the text is strongly asserted through the mentioning of the ‘fable’, 
and if the novel can be linked to reality, it is only via the uncertainty and irony that 
are created by its positioning as a fiction. This creates a very different set of 
expectations for the reader from the ones that arise from a reading of the ‘Notes’, 
which reproduce the conventions of social sciences, with their footnotes, 
quotations, and theoretical apparatus – elements which are as much part of the 
aesthetics of the text as its ‘poetic’ exuberance, and which suggest a different 
relation to factual truth.  
The initial location of the ‘Notes’ within the field of social sciences is indeed 
central to the experience created by the text. For instance, in his review of De la 
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postcolonie, Marcel Kabasele describes the reading of the book as a process of 
‘bewitchment’, which, according to him, is to be attributed to the aesthetic qualities 
of Mbembe’s writing: ‘Dans son écriture, la phrase se fait art ou, mieux, image et 
magie au point où le texte lui-même finit par participer d'un procès 
d'envoûtement’.314 Kabasele insists on Mbembe’s rupture with ‘positivist social 
sciences’ and on the fact that the text operates at the level of belief rather than 
reason: 
[les lecteurs] se laissent entraîner par l’extraordinaire puissance des mots et oublient 
d’interroger le bien-fondé des arguments de l'auteur. La raison en est que l’écriture de 
Mbembe est en elle-même un art de la représentation. Elle crée à elle seule un monde 
auquel l’on peut choisir de croire ou non. De mon point de vue, en cela réside la puissance 
et l’originalité de cet auteur: sa capacité à sortir le lecteur du champ de la raison pour 
l’installer dans celui de la croyance.
315
 
But if we pay closer attention to Kabasele’s description of this reading experience, 
it appears that the ‘belief’ Mbembe manages to produce is still dialectically linked 
to the modes of scientific discourse it subverts: the notion that the reader ‘forgets’ 
that he should be examining the accuracy of the argument, and the movement from 
belief to reason sketched out in the last sentence (‘sortir du champ de la raison’) 
imply that the experience is not simply a ‘magical’ hallucination performed by the 
text but occurs within a context of interpretation that was originally marked by the 
referential conventions of social science.  
Some sympathetic critics have however attempted to focus on the aesthetic 
qualities of Mbembe’s work and to read it as literature, thereby neutralizing the 
criticisms elicited by its epistemological inconsistencies. For instance, in a review 
of De la postcolonie, the historian Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch refers to Mbembe 
as a writer and a poet, celebrates his ‘superb’ writing, and applauds the fact that in 
the book ‘La langue devient instrument d’analyse’ (an intriguing phrasing that is 
quite revealing of the heterogeneity between language and thought that is 
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presupposed by her argument).316 But this also leads her to downplay the referential 
dimension of De la postcolonie and even to deny that it offers a depiction of the 
reality of Africa: ‘Le texte est lucide et décapant, mais il révèle davantage un état 
d’esprit qu’un constat scientifique. Il instruit au moins autant sur la personnalité de 
l’auteur – déchirée, multiple, insoluble et tragique – que sur l’Afrique’.317 In doing 
so, and in confining the text to the topos of artistic self-expressivity, Coquery-
Vidrovitch deprives Mbembe’s project of a crucial, and constitutive dimension. 
Indeed, Mbembe’s use of fiction and literature differs greatly from the many self-
critical analyses of the social sciences that have explored their ‘literariness’ and 
‘fictionality’ in order to question their own authority and objectivity. This attitude 
was, for instance, famously articulated by James Clifford in Writing Culture: The 
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography in 1986. The collection of essays gathered by 
Clifford analyses the growing prevalence of fiction and self-reflexivity in 
ethnography, and the evolution of the field away from the model of the natural 
sciences.318 The works inspired by this evolution have tried to make visible their 
own determinations, which often translates into a form of self-consciousness and 
the adoption of autobiographical modes of writing – a tendency one also finds at 
work in V.Y. Mudimbe’s reflexion, or in postcolonial theory (Gayatri Spivak being 
the example par excellence).319 For instance, Clifford mentions the growing 
prominence of the ethnologist’s ‘fieldwork account’: 
Variously sophisticated and naïve, confessional and analytic, these accounts provide an 
important forum for the discussion of a wide range of issues, epistemological, existential, 
and political. […] With the “fieldwork account” the rhetoric of experienced objectivity 
yields to that of the autobiography and the ironic self-portrait. The ethnographer, a 
character in a fiction, is at centre stage.
320
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But Mbembe’s text enacts a much more ambivalent strategy. In fact, in his reply to 
the objections made to the ‘Notes’ in Public Culture, Mbembe expressed strong 
misgivings toward these self-critical postures:  
I have been summoned to reveal “from which vantage point” I speak. […] One would have 
thought that this old and tedious preliminary had lost its legitimacy as the excesses caused 
by the “narcissistic turn” (and its corollary, the exaltation of “me”) are now evident. 
Having realized that “savages” exist only in our own fantasies, we are pushed more and 
more by the exoticism of a new genre to treat simultaneously the problems of the object 
and those of the researcher, to renounce an examination of the real, to privilege reversal on 
the self, self-analysis and autobiography.
321
 
The ‘Notes’ are indeed very far from the self-reflexive model sketched out by 
Clifford, as is suggested by the enunciation of Mbembe’s text, which is marked by 
the codes of scientific objectivity and distance: the use of the first person plural and 
the impersonal ‘on’. In creating proximity between his own text and works of 
fiction, Mbembe is not trying to undermine his own claims to truth, but, more 
radically, asking us to consider how fiction can provide new resources in the 
production of knowledge. 
*   * 
* 
As readers of the ‘Notes’ we therefore find ourselves in the face of an apparent 
contradiction. Taking Mbembe’s project seriously necessitates that we maintain a 
certain distinction between literature and social science: for the ‘Notes’ to be 
effective, we must suppose that some texts, including Mbembe’s, are capable of 
referring to realities outside themselves and of producing a knowledge about these 
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realities that can be judged primarily according to its truth value. But if the text 
were read from this perspective, in which social science texts are not just fictions or 
indeterminate pieces of literature, Mbembe’s text would not constitute credible 
scholarship, relying as it does on literary effects and fictional sources. Accordingly, 
a number of readings of Mbembe’s work exhibit a tension, and sometimes even a 
conflict, between several levels of evaluation. For instance, in a discussion of the 
notion of ‘postcolony’, Adebayo Williams expresses his reservations about the 
over-generalizations that underpin the concept in Mbembe’s ‘Notes’: ‘If the hubris 
of postcolonial studies derives from the inflation of a local condition into a cosmic 
paradigm, the very idea of Africa as a massive, monolithic postcolony must be one 
of the comforting illusions of contemporary theories of African cultural, economic, 
and political production’. 322 Yet Williams adds a few lines later that ‘as a trope, the 
postcolony is profoundly illustrative of the African condition in the epoch after the 
cessation of actual colonization’.323 In this distinction between the descriptive and 
metaphorical dimensions of the concept of the postcolony, we find again the 
different levels at which the text asks to be read: a descriptive one and a 
metaphorical one, a scientific one and a literary one. 
A particularly interesting depiction of these contradictions and of the effect they 
may have on the reader’s experience of the text was offered by Ato Quayson, who 
describes the work of Mbembe in On the Postcolony as a ‘conflation of “truths”’:324  
And yet, curiously enough, the generalizations about the place of Africa in the Western 
imaginary, the shape and style of commandement, arbitrariness and the culture of impunity 
all seem, from the perspective of anyone conversant with the scholarly literature on Africa 
by both Africans and Westerners, quite true. But how is this seeming truthfulness 
discursively produced in On the Postcolony itself? Why is it that as a reader, I find myself 
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This passage offers an eloquent testimony to the unsettling effects of Mbembe’s 
writing. Quayson’s prudence and hesitancy (‘curiously enough’, ‘seeming 
truthfulness’), as well as his insistence on the fact that he is an informed reader, 
who reads not only Western but also African literature about Africa, reveal the 
depth of his discomfort. The strange ‘assent’ that Mbembe’s text manages to obtain 
from some of his readers inevitably raises the issue of its relation to reality: how 
can we explain the perceived capacity of the text to describe African realities when 
it breaks most of the rules that are supposed to establish its credibility?  
Quayson’s own hypothesis is that the perplexing ‘truthfulness’ of the text derives 
from a certain ‘familiarity’ in Mbembe’s representation of Africa: ‘the force of this 
persuasiveness lies in the fact that On the Postcolony cannot entirely escape 
reproducing intimations of the familiarity of Africa’.326 Again, the choice of the 
euphemistic phrases ‘intimation of the familiarity of Africa’ (instead of, say, 
‘clichés’) and ‘cannot entirely escape reproducing’ suggests a persistent 
uneasiness. To make his point, Quayson examines the similarities between Hegel’s 
much reviled treatment of the continent, as analysed by Mbembe in Chapter 5 of 
On the Postcolony, and Mbembe’s own description (which, incidentally, is inspired 
by Sony Labou Tansi’s novel Les Sept solitudes de Lorsa Lopez), arguing that ‘it is 
as if the structure of interlocution by which Hegel’s intimations of the familiar are 
taken seriously as a point of refutation ends up producing a mirror image within 
Mbembe’s text itself’.327 This brings us back to the predicament of discursive ‘déjà-
vu’ I first described in Chapter 1, and to Mbembe’s attempt to escape it through the 
invention of a new writing. However, as this last section will show, we have not 
come full circle. If, as Quayson puts it, it is impossible to ‘entirely escape’ these 
previous discourses, Mbembe’s text also suggests the possibility of experiencing 
these repetitions in a different manner. To illustrate this, I will focus on one of the 
central concepts of the ‘Notes’: the fetish. 
A striking aspect of Mbembe’s use of the ‘fetish’ is that it makes virtually no 
reference to the heavy theoretical baggage of the term, or to its previous uses by 
Freud, Marx, Comte, Hegel or the surrealists, to name but a few. Theoretical 
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references regarding the notion are scarce and only appear in footnotes. However, it 
is probably not a coincidence that Mbembe, in order to allegorize the operations of 
the postcolonial state, seized on a concept that has been so overinvested and 
repeatedly transformed. In fact, the concept of the fetish may be considered a prime 
example of the discursive saturation against which Mbembe was initially reacting. 
To understand this, a reading of the issue of the Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse 
Mbembe recommends in one of his footnotes proves helpful. In the first article, 
‘Fétiches sans fétichisme’, Jean Pouillon argues that ‘l’histoire de cette notion est 
celle de malentendus, d’oublis, et de glissements de sens, mais les glissements de 
sens ont aussi un sens’.328 He then traces back the origin of the term to the 
Portuguese fetisso or feitizo and defines it as: ‘le culte des choses inanimées, ou 
plutôt, qui sont, pour nous et en vérité selon nous, inanimées, mais qui sont, pour le 
sauvage et à tort, douées d’une force mystérieuse. Ou encore le fétichisme est la 
négation de l’écart entre l’objet et ce dont il est le véhicule’.329 This definition fits 
well with Mbembe’s idea that the characteristic of the postcolonial state is to 
‘institute’ itself and to impose its own meanings in the bodies and minds of its 
subjects, without tolerating any form of mediation. Pouillon also suggests that the 
notion of fetishism was in large part a projection of the Portuguese colonizers onto 
the practices and cults they were observing, contending that it was a way to 
attribute to the ‘savages’ the very confusion they were afraid of for themselves:  
le catholique portugais qui ne voyait pas de difficulté à affirmer la présence de son dieu 
dans l’hostie sans dire pour autant que ce dieu était l’hostie même, répugnait à prêter au 
‘sauvage’ la même capacité d’abstraction […] Dans cette hypothèse le fétichisme des 
‘nègres’ aurait été surtout celui que les découvreurs chrétiens de l’Afrique, du fait de leurs 
propres croyances, redoutaient inconsciemment pour eux-mêmes. 
330
 
The process of projection and misinterpretation that presided over the constitution 
of fetishism as a concept was explored at length in William Pietz’s series of papers 
on ‘The Problem of the Fetish’, to which Mbembe also refers in his notes.331 Pietz 
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argues that the notion is ‘proper to neither West African nor Christian European 
culture’ but a truly intercultural concept, born from mutual incomprehension and 
heavily influenced by European colonizers’ own anxiety about the issue of 
idolatry.332 According to Pietz, the ‘fetish’ was a ‘middleman’s word’, elaborated in 
the context of the trade relations that European merchants visiting the West coast of 
Africa were trying to establish with Africans. The discrepancy between the 
merchants’ ‘rational’ theory of value and that of Africans was explained by ‘the 
African’s supposed irrational propensity to personify material (...) objects, thereby 
revealing a false understanding of natural causality’ and their supposed ‘attribution 
of causal relation to random association’.333 The structure of fetishism was 
progressively used to explain African societies in general and came to represent the 
very opposite of enlightenment:  
Fetishism thus represented a principle of social order based on an irrational fear of 
supernaturally caused death rather than a rational understanding of the impersonally just 
rule of law. It therefore revealed the true political principle (always supplemented by 
arbitrary despotic violence) that governed all unenlightened societies, since ignorance 
about the workings of physical causality – the very definition of a mentality lacking 
“enlightenment” – provided the ground of religious delusion necessary for this system of 
social obligation to work. As a fundamental principle of both individual mentality and 




If we follow Pietz’s argument, the fetish was therefore crucial in constructing the 
image of Africa as a radically uncivilized and despotic space, and Laura Mulvey 
has even suggested that ‘the concept and discourse of fetishism has itself played an 
important part in justifying the colonization, exploitation and oppression of 
Africa’.335 We need to remember also that the use of the word in later theories, 
notably by Freud or Marx, was a form of ironic gesture, consisting in applying to 
Western societies a concept which had been created to describe the uncivilized and 
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irrational beliefs attributed to African people.336 By reimporting the concept into his 
own depiction of African postcolonial regimes, Mbembe seems to be adding a new 
layer of irony, with extremely ambiguous effects. 
Maybe this could explain, following Quayson’s approach, why Mbembe’s analysis 
‘rings true’: just as the ‘domestication’ of the fetish corresponded to a mutual 
paralysis of the dominated and the dominant in the postcolony, the fetish may also 
be the theoretical point at which Mbembe’s attempt reaches a state of conceptual 
‘conviviality’ with colonial discourses about Africa. Such anxieties concerning 
Mbembe’s potential complicity with (neo-)colonial representations of Africa were 
raised by several commentators, notably Judith Butler, whose review of the ‘Notes’ 
starts with the question of whether Mbembe’s heavy reliance on French theory 
might not constitute a form of intellectual ‘recolonization’: 
can Foucault and Bakhtin be used to describe the postcolonial situation, given that they 
theorize from within the colonial discourse of France and represent what some might see as 
a further expression of colonial hegemony? To use such theory to describe postcoloniality 
may well constitute a recolonization of the postcolony, and ought this to be the direction 
for social and political theory?
337
  
As Michael Syrotinski suggests, such a conflation of French theory with French 
colonialism is questionable (as is the implication that Bakhtin is a French 
theorist).338 Not only does it ignore how a critique of colonialism has explicitly or 
implicitly informed the work of French theorists, but it also reproduces the 
assumption that national or racial identity determines the political meaning of a 
work. However, in her answer to her own question, Butler offers an engaging 
hypothesis by comparing the paradoxical subversions of the postcolonial subject 
described by Mbembe to the operations of the text itself: ‘I would suggest that this 
kind of recapture of power, this subversion in and through ratification, might be 
read as part of Mbembe’s own textual strategies in the “citing” of the French 
theorists, in the reworking and rearticulation of their theoretical apparatus’.339 
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Butler then suggests that Mbembe’s description of the postcolonial subject could be 
used to describe Mbembe’s own theoretical enterprise and quotes the following 
passage of the ‘Notes’ as an illustration:  
faced with this plurality of legitimizing rubrics, institutional forms, rules, arenas, and 
principles of combination, the postcolonial “subject” mobilizes not just a single “identity,” 
but several fluid identities which, by their very nature, must be constantly “revised” in 
order to achieve maximum instrumentality and efficacy as and when required.
340
  
The mobilization of ‘a plurality of legitimizing rubrics’, and the quest for 
‘maximum instrumentality and efficacy’ offer a very apt depiction of Mbembe’s 
own writing and of its ability to situate itself on a multiplicity of epistemological 
levels, not as a way to undermine its own authority, but, on the contrary, as a 
strategy to reinforce its own power of conviction by escaping the constraints of 
each of the discourses from which it borrows. This doubling of the text by itself 
opens the possibility for a translation of the conceptual aspect of the text into an 
analysis of its poetics, and in this perspective, it is not clear any more whether the 
concept of the fetish seeks to represent African realities, or whether this 
representation is used as a way for the text to describe its own strategies, or again if 
it is only meant as a parody of previous representations of Africa. 
Although Butler’s argument regarding the homology between the object described 
in the text and the text’s own construction offers an important key to the ‘Notes’, 
what I would like to consider now is rather how our reading of Mbembe’s text 
could take us beyond the mutually reinforcing alternatives of the parody.341 My 
                                                          
340
 Quoted in Butler, 67-74 (p. 69). This passage does not appear as such in the other versions of the 
text. The version published in Africa and On the Poscolony reads instead: ‘Furthermore, subjects in 
the postcolony have also had to have a marked ability to manage not just a single identity for 
themselves but several, which are flexible enough for them to negotiate as and when required’ 
Mbembe, ‘Provisional Notes on the Postcolony’, 3-37 (p. 5); On the Postcolony, p. 104. 
341
 My argument does not engage directly with Judith Butler’s own discussion of fetishism in 
Mbembe’s text, as it is only marginally relevant to the point I am trying to make. Butler first uses the 
concept to draw attention to the disavowal of the feminine that she regards as central to the 
postcolonial state’s obsession with virility: ‘With or without Freud, however, we can ask whether the 
fetishization of orifices and genital organs can be understood apart from their relation to gender; 
indeed, can the very meaning of defilement be dissociated from feminization?’ Butler, 67-74 (p. 70). 
She later comes back to the notion in order to suggest that a deeper engagement with the colonial 
origins of postcolonial power could more efficiently ‘displace’ the claims of the postcolonial fetish-
state and break with the cycle of contestation/reinstitution that characterizes the relationships between 
the ruler and the ruled: ‘if the vulgarizing of the law does not displace it, but happens in the course of 
its re-fetishization and re-enhancement (...), it may be that we might displace the fetish through some 
165 
 
contention is that there is yet another possible interpretation of the fetish, one that 
would not place the emphasis on what the text reproduces or refutes, but on the 
experience it creates. At this point, I would like to come back not to Quayson’s 
argument, but to his hesitation. The paradoxical nature of his question, ‘Why is it 
that as a reader, I find myself assenting without question, even while sensing that 
some of the assertions could well be refuted?’, is reinforced by the apparent self-
contradiction that consists in questioning one’s own incapacity to question. This 
may remind us of the ‘I know, but all the same...’ that is often used to describe the 
mental process of the fetishist in Freudian theory.342 This echo is worth signalling if 
we consider its implications for the opposition between knowledge and belief that 
founds the colonial idea of the fetish. In Fetishism and Curiosity, Laura Mulvey 
deconstructs this opposition and describes how her inquiry has led her to evolve 
from a conception of the fetish ‘as a psychological and social structure that 
disavowed knowledge in favour of belief’, to a new understanding of the notion as 
a structure that ‘can maintain knowledge and belief simultaneously’.343 According 
to Mulvey, ‘The fetish object acts as a “sign”, in that it substitutes for the thing 
thought to be missing, the maternal penis’ and therefore also ‘functions as a mask, 
covering over and disavowing the traumatic sight of absence’.344 But Mulvey points 
out that this disavowal is always incomplete, because the fetish simultaneously 
contains a knowledge of the sexual difference it seeks to hide: ‘The fetish object 
also commemorates. It is a sign left by the original moment of castration anxiety 
and is also a mark of mourning for the lost object. The fetish as sign includes, 
therefore, even in its fixated belief in the female penis, a residual knowledge of its 
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origin’.345 A comparable coexistence of belief and knowledge, of which Quayson 
provides a telling example, is central to the contradictory experience created by 
Mbembe’s text, in which the referentiality of the non-literary text and the 
‘suspension of disbelief’ demanded by fiction constantly intersect. Mbembe’s text 
is not just an endorsement or a parody of the colonial concept of the fetish: in 
creating the possibility for the reader of experiencing simultaneously what are 
usually understood as opposite modes of cognition, Mbembe disrupts the 
hierarchical opposition between (rational) knowledge and (fetishist) belief, which, 
according to Pouillon and Pietz, presided over the colonial elaboration of the fetish. 
Crucially, this destabilization is not found within the internal structures of the text. 
It is only activated in the process of reading, and it is only through the interpretive 
difficulties experienced by the reader that the porosity between knowledge and 
belief comes to be revealed. Instead of espousing Mbembe’s mystical celebration 
of the transformative power of metaphorical and poetic writing, my own analysis of 
the aesthetics of the ‘Notes’ has emphasized that these transformations happen at 
the intersection between the world represented in the text and the world of the 
reader, and that the relations between them are inescapably mediated by generic 
and disciplinary conventions, even (in fact, especially) in the case of a text that 
subverts these conventions. Thus, in reading Mbembe’s text, we can catch a 
glimpse of connections and articulations which exceed the usual categories through 
which we usually link our world and its representations. But paradoxically, this 
transcendence is itself produced by the persistence, in the reader’s mind, of the 
categorical distinctions it disrupts, between fiction and non-fiction, or literature and 
the social sciences. In his recent essay Sortir l’Afrique de la grande nuit, Mbembe 
suggests that African fiction offers a privileged medium of inquiry to retrieve a 
truth about Africa that still lies beyond the reality of violence. But this truth, 
Mbembe writes, ‘has lost its name’, which needs to be found again: ‘C’est 
également cette ruine [Africa’s ‘originary ruin’] que la littérature portera à la 
fiction, arguant du fait qu’une vérité demeure au-delà de la violence, même si cette 
vérité a perdu son nom. Et c’est ce nom qu’il faut retrouver’.346 In the end, perhaps 
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Mbembe’s text should be understood as an invitation to experience, through the 
practice of reading, what this knowledge of Africa would feel like, if its name 
could be found, if we managed to escape the conceptual impasses of colonialist and 
Afrocentrist discourses, in order to invent a new institution, which would not 
conflate literature and the social sciences, but emerge from what has been both 







In her famous 1975 essay ‘Fascinating Fascism’, Susan Sontag denounced the 
pervasive influence in contemporary American culture of what she described as 
‘fascist aesthetics’. Taking as her starting point a recently published photography 
book by Leni Riefenstahl, The Last of the Nuba, Sontag offered an exacting 
examination of what constituted for her not only the formal and thematic continuities 
of Riefenstahl’s output throughout her career, but also the continuities between her 
art and her involvement with Nazism. Building on these points, Sontag argued for the 
existence of a fascist aesthetic which, according to her, appeared not only in 
Riefenstahl’s most famous propaganda ‘documentaries’, Triumph of the Will and 
Olympia, but also in her early mountain films and later photographic work, as well as 
in a number of contemporary cultural manifestations and sexual practices, such as 
gay sado-masochism.347 Fascist aesthetics, according to her essay, include a number 
of privileged themes (e.g. ‘situations of control, submissive behaviour, extravagant 
effort, and the endurance of pain’), figures and motifs (‘the massing of groups of 
people; the turning of people into things; the multiplication or replication of things; 
and the grouping of people/things around an all-powerful, hypnotic leader-figure or 
force’), but also formal features, such as the alternation ‘between ceaseless motion 
and a congealed, static, “virile” posing’. The combination of these elements, Sontag 
contended, serves a distinctively fascist ideology as it ‘glorifies surrender, [...] exalts 
mindlessness, [...] glamorizes death’.348 
This assimilation of the aesthetics of Riefenstahl’s films to Nazi ideology constitutes 
quite obviously a refusal of the notion of aesthetic autonomy: according to Sontag, 
the very conception of a film like Triumph of the Will ‘negates the possibility of the 
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filmmaker’s having an aesthetic conception independent of propaganda’.349 In her 
analysis, aesthetics and the notion of aesthetic autonomy become a repository of 
political values and even a particularly insidious vector of ideological contamination, 
as they facilitate and even legitimate the circulation of fascist propaganda. This leads 
her to condemn in very harsh terms various attempts to rehabilitate Riefenstahl’s 
work, which, according to her ‘do not augur well for the keenness of current abilities 
to detect the fascist longings in our midst’350 – although one may wonder about the 
keenness of Sontag’s own abilities, since she admits a few pages earlier that ‘if the 
book were not signed by Riefenstahl, one would not necessarily suspect that these 
photographs had been taken by the most interesting, talented, and effective artist of 
the Nazi era’.351 ‘Fascinating Fascism’ thus stages an opposition between Sontag’s 
own political interpretation of Riefenstahl’s films and another position, attributed to 
‘the most influential voices in the avant-garde film establishment’, which seeks to 
rehabilitate Riefenstahl in the name of aesthetics. For Sontag, any contention that 
Riefenstahl ‘was always a beauty freak rather than a horrid propagandist’ is in bad 
faith and irresponsible.352  
This controversial argument was actually Sontag’s second attempt to engage with 
Riefenstahl.353 Her book Against Interpretation already included a few paragraphs on 
the topic and, crucially, in these pages, Sontag defended the exact opposite of her 
1975 position. Sontag’s early discussion of Riefenstahl appeared in an essay entitled 
‘On Style’ (1964), which offered a particularly bold argument for the complete 
autonomy of the work of art, and contended that art should only be appraised 
according to its aesthetic value. The main point of the essay was to condemn what 
Sontag perceived as a persistent duality between style and content in the practice of 
art criticism, on the grounds that in talking about the ‘style’ of a work of art, one 
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cannot avoid implying ‘that style is merely decorative, accessory’.354 By contrast, 
Sontag defended the radical position that subject-matter is itself a stylistic 
convention, and that its function in art should be interpreted as purely formal: ‘In art, 
“content” is, as it were, the pretext, the goal, the lure which engages consciousness in 
essentially formal processes of transformation’.355 Riefenstahl was then bravely 
invoked as an illustration of this argument: ‘To call Leni Riefenstahl’s The Triumph 
of the Will and The Olympiad [sic] masterpieces is not to gloss over Nazi propaganda 
with aesthetic lenience’, Sontag wrote, because ‘Through Riefenstahl’s genius as a 
film-maker, the “content” has – let us even assume, against her intentions – come to 
play a purely formal role’.356 
The contrast between these two positions is made even more striking by the fact that 
the texts seem to respond to each other, even though ‘Fascinating Fascism’ never 
acknowledges Sontag’s previous argument. For instance, her assertion in 
‘Fascinating Fascism’ that ‘it is dishonest as well as tautological to say that one is 
affected by Triumph of the Will and Olympia only because they were made by a 
filmmaker of genius’357 sounds like a direct rebuke to the sentence from Against 
Interpretation that I have just quoted: ‘Through Riefenstahl’s genius as a film-maker, 
the “content” has – let us even assume, against her intentions – come to play a purely 
formal role’. Comparably, in the first essay, Sontag warned: ‘The Nazi propaganda is 
there. But something else is there, too, which we reject at our loss’.358 The burden of 
that loss on the argument of ‘Fascinating Fascism’ becomes all too obvious when, 
while admitting that ‘Triumph of the Will and Olympia are undoubtedly superb 
films’, Sontag attempts to argue in the same paragraph that in spite of being ‘the 
greatest documentaries ever made’, they ‘are not really important in the history of 
cinema as an art form’.359 This puzzling turnaround was pointed out by Hilton 
Kramer in The New York Times, who described ‘Fascinating Fascism’ as ‘one of the 
most important inquiries into the relation of aesthetics to ideology we have had in 
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many years’, before adding that ‘the only really troubling aspect of its publication – 
so welcome in every other respect – is the author’s refusal to acknowledge her own 
contribution to a phenomenon she now vehemently deplores’.360 
Sontag’s conflicting positions provide a good illustration for the two extremes 
between which my thesis has tried to navigate. The argument of Against 
Interpretation embraces a type of aestheticism that many politically committed 
critics would probably find not only irresponsible but actually untenable, while the 
argument defended in ‘Fascinating Fascism’, with its categorical insistence on the 
priority of political judgement over aesthetic appreciation, bears some similarities to 
the apparent privileging of political issues that characterizes a number of politicized 
approaches, such as postcolonial criticism. In the preceding chapters, my own 
response to this apparent dilemma has consisted in producing a series of readings that 
highlight the mutual embeddedness of the political and the aesthetic, emphasizing 
that aesthetic interpretations are situated within wider social and political contexts, 
and sometimes feed on the meanings and interpretations that they are supposed to 
transcend. This approach has revealed too how ethical or political judgments on art 
and literature are themselves shaped by aesthetic factors.  
Throughout the thesis, I have adopted a rather sceptical stance towards the political 
import of critical interpretations, even when they are concerned with a theme as 
obviously political as dictatorship. I have suggested, after a number of recent 
interventions in the field, that one of the main challenges for the practice of 
postcolonial criticism is to rethink the articulation of its political and aesthetic 
concerns in more realistic terms. These issues were central to my discussion of Henri 
Lopes in Chapter 1, which laid out some of the contradictions and paradoxes that 
emerge from this mutual embeddedness of the aesthetic and the political. I explored 
these issues in the light of the particular context of postcolonial African dictatorships, 
focusing on the difficulty of finding new forms of thought and expression in a 
situation where both colonial and anticolonial discourses have been recuperated by 
oppressive regimes. This chapter drew an opposition between, on the one hand, an 
interpretation of the politics of Lopes’s text based on textual evidence – in this 
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instance, a reading which would attribute to its irony and distance vis-à-vis political 
commitment a liberating value in relation to the discursive deadlock I just mentioned 
– and, on the other hand, an examination of the actual political and biographical 
context of the text, in which this irony could take on a somewhat different meaning. 
However, I suggested that this contradiction could not be easily solved by restricting 
our inquiries either to the aesthetic aspects of the text or to its political significance, 
not only because the impulse towards extra-textual realities is crucial to the interest 
we take in many literary texts, but also because our reasons for discussing the politics 
of texts or their ideological effects derive from our pre-existing interest in these texts 
as aesthetic objects. 
The following two chapters took this paradox further by showing how in practice, 
formal and political interpretations are constantly and inevitably intermingled in the 
way we interpret texts or films, even when we think that we are actually privileging 
either aesthetic or political/ethical readings. Thus, by analysing Chinua Achebe’s 
Anthills of the Savannah in relation to the model of the ‘roman à thèse’ defined by 
Susan Suleiman, the second chapter highlighted how the ‘literary’ aesthetics of the 
text emerge precisely in the attempt to discern an explicit political message within it. 
Thus a broadly ‘modernist’ aesthetics that insists on polysemy, multiple meanings 
and ambiguity can only exist in opposition to a hypothetically straightforward and 
non-literary mode of interpretation, with which the text is implicitly compared, and 
to which it ‘resists’. This, I suggested, complicates the opposition between political 
commitment and literariness which has often polarized discussions of African 
literature. Conversely, my examination of filmic representations of Idi Amin in the 
third chapter highlighted the tortuous ways in which apparently non-aesthetic 
judgments, such as political or ethical evaluations of films in which the question of 
historical accuracy seems especially pressing, are in fact inescapably influenced by 
aesthetic and generic conventions. I showed that the manner in which 
ethical/political responsibilities are often set against ‘aestheticization’ in discussions 
of violent political realities such as dictatorship is itself deeply entangled in 
historically and culturally produced aesthetic conventions.  
In the course of my discussion, and particularly in the last two chapters, I have 
placed increasing emphasis on the notion of experience. My use of the notion is not 
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meant to create an opposition between, on the one hand, a supposedly ‘spontaneous’ 
or ‘commonsensical’ apprehension of texts, and on the other, a theoretical and 
intellectualized one, or between the ‘ordinary’ reader and the critic. On the contrary, 
the experiences I have discussed, and which have often been teased out of works of 
criticism, are immersed within complex processes of interpretation, and enabled by 
socially produced conventions and modes of perception. This appeared clearly in the 
last chapter, where my discussion of Achille Mbembe’s ‘Notes on the Postcolony’ 
centred on how the complex aesthetics of the text induce a hesitation between an 
interpretation of the article as social science and an interpretation of it as literature, 
thereby troubling our perception of its referentiality and factualness. This last chapter 
attempted to foreground the productivity of the entanglements I have been 
examining, by showing how this hesitation between different modes of attention 
could produce new forms of knowledge. I also suggested that this might provide us 
with a way out of the alternative, described in the first chapter, between an account 
of postcolonial dictatorships that reproduces colonial notions of Africa as a despotic 
and violence place, and one that would fail to acknowledge that the emergence of 
these regimes calls into question the relevance of anticolonial and nationalist 
discourses. By situating the knowledge produced by Mbembe’s text in the mixed 
experience of the reader, I have abstained from answering the question of its actual 
truthfulness or credibility, while simultaneously emphasizing the centrality of these 
concerns to the way we make sense of it. In doing so, I have thus displaced the initial 
alternative between, on the one hand, a reading that would simply judge the text on 
its accuracy or factualness and, on the other hand, a reading that would dismiss these 
considerations as irrelevant in the light of its aesthetic and literary qualities. Instead, I 
have focused on the way these two possibilities constantly intersect in the reading 
experience, in ways that are themselves conducive to meaning.  
A similar displacement is also crucial to the way I have sought to re-articulate the 
dilemma I described in the Introduction, when I talked about postcolonial critics’ 
difficulties in combining and reconciling their political and aesthetic concerns. 
Instead of mounting a case for or against the aesthetic, my arguments have suggested 
that it needs to be accepted as a constitutive part of the way films and literature are 
experienced and as essential not only to postcolonial criticism, but to literary/cultural 
174 
 
criticism more generally. One may share Bourdieu’s distrust of the rhetoric of 
‘unknowability’ and transcendence which has often been associated with aesthetic 
experience and has sometimes prevented the exploration of its conditions of 
possibility. One may accept that aesthetic experiences are neither universal nor 
natural, but shaped by ‘the social conditions of the production (or the invention) and 
of the reproduction (or the inculcation) of dispositions and classificatory schemas 
which are activated in artistic perception’.361 However, acknowledging the 
constructedness of our aesthetic experiences does not imply that they are not real; 
quite the contrary. Thus, even if we agree with, say, Terry Eagleton that the aesthetic 
is an ideology which, by valorizing the notions of autonomy and self-determination, 
‘provides the middle class with just the ideological model of subjectivity it requires 
for its material operations’, the aesthetic is only able to perform these functions 
because it simultaneously appropriates and influences actual experiences.362 These 
experiences may differ from the discourses that are usually used to conceptualize 
them; in particular, they may never be ‘pure’ of other interests (although the currency 
of this notion of purity necessarily has an influence on them); they nonetheless exist. 
Thus, in the case at hand, although it is very unlikely that in reading texts about 
African dictatorship, our attention will be fixed solely, or even primarily, on their 
‘formal features’, our experience of these texts is nonetheless inextricably tied to the 
peculiar status ascribed historically and socially to those features.  
Another implication of this approach is that I do not think one needs to endorse the 
classic discourses about the aesthetic in order to examine aesthetic experiences. In 
her book Contingencies of Values, Barbara Herrnstein-Smith suggested that the 
dominant conception of the aesthetic supposes a series of mutual definitions, in 
which ‘aesthetic’ refers simultaneously to the experiences elicited by works of art, to 
a class of objects which are identified as ‘art’ on the basis of their ability to create 
aesthetic experiences, and to a series of properties and qualities of these objects 
(typically, their ‘form’) that are said to be particularly conducive to aesthetic 
experiences:  
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following Baumgarten and early nineteenth-century usage as influenced by Kant, it 
[‘aesthetic’] can [...] indicate a certain type of cognitive activity and/or sensory experience, 
specifically the type elicited by artworks either uniquely or among other things. At the same 
time, it can indicate a certain type of property of any object: specifically, the type of “purely 
formal” property which, according to Kant’s analysis, uniquely elicits the sorts of experience 
which, if all else is in order, constitute genuine judgment of taste. A combination or 
conflation of these [...] senses issues in the familiar recursive use of the term to name certain 
types of experience and certain types of objects and certain types of properties of objects, so 
that “aesthetic” comes to be roughly equivalent to “relating to certain cognitive/sensory 
experiences, these being the ones elicited by objects that have certain formal properties, these 
being the ones that identify objects as artworks, these being the kinds of work that elicit 
certain cognitive/sensory experiences, these being...,” and so forth around again.
363
 
In Herrnstein-Smith’s argument, this definition is inscribed within a critique of the 
discourse of aesthetic value, and its circularity invoked as proof of the inanity of 
traditional aesthetic claims (she describes her account as ‘a parody, but not by 
much’).364 Yet, whatever judgement one chooses to pass on it, I would argue that the 
circularity Herrnstein-Smith emphasizes is nonetheless central to the way the 
aesthetic is commonly understood and indeed experienced.365 Her account highlights 
what I consider a crucial dimension of the aesthetic experience: that the different 
poles of the aesthetic are closely linked to each other through a complex dialectic 
between subjective (but socially produced) modes of perception on the one hand, and 
characteristics of the artistic object or literary text on the other hand. What emerges 
from this, regardless of the consistency of the theories that are derided in this 
passage, is that at the level of experience, the aesthetic is neither an ‘essential’ 
property of the work of art, nor simply ‘constructed’ by the viewer or reader, but is 
both the product of a subjective response (informed by existing conventions and 
theories regarding art and literature) and a reaction to certain features of the object or 
text.366  
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Such a focus on the experiential dimension of the aesthetic may help us move 
beyond what constitutes one of the most problematic aspects of the notion, namely 
the universalism that is often associated with it, and particularly with the Kantian 
conception of the judgment of taste.367 As discussed in Chapter 3, in highlighting the 
situatedness of aesthetic experiences, I have emphasized that they will differ 
according to the historical, cultural or social background of the viewer or reader. It 
follows that the experiences depicted in this thesis are not necessarily representative 
of those of all readers or viewers. However, this situatedness and, more precisely, the 
conventional and social inscription of the aesthetic also implies, as I have already 
indicated, that these experiences are not purely subjective, and consequently, that a 
degree of generalization is actually possible from these specific, individual examples. 
Although the reluctance of critics, and particularly of postcolonial critics, to consider 
their own experiences as representative is often inspired by an eagerness to dissociate 
themselves from claims to universalism, it is on some level inconsistent with the idea 
that these experiences are not transcendent and universal, but shaped by institutional 
and social factors. Admittedly, as Rita Felski suggests in a recent discussion of the 
reading experience, the professional ‘readings’ of critics are subject to a vast number 
of constraints which do set them apart from other readers:  
the use of the term “reading” in literary studies to encompass quite disparate activities, from 
turning the page of a paperback novel to elaborate exegeses published in PMLA, glosses over 
their many differences. The latter reading constitutes a writing, a public performance subject 
to a host of gate-keeping practices and professional norms: a premium on novelty and deft 
displays of counter-intuitive interpretive ingenuity, the obligation to reference key scholars in 
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Nonetheless, as Felski notes, academic and non-scholarly interpretations, beyond 
their differences, ‘share certain affective and cognitive parameters’.369 Critics and 
non-critics alike read in ways that are shaped by cultural assumptions, generic norms, 
or aesthetic conventions, and not all these assumptions, norms and conventions will 
be limited to a given professional circle, or even to a specific cultural area.370  
Using a variety of examples, I have therefore argued for the importance of 
integrating a complex and realistic notion of experience into critical discourse, 
particularly when it wishes to discuss the political implications of texts. Again, 
Sontag’s hesitation over Leni Riefenstahl provides a good illustration of what is at 
stake. In spite of the radically opposed priorities they establish between political and 
aesthetic concerns, Sontag’s two texts share common ground: both constitute (each 
in its own excessive manner) an attempt to evade the mixed and complex aesthetic 
experience elicited by Riefenstahl’s films. In Sontag’s earlier defence of Riefenstahl, 
this experience is described in the following terms: ‘we find ourselves – to be sure, 
rather uncomfortably – seeing “Hitler” and not Hitler, the “1936 Olympics” and not 
the 1936 Olympics’.371 The bracketing of Hitler and the 1936 Olympics by quotation 
marks represents graphically the process of detachment from the world that the 
exercise of aesthetic contemplation demands in Sontag’s formalist argument, 
suggesting that Riefenstahl’s ‘genius’ should insulate the representation from its 
referent in the real world. But then, one might ask, why are we ‘to be sure, rather 
uncomfortable’? This admission, made in passing, suggests that the quotation marks 
may not suffice to protect us against our own referential impulses. Thus, throughout 
her essay, Sontag’s argument comes up against its own impossibility. In her 
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description, a truly aesthetic experience necessitates the repression of a variety of 
concerns of a cognitive, sensual, or moral order, while the reaction she advocates 
must be ‘detached, restful, contemplative, emotionally free, beyond indignation and 
approval’.372 But in each of her attempts at conveying this experience, the repressed 
impulse toward reality and extra-aesthetic judgments still lingers: ‘Approving or 
disapproving morally of what a work of art “says” is just as extraneous as becoming 
sexually excited by a work of art. (Both are, of course, very common)’.373 This 
‘impurity’ of the aesthetic experience which, in the 1964 text, is evacuated as a 
failure on the part of the spectator (albeit an inevitable one), becomes, in ‘Fascinating 
Fascism’, the main ground on which the films and their defenders are condemned:  
The ironies of pop sophistication make for a way of looking at Riefenstahl’s work in which 
not only its formal beauty but its political fervour are viewed as a form of aesthetic excess. 
And alongside this detached appreciation of Riefenstahl is a response, whether conscious or 
unconscious, to the subject itself, which gives the work its power.
374
  
The referential movement that was downplayed in the first text is this time openly 
denounced as the hidden source of the work’s aesthetic appeal, and the incapacity of 
the spectator to attain the ideal of ‘detached appreciation’ leads Sontag to refuse 
outright the possibility that the viewer might escape the effects of the films’ 
propaganda.  
What emerges from the juxtaposition of Sontag's two texts is that beyond their 
different appreciation of the hierarchy between politics and aesthetics, both are 
haunted by a discrepancy between the actual experience of watching Riefenstahl’s 
films, and a conception that defines the aesthetic as pure detachment and enjoyment 
of form. This is explicitly acknowledged in the 1964 essay, where Sontag writes: ‘Of 
course, we never have a purely aesthetic response to works of art’.375 But maybe this 
opposition between an imaginary, apparently unreachable, ‘purity’ of the aesthetic 
and the constant ‘failure’ of our actual reactions conceals what might otherwise be 
quite obvious: that this ‘impurity’, since it is inseparable from the ‘aesthetic’ 
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experience, must in fact be part of it. It seems undeniable to me that if we enjoy 
watching Triumph of the Will, we are also enjoying something else, which has to do 
with the subject it represents, and with the negative fascination it may exert. 
However, it is one thing to admit that in responding to the film’s aesthetics we also 
respond to ‘the subject itself’, or that ‘Hitler’ necessarily directs us towards Hitler, 
and quite another to identify what the relation between them actually is and what 
effects it may have.  
It is precisely in relation to such issues that the work of criticism can make a 
distinctive contribution, by offering us a better understanding of the nature of our 
aesthetic experiences, and of the different, even incommensurable, investments that 
we place in them. Although I have expressed scepticism towards Sontag’s moralizing 
stance, I am not arguing that we should simply give in to the potential confusion that 
sometimes characterizes these experiences. On the contrary, the role of criticism is to 
offer new insights into the various assumptions and conventions that shape our 
experiences, sometimes to question our intuitions and impulses, but also to highlight, 
as I tried to do in the last chapter, how they can provide us with new forms of 
understanding. What can be achieved by focusing on these issues may always sound 
secondary, if not irrelevant, compared to the urgency of the various predicaments 
that are often depicted in postcolonial texts – although, after focusing on dictatorship, 
one may perhaps feel more inclined to value the idea that not all experiences and 
activities need to be justified politically. Ultimately, what critics need to reengage 
with is the value of the aesthetic experience itself, and this, as I have suggested, 
cannot be adequately conceptualized either in terms of political usefulness or of 
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